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INSOLVENCY IN THE '80's
1980 was a particular gloomy year for the savings and loan industry.
The combination of high interest rates paid on deposits and low interest
rates from outstanding mortgages has lead to predictions of widespread
financial ruin in the industry. As the economy continues to falter, many
institutions are faced with the possibility of becoming insolvent, likely resulting in merger or the appointment of receiver. The latter event is the
focus of this project.
All the states and the federal government have established procedures
under which a receiver may be appointed to take over the assets of an
insolvent savings and loan association. Usually, the appointment of a receiver results from a summary adjudication by a government agency that
the association's assets are in jeopardy. This project will focus on the legal
ramifications of the appointment of a receiver. Several important questions
are addressed: What are the procedures for the appointment of a receiver?
What factors are considered in making this decision? What rights does the
association have during the administration process? What is the scope of
judicial review of the decision? What other remedies do the officers, shareholders and depositors have?
Lack of pertinent authority makes many of these questions difficult to
answer. Nevertheless, some preliminary conclusions can be drawn. A savings and loan association has little or no chance of overturning an administrative decision to appoint a receiver, provided that there is some rational
basis for the decision. Courts generally allow the supervisory agency a great
deal of latitude in taking such steps as the agency deems necessary to protect
the assets of the association. Constitutional objections to the summary
nature of such proceedings are not likely to succeed. In fact, the only remedy
may be for the failure to protect adequately the assets of an insolvent savings
and loan association. Some courts have held a state liable for the negligent
supervision of an insolvent savings and loan association.
This project is divided into five parts. Part I examines the federal
statutory scheme for the supervision of federally-chartered savings and loans.
The provisions of 12 U.S.C. § 1464 are examined closely to determine the
extent of the power of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board to appoint
a receiver. The due process implications of this process are examined in
light of the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Fahey v. Mallonee.
Finally, the question of the scope of judicial review of the Board's decision
is examined. Whether the association is entitled to a review de novo is a
question which could play a significant role in litigation in this area in
the future.
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1982
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Part II compliments the discussion of Part I with an examination of
the recent decision of Washington Federal Savings and Loan Association v.
Federal Home Loan Bank Board. In this case, the officers of the association
challenged the Board's decision to appoint a receiver and merge the association. The Federal District Court in Cleveland, Ohio, upheld the appointment. This case represents the first challenge to a receivership proceeding
in many years.
Part III examines the issues in terms of the states' supervision of savings and loan associations. The same questions that arise in the federal area
are addressed here. The statutory scheme in Ohio is used as a starting point
for the analysis. As is the case in the federal area, the small amount of
precedent indicates that associations have little or no recourse from the
appointment of a receiver.
Part IV represents an exploration of a different area of the supervision of the savings and loan industry. Six states, including Ohio, have
organized deposit guarantee funds to protect the depositors of savings and
loan associations. These funds represent important alternatives to the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation. This part examines the statuory framework of these funds (in conjunction with Professor Ronald Alexander's article on the Ohio Deposit Guarantee Fund, found elsewhere in this
issue) and discusses the question of whether such funds are agencies of the respective states for purpose of compliance the states' Administrative Procedure Act.
Part V concludes the project by analyzing whether a state might be
liable to the shareholders or depositors for the negligent supervision of an
insolvent savings and loan association. Two cases which have found such
liability are examined in depth. Finally, the Ohio Court of Claims Act is
analyzed to determine whether such action is possible in Ohio.
The following students participated in this project:
HOWARD S. ESSNER: Coordinator
BRUCE
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FEDERAL SUPERVISION OF SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS

HE FEDERAL HOME LOAN BANK SYSTEM is a three-tiered network com-

posed of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board," the twelve regional
Federal Home Loan Banks,2 and their member institutions which include
federally chartered savings and loan associations.' This article will focus
on the member savings and loan associations' and more particularly on the
procedures by which such an association can be placed into conservatorship

or receivership.
After a review of the relevant statutory material, this article will explore the due process aspects of such procedures and the judicial review
available. Obviously, an action to place a given savings and loan institution
into receivership will give rise to many other complex and perplexing issues,
depending on the particular facts of the case.' This article will not attempt
to deal with issues of that sort, but will provide an overview of the due
process considerations any such action will give rise to.
A.

The Statutory Framework
The relevant federal law in this area is found in the Home Owners'
Loan Act of 19331 and the National Housing Act 7 both set forth in title
12 of the United States Code. Of primary importance is section 1464
(d) (6) (A) which reads in part as follows:
The grounds for the appointment of a conservator or receiver for an
association shall be one or more of the following: (i) insolvency in
that the assets of the association are less than its obligations to its
creditors and others, including its members; (ii) substantial dissipation
of assets or earnings due to any violation or violations of law, rules,
or regulations, or to any unsafe or unsound practice or practices; (iii)
an unsafe or unsound condition to transact business; (iv) willful violation of a cease-and-desist order which has become final;8 (v) concealment of books, papers, records, or assets of the association or refusal
to submit books, papers, records, or affairs of the association for inspection to any examiner or to any lawful agent of the Board."
1 12 U.S.C. § 1437 (1976).

212 U.S.C. § 1423 (1976).
3 12 U.S.C. § 1424 (1976).
4

For a discussion of the similar issues faced by a district bank in this position, see, Fahey v.

O'Melveny & Myers, 200 F.2d 420 (9th Cir.
5 The recent case of Washington Fed. Say.
(ND. Ohio 1981) illustrates this point. The
counts, ranging from "estoppel" to improper

1952).
& Loan Ass'n v. FHLLB, 526 F. Supp. 343
activity of the Board was challenged upon ten
rule-making.

6 12 U.S.C. §§ 1461-1470 (;976).

T 12 U.S.C. § 1701-1750 (1976).
'See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1464(d)(2), (3), and (4) (1976).
9 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(6)(B) also authorizes the appointment of a conservator or receiver

wben the association consents to it,
an association isremoved from membership in
a federal home loan bank, or whenwhen
the association loses itsinsured status under -the
Federal
Savings and Loan Insurance
Corporation.
Published
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In implementing these provisions the Board is given "exclusive power
and jurisdiction" to decide whether to appoint a conservator or receiver, and
may act when in its "opinion" one or more of the above stated grounds
exist."0 The statute expressly permits the Board to make such an appointment "ex parte and without notice" to the association."' When appointed, a
conservator receives all the powers possessed by the members, directors,
and officers of the association.12 In addition, it is granted the authority to
operate the association in its own name or to conserve the association's
assets, provided such authority is exercised within the standards established
by the Board.' These standards are found in the regulations promulgated
by the Board pursuant to section 1464(d)(11).
Regulations concerning conservators are found in parts 547 and 548
of title 12 of the Code of Federal Regulations. They provide that upon
taking possession, " a conservator "shall immediately take possession of
the association's books, records, and assets."' 5 The conservator is further
required to collect immediately all obligations and money due the association and, subject to the supervision of the Director, it must take any
action necessary to conserve the association's assets.' Its only other affirmative duty is to inventory the association's assets as of the date possession
was taken.'
Sections 548.2 through 548.4 list the discretionary powers granted to
the conservator, most of which involve the payments of debts and the sale
of assets. Although a detailed discussion of all these powers is beyond the
scope of this article, one important element should be noted. Virtually
all of the conservator's discretionary authority can be exercised only with
the approval of the Board or Director.
In the event that the Board considers it more advisable to appoint a
receiver than a conservator, it is required by statute to appoint the Federal
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (Corporation). 8 To ascertain the
full extent of the Corporation's powers as receivers, reference need be made
to sections 1464, 1729, and 1730, and the regulations promulgated by the
Board under their authority. The regulations provide that upon taking
possession, the "receiver shall, without further action, succeed to the rights,
titles, powers, and privileges of the association, and to the rights, powers,
20 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(6) (A) (1976).
12 id.
2

12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(6)(D) (1976).

12

Id.

16 12 C.F.R. § 548.1 (1981).
19 12 C.F.R. § 547.7 (1981).

I' 12 C.F.R. § 548.2 (1981).
i712 C.F.R. § 548.5(a) (1981).
.sSee 12 U.S.C. §§ 1464(d)(6)(D), 1729(b) (1976). The latter secti.n also. permits the
FSLIC to act as a conservator as wellas a receiver. 7
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol15/iss3/3
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and privileges of its members, officers, and directors."' 9 The specific
powers and duties of the receiver are found in part 549 of title 12
of the Code of Federal Regulations. As with a conservator, the receiver
is under a duty to collect all obligations and money due the association"0
and to take an inventory."' In most respects its discretionary authority is
the same as that of a conservator. 2 However, its actions pursuant to this
power generally do not require Board or Director approval.
Among the receiver's most important duties is its obligation to handle
claims against the association in relation to its liquidation. In this area the
Board maintains significant control over the receiver, supervising when and
how such claims should be processed. Methods required for handling the
claims depend on whether a particular association is a deposit association or
not." In any event, however, the main concern is providing notice and
opportunity to creditors, shareholders, and account holders so that they
may timely present their claims and participate in any liquidation of assets.
The Corporation as receiver is further empowered upon appointment:
(1) to take over the assets of and operate such association, (2) to
take such action as may be necessary to put in a sound and solvent condition, (3) to merge it with another insured institution, (4) to organize
a new Federal savings and loan association to take over its assets, or
(5) to proceed to liquidate its assets in an orderly manner, whichever
shall appear to be to the best interests of the insured members of the
association in default; and in any event the Corporation shall pay
the insurance as provided in section 172824 of this title and all valid
credit obligations of such association.
Whether or not the Corporation has been appointed receiver, it has
additional authority to deal with associations in default. It can make loans
to or purchase the assets of a troubled association. 8 Or, in order to facilitate
a merger or consolidation with another association, it may authorize a
"purchase and assumption" agreement as opposed to merely paying claims
under its obligation as insurer. 7 Subject to the approval of the Board, the
19 12 C.F.R. § 547.7 (1981).

12 C.F.R. § 549.3 (1981).
- 12 C.F.R. § 549.6(a) (1981).
22 12 C.F.R. §.549.3 (1981).
23See 12 C.F.R. § 549.4, 549.5, 549.5-1 (1981).
24
Section 1728(b) gives the FSLIC the option of paying the insurance claims either in cash,
or by making available a transferred account in another insured institution.
25 12 U.S.C. § 1799(b) (1976). The section further states that upon payment, the FSLIC is
subrogated to the rights of the insured.
26 12 U.S.C. § 1729(f)(1) (1976).
27 12 U.S.C. § 1729(f) (2) (1976). The power of the FSLIC to enter into purchase and
asumption agreements was challenged recently in Washington Fed. Say. & Loan v.
FHLBB, 526 F. Supp. at. 393-96, and upheld. For the preferability of purchase and
assumption agreements over the cash payment of claims, see Bransilver, Falling Banks.:
FDIC's Options and Constraints, 27 AD. L. Rv."327 (1975); see also Burgee, Purchase
20
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Corporation may also provide for the organization of a new federal savings
and loan association to facilitate the liquidation of one of its insured mem28
bers.
B.

The Decision to Appoint a Conservatoror Receiver: Due Process
Implications
The statutory scheme for the appointment of a conservator or a receiver over a federally chartered savings and loan association permits action
by the Board without notice and hearing, commonly referred to as "summary
action."2 The first response to such summary action is instinctively that it
is a denial of due process. Generally notice and a hearing are necessary before governmental action may interfere with a life, liberty, or property interest.8° In 1947, the United States Supreme Court decided Fahey v.
Mallonee.3" Fahey is now frequently cited for the proposition that a financially
troubled savings and loan institution has no due process rights to notice and
a hearing before being placed into conservatorship or receivership. 2 Had
such bank failures been common at the time of this decision it is quite possible
that this reading of the case would have been questioned long ago. Instead,
the heretofore financial soundness of our nation's savings and loan institutions
has offered no incentive for a reexamination of the precise significance of
the case. 3 The inquiry therefore becomes, what was actually decided in
Fahey?
The case arose when a conservator was appointed by the Board to
take over the operations of the Long Beach Federal Savings and Loan
Association. The appointment was made without prior notice or hearing.
The conservator then began to take steps necessary to merge Long Beach
Federal with other similar institutions. The plaintiff shareholders of Long
Beach Federal sought to prevent the merger." As the lower court"5 noted,
the plaintiffs focused their attack on section 1464(d).16 They argued that,
in authorizing the Board to promulgate rules and regulations thereunder,
Congress was guilty of an impermissible delegation of the powers granted
and Assumption Transactions Under the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 14 FoRum 1146

(1979).

28

12 U.S.C. § 1729(a) (1976).

Freedman, Summary Action by Administrative Agencies, 40 U. Cm. REv. 1 (1972).
See text accompanying notes 55-56 infra.
81332 U.S. 245 (1947).
8
2See text accompanying notes 48 and 62-63 infra.
38 The- court in Washington Fed. Say. & Loan v. FHLBB, 526 F. Supp. at 343, makes
the point that the issue has not arisen since 12 U.S.C. 1464 was amended in 1966. See
29See

80

footnote 1 of the court's memorandum and order dated July 17, 1981.
84Mallonee v. Fahey, 68 F. Sdpp. 418 (S.D. Cal. 1946).
85 The

case was heard before a three-Judge district court and was then directly appealed

to the United States Supreme Court.

as This section of the code has since undergone several amendments which have substantially
altered the provisions of § 1464(d).
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol15/iss3/3
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it under Article I of the United States Constitution. Their argument was
that subsection (d) of the statute granted to the Board essentially legislative
authority "without prescribing either adequate, or any statement of policy,
standards, limitations, or criteria to guide the board in exercising its
functions."'"
8 and SchechThe lower court looked to PanamaRefining Co. v. Ryan3
ter Poultry Corp. v. United States," the two most important "impermissible
delegation"'" cases of their time. Panama Refining had held that there were
limits to the congressional power to delegate authority to other organs of
government, limits which could not constitutionally be transcended. The
hallmark of an unconstitutional delegation is a lack of standards or policy
limits which circumscribe the authority delegated. Where such standards
are lacking, it is the legislative prerogative itself which has been conferred.
This analysis was later approved and expanded in Schechter Poultry. Applying these principles, the lower court in Fahey concluded that the statutory section at issue gave the Board unlimited authority and discretion
to conduct conservatorships and receiverships: "We hold Sec. 5(d) of
Home Owner's Loan Act of 1933, as amended, unconstitutional and void
as attempting to delegate legislative power to the Federal Home Loan
Bank Board."'"
That was the posture of the case when it came before the Supreme
Court. In its opening remarks, the Court noted in passing that the case
might present a due process claim. That, however, was the only time the
issue was raised. The Court then reviewed the lower court's holding that the
statute in issue was an "unconstitutional delegation of the congressional
function."4 It characterized the Panama Refining and Schechter Poultry
cases relied upon below as follows: "Both cited cases dealt with delegation
of a power to make federal crimes of acts that never had been such before
and to devise novel rules of law in a field in which there had been no set-

tled law or custom.""
Since the two cases had addressed matters criminal in nature, the
Court declined to apply them to the issue of purely regulatory authority
before it in Fahey."5 An additional factor was that the various problems and
8

7Mallonee v. Fahey, 68 F. Supp. at 420.
88293 U.S. 388 (1935).
89295 U.S. 495 (1935).
40 This principle is found nowhere in the body of the Constitution, but its source is probably
Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1 (1825).
41 Mallonee v. Fahey, 68 F. Supp. at 421. The court also noted at page 420, in a statement
which was clearly dictum: "We think due process requires a hearing on notice and this
should be provided within the Act itself."
, 2 Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. at 247.
48 Id.at 249.
4 id.

atIdeaExchange@UAkron,
250.
5ld.by
Published
1982

9

Akron Law AKRON
Review, Vol.
[1982], Iss. 3, Art. 3
LAW15RE

[Vol. 15:3
1w

remedies dealt with in the Board's regulations were "as old as banking
enterprise" itself, ' and had traditionally been the subject of expert supervision and regulation. These considerations led the Court to pronounce a
different standard for deciding delegation cases involving supervisory administrative actions. When regulations promulgated under statutory authority are "sufficiently explicit, against the background of custom, to be
adequate for proper administration," the delegation is not unconstitutional. "7
At this point in the opinion the Court's language is somewhat ambiguous,
and uncritical readers have assumed that the due process issue was addressed. In fact, the Court held merely that summary action concerning
the appointment of conservators and receivers is so well engrained in the
custom and history of the banking industry that it falls within the ambit of
the established tests for constitutionality. It found that there was no impermissible delegation. By deciding the case on these grounds, it left the
due process issues raised by summary action for another day. It is unfortunate that subsequent authorities have interpreted the Court's holding on the
constitutionality of the delegation as settling all of the due process issues
as well.' 8
The second basis for the holding was also far removed from contemporary due process analysis. The Court stated that even if the statute in
question were defective in a constitutional sense, the decision of the lower
court would have had to be reversed.' 9 Long Beach Federal had been granted
its charter as a federal savings and loan association under the same statute
that it then sought to have declared unconstitutional. In the Court's view,
the chartering and dissolution provisions of the statute were "hardly severable"
from one another,5 0 and the association could not take advantage of the
privilege and then attack the validity of the statute. "We hold that plaintiffs are estopped, as the Association would be, from challenging the provisions of the Act [at issue]."'" This ground for the holding could be read
as relegating to dictum all aspects of the opinion dealing with the delegation
doctrine and the Court's passing reference to due process. Although this
estoppel analysis is of dubious constitutional validity today,5" it is on occasion resurrected to support a result-oriented decision.5" In any event, the
46 [d.

Id. at 253.
8 See, e.g., Greater Del. Valley Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB,, 262 F.2d 371, 373
(1958), where the court stated: "It is now settled that such an administrative taking over
of a savings and loan association by the parent Board without provision or opportunity for
47

advance litigation of the propriety of the seizure is constitutionally unobjectionable," citing
Fahey v. Mallonee.
'9Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. at 255.
8old.
5 Id. at 256.
5

2See text accompanying notes 66-71 infra.
a3id.
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Court's treatment of the delegation issue illustrates the principle that such
attacks are generally unsuccessful."
If we assume that Fahey did not decide whether summary action in
this area is constitutionally permissible under a due process analysis, the
issue becomes, what would the Court do if it were confronted with this
question today? The inquiry begins with the basic proposition that, "The
fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard."55
A further requirement is the opportunity be granted "at a meaningful time
and in a meaningful manner."5 These considerations might lead one to
question the rationale for permitting a hearing after the governmental intrusion.
It has been said that, "The justification for summary action lies in
the necessity for the government to act immediately. ''5 7 Although recent
cases have indicated that this statement is not completely accurate, it provides
a good starting point for analysis because it is based on the assumption that
under certain conditions the public interest can be served only by expedited
procedures. The summary action cases which have reached the Supreme Court
to date appear to fall into three main categories: those involving emergency
situations; those concerning statutory entitlements; and those in the area
of replevin-type statutes (including wage garnishment).58
If the Court categorizes a case before it as involving an emergency
situation, summary action is likely to be upheld. Classic examples are
North American Cold Storage Co. v. City of Chicago9 and Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc.6" In North American, the Court was confronted
with an Illinois statute which permitted summary seizure and destruction
of unwholesome food. Finding that the storage of contaminated food presented a perious threat to public health, the Court had little difficulty upholding this governmental activity on the ground that the property interest
of its owner was vastly outweighed by public concerns. Ewing involved mislabelled vitamins, and the Court upheld a summary seizure on grounds
similar to those in North American. Although in Ewing the impact on public
health was less clearly established, the Court deferred to the congressional
finding that mislabelled products constituted a matter of serious public con54 But see Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607,
664, n.1 (1980), in which Justice Burger, in a concurring opinion joined by Justice Rehnquist,
appears to assume the continuing vitality of this doctrine.

55 Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914).
" Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).

51 Freedman, supra note 29, at 1.
58 Freedman, supra note 29, at 9-14 gives further examples of the use of summary action in

the areas of national security and tax assessments,
69211 U.S. 306 (1908).
U.S. 594 (1950).
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cern, and on that basis upheld the federal statute permitting their summary
seizure."
Fahey is usually grouped with these two prior cases. The three are viewed
as having created a constitutional jurisprudence of "emergency." This
characterization has been reiterated by the Court in a number of decisions,
including some very recent ones," and has been adopted by some very
reputable authors."' Thus, convincing the Court to undertake a reevaluation
of Fahey in light of modem developments in the due process arena would
be a formidable task. The greatest preliminary hurdle would be to persuade
the Court that the appointment of a conservator or receiver for a savings and
loan association does not constitute an emergency. 4 The Court would
otherwise summarily uphold the statutory procedures on the basis of the
emergency doctrine. 65
Furthermore, a favorable determination on the emergency issue would
be unlikely to settle the matter. In many ways this kind of case is similar
to the line of "statutory entitlement" cases the Court has decided over the
last decade. A given savings and loan association is granted a charter to
become a member of the local district bank. Under the same statutory
scheme its membership can be taken away, particularly when a receiver
is appointed and the association is dissolved or merged with another. In
reevaluating the statutory procedures, therefore, the Court might look to
Goldberg v. Kelly" and its progeny. Goldberg involved a New York statute
which granted federally assisted welfare benefits to those who qualified,
and provided for summary termination of benefits upon disqualification.
The case is noted not only for recognizing that statutory entitlements such
as welfare benefits are protected property rights for due process purposes,
but also for its discussion of the "hearing" requirements of due process.
In determining whether summary action was permissible in this situation,
or whether a pre-termination hearing was necessary, the Court endeavored
42 Id. at 600-602.
2
See, e.g., Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., - U.S. .. , 49
U.S.L.W. 4654 (1981); Parratt v. Taylor, - U.S. - 49 U.S.L.W. 4509 (1981); Mackey
v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1 (1979).
63
See L. TRINE, AmmucAN CONSTIrtnIONAL LAW 546-47 (1978); B. ScHwARTz, ADMINIsTRATrvE LAW 211-12
64It appears that the

(1976).

violation of a cease and desist order, one ground for the appointment
of a conservator or receiver under § 1464(d) (6) (A) arguably does not constitute an
emergency situation.
45 It is curious that the Court in Fahey did not cite North American Cold Storage v.
Chicago, 211 U.S. at 306, a case which presumably would have supported the Court's
position, had it actually been deciding the due process issue.
- 397 U.S. 254 (1970). Reference might also be made to the line of "license" cases decided
by the Supreme Court under modern due process analysis. If a court adopted a "license"
analysis, as opposed to a "statutory entitlement" analysis, in the federal savings and loan
area, a constitutionally protected property right would still be implicated. See, e.g., Mackey v.
Montrym, 443 U.S. 1 (1979); Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105 (1977); Bell v. Burson, 402
U.S. 535 (1971).
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to balance the public interest involved against the private interests at stake.
In this setting the Court found that the continuation of welfare benefits,
often an individual's only means of support, outweighed the governmental
interests of administrative convenience and avoiding additional expense."'
The case is notable in a further respect relevant to procedures involving savings and loan associations. In resorting to a balancing test, the
Court seemed to recognize that in some situations the public and private
interests involved may actually be less divergent than they might appear.
For example, although an individual has a substantial interest in the continued receipt of welfare benefits, the government's interest in social welfare
programs, i.e., in maintaining a minimal standard of living for its citizens,
is equally important.68 The Court therefore, in applying the balancing test,
found governmental interests on both sides of the scale. This suggests that
in certain settings the individual interests involved may be supported by
various governmental interests thereby weighing against the permissability
of summary action.
Much the same analysis could be applied to a savings and loan institution. On the one side, the government has an interest in protecting investors from the unsound practices of a given association. 9 But, on the
other side, these associations exist primarily to help people finance the
purchase of homes, notwithstanding the fact that they are in the business
of making money. The dissolution of such an institution might have the
effect not only of reducing available home purchasing funds but also of
creating a cloud on neighboring banks and banking in general."0 So, as in
Goldberg, the situation may be one in which the private and public interests
are pursuing complimentary goals.
The inquiry does not stop with Goldberg. Some time later in Matthews v. Eldridge,"' the Court developed a three part test to evaluate summary terminations of a statutory entitlement: 1) the private interests at
stake; 2) the risk of an erroneous termination which the summary procedure may entail, and the probable value of additional procedural safeguards; and 3) the governmental interests involved.72 The first and third
of these factors have already been discussed, leaving for consideration the
risk of error involved in any given instance. It could be argued that the
very fact that a summary procedure is being used implies a substantial risk
"
of error.7" The Court in Ewing, intimated as much. It is especially true
at 266.
at 264-265.
Freedman, supra note 29, at 14-16.
Bransilver, supra note 27, at 329, 334, 336.
11424 U.S. 319 (1976).
*7Id.
8 Id.
See
10 See

"Id. at 335.

w Freedman, supra note 29, at 27-29.
U.S. at 316-17.

74211
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in determining the financial status of a bank where the factors are plentiful
and the record is voluminous. An attempt could be made to convince the
Court that the appointment of a conservator or receiver for a savings and
loan association is a situation in which summary action creates a high risk
of error.
For present purposes, a discussion of the statutory entitlement cases
would be incomplete without making reference to Arnett v. Kennedy."
The plurality opinion by Justice Rehnquist is interesting in two respects:
first, because it is barely reconcilable with other statutory entitlement cases,
and secondly, because it cites Fahey v. Mallonee as authority. Again, the
question before the Court was whether a statutory property right could be
terminated without a prior hearing. The opinion concluded that, "where the
grant of a substantive right is inextricably intertwined with the limitations
on the procedures which are to be employed in determining that right,
a litigant in the position of appellee must take the bitter with the sweet.""6
If this principle were uniformly applied, cases such as Goldberg would never
reach the Supreme Court and much of the law of due process relevant to
statutory entitlements would be in serious jeopardy. The impression that
this position is very similar to the "estoppel" approach taken by the Court
in Fahey is unmistakable. Indeed, Justice Rehnquist cites Fahey at length
for the proposition that one who derives benefit from a statutory provision
is estopped from questioning its constitutionality in other regards."" Does
this opinion indicate that the justices who concurred in it believe that the
Fahey situation should today be analyzed under a statutory entitlement
rationale? Or does it confirm this article's suggestion that Fahey was decided
on an estoppel theory and not on due process grounds? These questions
appear ripe for consideration.
Finally, any exploration of the procedural due process aspects of summary action must make mention of Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp."' and
Fuentes v. Shevin. 9 These cases demonstrate that the Court is willing to
require a pre-termination hearing even when the interest deprived does not
involve vital necessities.8 0 Snaidach, of course, involved the summary garnishment of a debtor's wages; Fuentes dealt with the summary seizure of
a debtor's property pursuant to a state replevin statute. In both cases the
Court noted that the property seizures were initiated not by the government
but by individual creditors. Therefore, the governmental interests implicated
were not so compelling as in other areas where summary action had been
Is416 U.S. 134 (1974).
76

1d. at 153-54.
ITId. at 153.
vs 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
TO407 U.S. 67 (1972).
60 Matthew v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 326.
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permitted.8 In balancing the interests, the Court found that the debtor's
private interest in retaining his property outweighed the other interests
involved.
Some doubt was cast on Fuentes by Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co.,82
in which the Court found sufficient procedural substitutes for prior hearings
so as to permit the summary seizure. North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. DiChem, Inc."3 appears to have revived Fuentes, and has left the field somewhat
muddled. Nonetheless, the cases in this area demonstrate that the Court will
utilize its balancing test in determining the constitutionality of a particular replevin-type statute. In these cases the interests to be balanced are mostly
private, and the government's interests are subordinated. Thus it is not altogether certain that the Court would apply the learning of this line of
cases if it were to face the due process issue presented by the ex parte
appointment of a conservator or receiver for a savings and loan association.
However, these cases are often critical in the due process area and are
worth consulting.
C.

JudicialReview
One aggrieved by agency action often has resort to judicial relief.
This situation might easily arise when a savings and loan association believes that the Board has acted improperly in appointing a conservator or
receiver. In this respect, section 1464(d) (6) (A) appears to provide some
opportunity for judicial intervention by stating in part:
In the event of such appointment, the association may, within thirty
days thereafter, bring an action in the United States district court for
the judicial district in which the home office of such association is
located, or in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia, for an order requiring the Board to remove such conservator
or receiver, and the court shall upon the merits dismiss such action
or direct the Board to remove such conservator or receiver.14
Unfortunately, this vague description of the judicial role in this context
raises many questions which are not easily answered.
It is likely that a court would view the standard to be applied as that
of "judicial review," invoking the various principles long established as
proper for this judicial function.85 In so doing, it would necessarily be
guided by the relevant provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act. 86
Although this appears to be a safe approach to the question, it may not be
81 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. at 90-91.
8416 U.S. 600 (1974).
w 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
"12
U.S.C. § 1464(d)(6)(A) (1976).
6
5This was the approach taken in Washington Fed. Say. & Loan v. F-LBB, 526 F. Supp.
at 343.
86 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1976).
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the correct one. More is involved here than merely the review of agency
action.
As previously indicated, governmental deprivation of a protected property interest is permissible only where there has been compliance with the
principles of due process.8 7 At the very least, notice and an opportunity
to be heard are required. Congress has quite clearly authorized the Board
to act summarily in appointing a conservator or receiver, i.e. without the
opportunity of a prior hearing. Equally clear is the absence of a post-appointment hearing requirement before the Board. Thus an association's
right to bring suit in federal court for the removal of the conservator or
receiver is its only opportunity for a hearing. If the right to bring suit were
not so construed, the statute would be constitutionally defective as violative
of due process. The only possible construction of this statute which is consistent with constitutional requirements is that the ability to bring suit provides the association with an opportunity to be heard. The question then
becomes whether the various standards of judicial review are consistent
with due process hearing requirements. If not, they cannot be applied,
because the present statute creates a singular situation in which the constitutionally required hearing and the opportunity for judicial review occur
at the same time.
The various standards for judicial review of agency action are found
in section 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act," Generally, agency action may be set aside if found to be arbitrary and capricious, unsupported
by substantial evidence, or unwarranted by the facts where factual findings
are subject to a trial de novo. To date, the most significant Supreme Court
decision interpreting this section is Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v.
Volpe."9 Overton Park would indicate that review pursuant to the "substantial evidence" test is not available to an affected savings and loan association, because that standard applies only to formal agency action. As
the Court indicated, the basic requirement for obtaining this standard of
review is that agency decision drawn into question be one made on the
record." Since there is no requirement in section 1464(d) (6) (A) that
the Board's action be conducted formally on the record, a different standard of review must be applied.
Review under the arbitrary and capricious standard is "a narrow one.' "
To make such a finding, a court must consider whether a given agency
decision was based on a consideration of relevant factors and whether a
87

See text accompanying notes 55-56 infra.

B85 U.S.C. § 706 (1976).

" 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
90 Id.at 415.
91 Id.at 416.
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clear error of judgment has been made. 2 Of the three possible standards
of review, this is the most restrictive and provides the aggrieved party with
little chance of changing the outcome. On the other hand, de novo review
provides the most searching, thorough analysis of agency action available.
The Court in Overton Park stated that this level of review is authorized in
two circumstances: 1) where the agency action is adjudicatory in nature
and the agency fact finding procedures are inadequate; or, 2) when issues
that were not before the agency are raised in a proceeding to enforce non9 3
adjudicatory agency action.
Since the intermediate standard of review, the "substantial evidence"
standard, will not be available to an association seeking review, a court
will have to choose between "arbitrary and capricious" or "de novo" review.
A court will more than likely be inclined to defer to agency expertise and
limit its review to the arbitrary and capricious standard, especially since the
requirements for de novo review are hard to meet. Nonetheless, Overton Park
decidedly does not preclude or limit de novo review where the statutory
provisions concerning the availability of review expressly permit it. This
fact becomes significant in the present context because the statutory language of section 1464(d) (6) (A) states that the Court shall review "upon
the merits." It is unfortunate that the phrase "upon the merits" does not
appear in any analogous statute in the United States Code so as to provide
some insight as to the scope of review available. However, an inference can
be drawn that the broadest possible review is required under this statute.
Section 1464 was amended in 1966. Before that, section 1464 (d) (2)
had provided that upon certain findings the Board could appoint a temporary
Supervisory Representative in Charge to supervise a troubled association.
After such an appointment and before a conservator or receiver could
be appointed, the Board was required to afford the association an opportunity for an administrative hearing on the matter. Once the Board then
decided to appoint a conservator or receiver, the association still could seek
judicial review of the Board's decision. The review was conducted "upon
the weight of the evidence," which was interpreted to mean a preponderance
of the evidence.9 ' Under the previous statute, therefore, an association was
entitled to an administrative hearing before the Board appointed a conservator
or receiver plus subsequent judicial review upon the weight of the evidence.
Although legislative history concerning the 1966 amendment is sparse, one
thing is clear: Congress' purpose in enacting the amendment was to facilitate quick, responsive action by the Board in case of a financial emergency. 5
The procedures under the prior statute were viewed as cumbersome and
92

id.

93 Id. at 415.
94 Beacon Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n. v. FHLBB, 162 F. Supp. 350 (E.D. Wis. 1958).
985S. REP. No. 1482, 89th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1966), reprinted in [19661 U.S. CODE CONG. &
3532.
AD.byNEws
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slow. Congress meant to remedy that situation, not to limit the judicial review available to the association. Before the amendment the association
was entitled to two hearings upon the weight of the evidence - one before
final agency action and the other at the point of judicial review. If the
amendment is interpreted to permit only the "arbitrary and capricious"
standard of review, not only is the association limited to one "after the
fact" hearing, but at that hearing there is a presumption in favor of the
propriety of the Board's action." Such an interpretation would represent
not only a drastic change in prior law, but also one wholly outside of the
congressional purpose in enacting the amendment. It is more logical to
infer that while Congress desired to expedite the procedures for appointing
a conservator or receiver, it also intended to preserve an association's full
panoply of rights for the post-appointment suit authorized by the statutes.
It is reasonable to conclude that "upon the merits" as found within section
1464(d) (6) (A) provides for something other than the "arbitrary and
capricious" scope of review, namely a trial de novo.
This result is suggested not merely by the statutory language and purpose but by constitutional requirements as well. As previously indicated,
the hearing provided for here is the only opportunity for the due process
hearing that the association is entitled to. It is difficult to believe that a
statute which provides only for a post-seizure hearing can also provide only
for a very limited standard of judicial intervention and not be constitutionally objectionable, especially since the language of section 1464(d)
(6) (A) can be read to allocate to the association the burden of proof in
its suit to be relieved from conservatorship or receivership. 7
The 1966 amendment made yet another significant change. Prior to
the amendment, Board action concerning the appointment of a conservator
or receiver required formal action upon the record. The amendment eliminated this requirement. Review without a record is speculative enough to
begin with. When taken into consideration along with the other changes
made by the amendment, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that a court
should engage in its own fact finding and hear the cause de novo. Due
process should permit no less. Since an association placed into conservatorship or receivership has the right under the present statute only to a
post-seizure hearing, that hearing should be conducted so as to maximize
judicial review. Anything less makes it difficult to correct agency error,
provides an association with extremely minimal hearing and review standards, and raises serious questions with regard to procedural due process
requirements.
9See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S, at 403.
97 This was again the approach taken in Washington Fed. Sav. & Loan v. FHLBB, 526 F.
Supp. at 343.
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WASHINGTON FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION V.

FEDERAL HOME LOAN BANK BOARD

On March 18, 1980, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (hereinafter Board) adopted resolution 80-181 whereby it appointed the Federal
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (hereinafter FSLIC) as receiver
for Washington Federal Savings and Loan Association of University Heights,
Ohio (hereinafter Washington Federal).' The Board determined that grounds
existed for appointment of a receiver pursuant to section 5(d) (6) (A)
of the Home Owners Loan Act of 1933.'
On the same day the Board, by resolution 80-182, authorized the
sale and transfer by the FSLIC as receiver of certain assets and liabilities
of Washington Federal to Broadview Savings and Loan Company (hereinafter Broadview)3 pursuant to a purchase and assumption agreement."
Resolution 80-182 also authorized an agreement of sale between the FSLIC
as receiver and the FSLIC in its corporate capacity for certain assets and
the assumption of certain liabilities of Washington Federal not purchased
or assumed by Broadview.' Additionally, the Board adopted resolution
80-183 authorizing the FSLIC in its corporate capacity to enter into an
indemnity agreement with Broadview and the agreement of sale with the
FSLIC as receiver. 6 Broadview employees took over Washington Federal
main offices and branches on March 18th, the same day these resolutions
passed. 7
Washington Federal filed a complaint in federal district court against
the Board and the FSLIC, basing jurisdiction in part on 12 U.S.C. § 1464
(d) (6) (A). 8 The complaint alleged that the Board's findings on which it
based the appointment of the FSLIC as receiver "were clearly erroneous
and unsupportable and there were no other facts on March 18, 1980 justifying the FHLBB's actions."9 Washington Federal prayed for a mandatory
injunction ordering the Board to remove the FSLIC as receiver and dissolve
the receivership and directing the Board, FSLIC, and Broadview to rescind
all actions taken pursuant to the receivership and to reestablish Washington
Federal's business and restore its assets. 10

I Washington

Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 526 F. Supp. 343, 348-49 (N.D. Ohio

1981).
212
8

U.S.C. § 1464(d)(6)(A)

(1976).

Broadview was the successful bidder among those savings and loan associations who submitted bids to enter the purchase and assumption agreement with the FSLIC. 526 F. Supp.

at 394.
4Id. at 349.

8Id.

eId.
'Id.
eld.
eId.

lId.
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Prior to trial the court entered a memorandum and order establishing
that the ultimate issue at trial was to be "whether Washington Federal has
sustained the burden of proving that the Board abused its discretion in
reaching its 'opinion' that a receiver should be appointed."" The court
placed the burden of proof on Washington Federal to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the Board acted arbitrarily and capriciously in
order to establish that the Board abused its discretion. 2
On July 17, 1981, the court issued its lengthy decision and concluded
that plaintiff failed to sustain its assigned burden of proof." Accordingly,
judgment was entered against Washington Federal and for the Board on
14
this count.
The court considered numerous facts and issues en route to its decision.
This segment will explore the major issues and facts considered, the court's
interpretation and application of the pertinent case law and statutes, its
reasoning and holdings on the major issues and the ultimate issue, and the
impact of the decision on the practicing attorney. The discussion will be
divided into three major sections: (1) exploration of the court's consideration of the ultimate issue of the appointment of the receiver; (2) exploration of the court's consideration of the related issue concerning the legality
of the purchase and assumption transaction entered into by the FSLIC
after its appointment; and (3) an analysis of specific issues from the point
of view of counsel for a savings and loan which has been forced into receivership.
A.

The Appointment of a Receiver
1. Scope of Judicial Review and Content of the Administrative Record

At the outset, the court determined that the scope of judicial review
applicable to the case was defined by the language of section 706 (2) (A)
of the Administrative Procedure Act 5 as follows: "The reviewing court
shall . . . (2) hold unlawful and set aside any agency action, findings
and conclusions found to be (A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law;... "I As to the record
to be reviewed, the court pointed out that section 706 directs that a court
reviewing an agency action must "review the whole record or those parts
of it cited by a party."'" The court determined, however, that section 706's
requirement that the administrative agency compile the administrative rec11 Id.

Id. at 349-50.
Is Id.at 402.
14 Id.
255 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1976).
1 Id. (quoted by the court, 526 F. Supp. at 350).
17 526 F. Supp. at 350.
22
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ord " was inapplicable to this case; it was found instead that section 1464
(d) (6) (A), under which Washington Federal brought its action, controls.'
Under section 1464(d) (6) (A) the association may seek an order requiring
the Board to remove the receiver in the United States district court. The
statute states that the court will decide whether to dismiss the action or to
direct the receiver be removed "on the merits."2 In order to decide "on
the merits," however, the court noted that the statute provides no guidance
as to the nature of the administrative record to be reviewed under this provision." Because no prior judicial interpretation of this language existed," the
court began its own determination of the permissible content of an administrative record underlying the Board's appointment of a receiver.
In order to reconstruct the record, the court required the Board to
bring forward any facts, analysis or findings upon which it based its opinion
to appoint a receiver. Without dispute from either party, the court accepted
transcripts of tapes of the actual conduct of several Board meetings for
the administrative record. More problematical was the oral testimony regarding meetings or briefing sessions between staff members, Board members and their assistants held prior to formal Board meetings. Washington
Federal argued that this testimony should not be included in the administrative record which should be limited to documents and records declaring
policy of the agency on which its judgment was based." The court found, however, that comments by staff members to Board members at briefing sessions
were a valid inclusion in the administrative record.' The court seemed to
agree with the logic of the Board's argument that an agency rightfully relies on
its staff for information compilation and that discussions and recommendations made by the staff relative to this information should be part of the
administrative record. 5

181d. The court made use of the interpretation of Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402
(1971).
19 526 F. Supp. at 350.
2012 U.S.C. § 1464(d) (6) (A) (1976).
2-1id.
22 Id. The court said at n.1 that this was the first receivership initiated by the Board since
the Financial Institution's Supervisory Act of 1966 (FISA) rewrote 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)
(6) (A). The procedure under former § 1464(d) provided for an administrative hearing and,
therefore, an administrative record based on the Board's application for appointment of a
receiver. This procedure was abolished by FISA.
'Id. at 351. Washington Federal based its argument on language from Home Box Office,
2
Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 54 (D.C. Cir. 1977). The Home Box Office court did not allow
ex parte comments made to commissioners to be included in the administrative record, however, finding that it would be impossible to remove ex parte comments from the commissioner's memory.
2526 F. Supp. at 351. The court noted that in this case only the comments of agency
personnel were at issue where in Home Box Office even comments of non-agency persons
were allowed as part of the record if they were disclosed and identified.
25 Id.
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2.

The Statutory Scheme and the Relevant Factors
After determining the scope of judicial review and the content of the
administrative record, the court turned to an examination of the relevant
factors under the statutory scheme and whether those relevant factors were
considered.26
Before appointing a receiver one or more of the grounds set out in
section 1464(d) (6) (A) must exist. The five possible grounds are:
(i) insolvency in that the assets of the association are less than its
obligations to its creditors and others including its members; (ii)
substantial dissipation of assets or earnings due to any violation or
violations of law, rules, or regulations, or to any unsafe or unsound
practice or practices; (iii) an unsafe or unsound condition to transact business; (iv) willful violation of a cease-and-desist order which
has become final; (v) concealment of books, papers, records, or assets
of the association or refusal to submit books, papers, records, or affairs of the association for inspection to any examiner or to any lawful
agent of the Board. 7
Although section 1464(d) (6) (A) gives the Board the exclusive power to
appoint a receiver, this power is capable of abuse. The Board's power,
therefore, is subject to review by the court to determine "whether the
decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether
'
there has been a clear error of judgment."28
In order to blend the exclusive grant of power in the Board to appoint
a receiver upon the existence of one or more specified grounds with the
requirement of consideration of the relevant factors, the court formulated
two "welding" rules. "Factors are only relevant if they may be subsumed
under 'one or more' grounds that form the basis of the Bank Board's 'opinion' to order a receivership. A relevant factor may be considered only in
connection with the ground or grounds under which it is subsumed."2
The Board appointed a receiver for Washington Federal after finding
two of the statutory grounds existed: "(1) Washington Federal [was] in
an unsafe and unsound condition to transact business in that it [was]
unable to meet its liabilities or obligations; and (2) the assets of Washington Federal [had] been substantially dissipated due to violations of law

wThe court noted that the parties agreed it was for the court to determine the relevant
factors, 526 F. Supp. at 354 n.4. PPG Industries v. Costle, 630 F.2d 462, 466 (6th Cir.
1980), endorsing Asarco, Inc. v. EPA, 616 F.2d 1153, 1160 (9th Cir. 1980), was cited for
the proposition that a reviewing court need not accept the agency's word that it considered
all relevant factors.
27 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d) (6) (A) (quoted by the court, 526 F. Supp. at 353).
23526 F. Supp. at 354 (quoting Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402,
416 (1971)).
29 526 F. Supp. at 354.
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or regulations and to unsafe or unsound practices."' Using its welding
rules, the court concluded that the "true condition" of Washington Federal
was a relevant factor subsumed under ground one.3 ' However, the court
limited this factor to a consideration of the true financial condition of Washington Federal for the month of March, 1980, the month the Board authorized appointment of the receiver.32
3.

Scrutiny of the Facts
The court examined financial reports, reports of periodic Board examinations of Washington Federal, accounting information, supervisory history, market operations and philosophy, and other information about the association
from periods prior to March, 1980, considering it pertinent background.
Also considered were numerous reports, memoranda, letters, proposals,
recommendations, statements made at meetings, and other information
produced by both sides, which either formed or may have formed part of
the basis of the Board's decision to appoint a receiver. In each case, the
standards applied to each piece of information were whether the statements
it contained were rationally based in fact found in the judicial record,8" were
material to a determination of the true financial condition of the association
in March, 1980,'" or reasonable.3 5
A general concern raised by Washington Federal was whether
there were any relevant factors which were not considered by the Board
but which should have been. Ultimately, the court found that the Board
did consider all relevant factors. Though there were several instances where
the court felt that the Board should have had certain specific information
before it, in each case the court found that the Board either had the substantial equivalent,"5 had access to the more specific information, or based
on the information the Board did have, it was reasonable to conclude that
the Board would have made the same decision had it had the missing information before it."' These alternatives were found to be sufficient in determining that the Board did consider all relevant factors.
Washington Federal also claimed that its financial condition was affected by 12 C.F.R. § 563.17-3, a regulation dealing with forward commitments." That the Board can regulate forward commitment of savings
30/Id.
31 Id.
32

The court did receive into the record evidence from earlier months to provide background for the appraisal of Washington Federals condition in March, 1980.
83 Id. at 363, 374.
4Id. at 371.
5 Id. at 362.
8s Id. at 388, 389.
'U ld. at 367.
8Id. at 389.
89
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and loans under this regulation was not challenged. However, the plaintiff
claimed that the Board was itself responsible for Washington Federal's financial condition due to the impact of this regulation and the Board's failure
to explain how Washington Federal should proceed in light of it. This fact,
it was contended, was a relevant factor not considered by the Board."0 The
court viewed this challenge as essentially an attack on the regulation and
as such, of no merit. The purpose of the regulation was to limit the activities
of an association but it sought to minimize the impact on associations conducting forward commitment activities by grandfathering in those commitments in excess of the regulation. Knowledge of the fact that this regulation
would have varying effects on associations was imputed to the Board. The
Board's failure to specifically state those effects was found by the court not
to be arbitrary or capricious behavior.
A more critical flaw in this argument was said by the court to be
Washington Federal's failure to show that the Board was required to consider a causal relationship between the regulation and its financial condition
as a relevant factor even if it was found to exist. The Board's regulations are
premised on the protection of the public health, safety and welfare. Private
rights may be adjusted on this policy basis. To consider the casual relationship
Washington Federal claimed, the Board would effectively be subordinating its
concern for public good to its concern for an entity it regulates. "1
Washington Federal also claimed that the Board based its decision
to place it in receivership on the application of accounting rule R-48 to
the association, which thereby rendered it insolvent. Contending that R-48
had no legal binding effect on it, Washington Federal was successful in its
claim that the receivership decision was therefore arbitrary and capricious.'
However, the court concluded that this did not void the receivership order
because the Board's decision that the association was insolvent or retroactively insolvent was based on other valid reasons."
The court closely examined the actions of the Board during the last
days before appointment of the receiver and on the day of the appointment
and determined that there were no defects, procedural or otherwise, that
would void the receivership order." Of particular concern was the
timing of the order by the FSLIC to Broadview that it could take over
Washington Federal's office. Though Broadview's authority to enter was
pursuant to the purchase and assumption agreement executed by the receiver, FSLIC, the evidence indicated that the takeover of Washington Fed4old.
,2id.

0 1d. at 382.
43 ld. at 383-84.
" Id. 384-87.
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eral's offices actually occurred prior to the formal execution of this document. The court found, however, that "the adoption of the receivership
resolution, 80-181, and the execution of the purchase and assumption agreement ratified the entry." 5 Because Washington Federal did not allege that
Broadview committed wrongful acts during the premature entry, no actionable injury was found on the record.
Existence of Ground for Appointment of a Receiver
The court examined separately each of the two grounds upon which the
Board rested its decision to appoint a receiver pursuant to section 1464
(d) (6) (A) in determining whether the Board abused its discretion.
4.

The first ground found to exist by the Board was that "Washington
Federal [was] in an unsafe and unsound condition in that it [was]
unable to meet its liabilities or obligations.""6 Based on the administrative record corroborated by undisputed facts in the judicial record, the court made seven factual findings which showed the true condition
of Washington Federal on March 18, 1980, and which supported the first
ground for receivership. 7 Additionally, the court found that the Board considered all the relevant factors in finding that this ground existed and,
therefore, did not abuse its discretion. 8
The second ground found by the Board to justify the appointment of
a receivership was that "[t]he assets of Washington Federal [had] been
substantially dissipated due to violations of law or regulations and to unsafe or unsound practices.""9 The court noted that the Board did not specify
what law or regulation had been violated to cause the dissipation of Washington Federal's assets. By an examination of the Board's proposed findings
and other arguments the court surmised that 12 C.F.R. § 563.8, a regulation
which provides a limitation on outside borrowing, and 12 C.F.R. § 563.17,
a regulation dealing with management and financial policies including regulation of forward commitments, were the provisions allegedly violated.5"
The Board argued that its staff could reasonably have concluded that certain
association practices were in violation of these two regulations. However,
the court noted that even if these conclusions were reasonable, there was
no evidence on the record that the Board was either told or had any knowledge of them.
In regard to the forward commitment regulation, the Board also failed
to show how the alleged violation of this regulation caused any dissipation
45 Id.at
48 id.
47ld. at
"SId. at
49ld. at

noid.

387.
387-88.
388-90. See supra, text accompanying notes 26-41.
391.
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in assets as required by the second ground for appointment. The only way
this dissipation could have been shown would have been by construing the
accounting rules, R-48, in conjunction with 12 C.F.R. § 563.17 which was
not possible given the court's ruling that Washington Federal was not bound
by R-48. 5 The court found that there was no showing that facts existed
which would allow the Board to rationally conclude that a "substantial dissipation of assets" was occurring under the outside borrowing regulation
(section 562.8), or that such dissipation if it did exist was caused by continuing violation of that regulation." The court therefore concluded that
the Board's determination that the association had sustained substantial
dissipation of assets due to violation of either regulation was arbitrary,
capricious and in violation of law. 5
The court found the only facts offered by the Board to show dissipation of Washington Federal's assets due to unsafe or unsound practices were
also used to support the first ground for appointment of a receiver."' More
significantly, none of these facts showed a dissipation and the Board was
found never to have been aware of any facts that constituted a dissipation.5
Though the facts offered by the Board were sufficient to justify appointment
of a receiver under the first ground, the court held that its use of the second
ground was arbitrary, capricious and in violation of law."
B.

Purchaseand Assumption Transaction
By resolution 80-182, the Board authorized the FSLIC as receiver for
Washington Federal to sell and transfer certain assets and liabilities to Broadview through a purchase and assumption agreement. The FSLIC was further
authorized to enter into an agreement of sale of certain assets of Washington
Federal with the FSLIC in its corporate capacity.
The court first addressed the issue of whether the question of the
legality of the purchase and assumption transaction was within the court's
power of review. The Board argued that the court's power of review under
section 1464(d) (6) (A) extended only to the appointment of the receiver
pursuant to resolution 80-181 and not to actions entered pursuant to resolutions 80-182 and 80-183, adopted after 80-181. The court rejected this
argument, however, reasoning "that what is joined together in fact cannot
be separated by abstract logic."'" Concluding that the receivership action
and the purchase and assumption transaction were "indivisibly" interwoven
alId.
Id. at 392.

52

go d.
5Id. at 393.
"Id.
"Id.
5T Id.
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in fact, the court found that review of the latter was properly before the
court."5
Resolution 80-182 authorized the FSLIC as receiver to execute the
purchase and assumption agreement with Broadview and the sales agreement with the FSLIC in its corporate capacity. The Board premised its enactment of resolution 80-182 on section 406 of the National Housing Act,"
section 5(d) of the Home Owners Loan Act of 1933,60 and regulations
issued pursuant to these statutes."' The court considered these statutes and
noted that under section 1464(d) (6) (A) the Board is required to appoint
only the FSLIC as receiver for an association. Further, section 1729(b)
requires the corporation (FSLIC) to be appointed as receiver when a federal savings and loan association is in default. Default is defined in section
1724(d) as "as adjudication or other official determination of a court of
competent jurisdiction or other public authority pursuant to which a conservator, receiver, or other legal custodian is appointed for an insured institution for the purpose of liquidation."" On this basis the court concluded
that a receiver could only be appointed for "the purpose of liquidation.""3
While under the definition of default the appointment of a receiver is only
for the purpose of liquidation, the court pointed out that the FSLIC as
receiver may take five actions under section 1729(b), four of which do
not require irreversible liquidation.6 4 The fifth alternative allows the receiver to liquidate the associations assets in an orderly manner.
The Board argued that Congress intended the term liquidation to be
given an expansive and flexible meaning in order to cover all the alternatives specified in section 1729(b). Washington Federal urged that liquidation should not be read so broadly. The court agreed with Washington
Federal.
Resolution 80-182 stated that the receiver of Washington Federal was
authorized to liquidate or sell its assets and property. The court reasoned
that section 1729(b)(5) implicitly gives the receiver the power to sell the
assets through the explicit grant of authority to liquidate the assets of an
association in default. 5 In support of its finding the court discussed analog8Id.
89 12 U.S.C. § 1729 (1976).
60 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d) (6) (A) (1976).
61 526 F. Supp. at 394.
621d. at 395 (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 1724(d) (1976)).
e3Id. The court also noted that regulation 547.6 combined § 1729(b) and 1724(d), providing: "The Board shall appoint only the [FSUC] as receiver for a Federal association
and only for the purpose of liquidation." Id. at 395 n.45.
*l1d.
The court set out the four actions listed in 12 U.S.C. § 1729(b): "(1) to take over
the assets of and operate such association, (2) to take such action as may be necessary to
put in sound and solvent condition, (3) to merge it with another insured institution, (4)
to organize a new Federal savings and loan association to take over its assets." Id. at n.40,
65 Id. atby 396.
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ous law regarding national bank receiverships. It has been recognized that
a receiver of a national bank has the power to sell assets and engage in a
purchase and assumption transaction as a form of liquidation."6 In reaching
its conclusion, the court relied on the opinion of the 9th Circuit in Gockstetter v. Williams"7 and Hancock Financial Corp. v. FSLIC,"' which both
concerned the sale of assets of an association in default to another association. The court found that it was "evident that the authority of a receiver
to liquidate includes its power to sell any or all of its assets and property."' 9
The court further noted that while "[in the case of national banks, as
Gockstetter points out, 'Congress has . . . made provision for bringing
the liquidation of the assets of national banks to an end by providing for
the sale of . . . assets,' "70 a savings and loan association has authority to
sell assets and property under several regulations adopted by the Board
pursuant to its power to make rules and regulations under section 1464
(d) (11). The court examined several regulations which clearly give the
receiver of a savings and loan association in default the power to enter
sales agreements and sell the assets and property of an association." Based
on these findings, the court concluded that the FSLIC as receiver had the
power to liquidate and sell the assets and property of Washington Federal.
Board resolution 80-183 authorized the FSLIC as corporation to
enter into an indemnity agreement with Broadview as part of the purchase
and assumption transaction and also to enter an agreement of sale with
the FSLIC as receiver. 2 Washington Federal accepted the authority of
the FSLIC to act as it did pursuant to section 1729(f), 13 noting the simil6s

Id.

67 9 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1925). In Gockstetter v. Williams, the court upheld the sale of

assets to a newly formed bank that had entered into what amounted to a purchase and
assumption agreement with the receiver of a national bank.
68 492 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 1974). The court in Hancock FinancialCorp. v. FSLIC upheld
the receiver's sale of assets of an association in default to another savings and loan association.
69 526 F. Supp. at 396 n.47.
TOId. at 396 (quoting 9 F.2d at 356). The provision referred to is codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 192 (1976).
11526 F. Supp. at 396-97. The regulations construed by the court as conferring this power
are 12 C.F.R. § 547.7, § 548.2, § 549.3(a), § 549.3(b)(2) and (4).
721d. at 397. The court noted that prior to the 1978 addition of 12 U.S.C. § 1729(f)(2) to
the National Housing Act (the Financial Institutions Regulatory Interest Rate Control Act
of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-620, 92 Stat. 3641), the FSLIC as corporation had no authority
to enter into an indemnity agreement as part of a purchase and assumption agreement.
Without the 1978 amendment to the act, the FSLIC had no authority to pay for the purchase
of assets of a refaulted association whose liabilities were being assumed by another insured

institution.
73 12 U.S.C. § 1729(f) states in relevant part:
Whenever an insured institution is in default or, in the judgment of the Corporation is
in danger of default, the Corporation may, in order to facilitate . .. the sale of assets
of such insured institution and upon such terms and conditions as the Corporation
may determine, purchase any such assets or assume any such liabilities . . . or guarantee
such other insured institution against loss by reason of its . . . assuming the liabilities
and purchasing the assets of such insured institution in or in danger of default.
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol15/iss3/3
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arity in language between this statute and section 1823(e) which empowers the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation to avoid loss by sale
of assets and assumption of liabilities by another insured bank.' Washington Federal pointed out, however, that section 1823(e) concludes with
the following sentence not found in section 1729(f)(2): "Any insured
national bank or District bank, or the Corporation and receiver thereof,
is authorized to contract for such sales or loans and to pledge any assets
of the bank to secure such loans. . . ."I' It was argued that since this
sentence specifically grants the FDIC as receiver the power to enter a
purchase and assumption transaction, Congress' failure to include similar
language in section 1729(f)(2) evinces Congressional intent that the
FSLIC as receiver not have the powers now claimed by the Board to conduct a purchase and assumption transaction."' Noting lack of Congressional
comment on the 1978 amendment to section 1729(f), the court determined
that plaintiff's argument was thereby undermined." The only information
available in the Senate's history of the 1978 amendment was a statement
by the Board's associate general counsel, Goldberg, which made clear that
the FSLIC as receiver had the power to engage in a purchase and assumption transaction, including the power to guarantee or indemnify. This statement gave no reason for Congress to find any significance in the absence
of the last sentence of section 1823(e) from the proposed amendment to
section 1729(f).78
The court rejected Washington Federal's argument based on First
Empire Bank v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp." where the last sentence
of section 1823(e) was found not to authorize the FDIC as receiver to
enter into a purchase and assumption agreement but merely to acknowledge
0
the fact that the receiver may enter a contract with the corporation." The
First Empire court discussed the history of purchase and assumption agreements in support of its conclusion. Washington Federal's argument that
under section 1729(f) (2) the FSLIC had authority to purchase Washington
Federal's assets from the receiver but that the receiver did not have the
authority to sell those assets to the FSLIC as corporation was found to
be groundless. The court concluded that the statute "reflects no such congressional intent to authorize only one-half of a transaction."'"
T4526 F. Supp. at 397 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) (1976)).
T5 Id.at 398.
I ld.
TT Id.
T8 Id. at 399.
19 572 F.2d 1361 (9th Cir. 1978). In First Empire holders of standby letters of credit is-

sued by a national bank that was insolvent and in receivership sued the FDIC, arguing that
the purchase and assumption transaction which the FDIC entered with another national bank
amounted to a preference of creditors whose obligations were assumed and such assumed
obligations did not include plaintiff's letters of credit.
so526 F. Supp. at 399 (quoting 572 F.2d at 1370-71).
81Ild. at 400.
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As final support for its view that the FSLIC in its corporate capacity
is empowered to purchase at its own receiver sale, the court read section
1729(f) (2) in conjunction with section 1464(d) (6) (D). Section 1464
(d) (6) (D) enables the receiver to enter into such a sale with the corporation and was found by the court to supply the same authority as the First
Empire court construed the last sentence of section 1823(e) to extendthat the receiver "can contract with the corporation.""2
Based on its statutory analysis the court concluded that the FSLIC's
actions in entering the purchase and assumption agreement and entering
the sales agreement and indemnity agreements was in accordance with the
law. In authorizing these agreements it was held that the Board did not act
arbitrarily or capriciously."
C.

Impact of the Opinion
Washington Federal contains several issues which might be of interest
to attorney practicing in the savings and loan industry. Given the present
economic condition of many associations across the nation, counsel might
very well find himself in a position similar to those of Washington Federal.
Three points emerge as crucial: 1) the court's holding on to what constitutes the contents of the administrative record; 2) the failure of Washington Federal to show that the Board's actions caused its financial condition; and 3) the findings necessary to support the appointment of a receiver.
1.

The Contents of the Administrative Record
In determining the contents of the record from which it was to review
the Board's decision, the court found inapplicable the requirement in section
706 of the Administrative Procedure Act" that the agency compile the
record. The court ruled that section 1464(d) (3) (A) 85 controlled instead.
Washington Federal was the first receivership initiated by the Board since
the Financial Institution's Supervisory Act of 1966" rewrote section 1464
(d) (6) (A), eliminating its requirement for an administrative record. The
court found the statute gave them no guidance concerning the nature or
composition of a judicial record in an action brought under section 1464
(d) (6) (A)." The only language in the statute which indicates the possible
content of the record is the phrase: "the court shall upon the merits dismiss such action or direct the Board to remove such conservator or receiver."8 8 In interpreting the scope of "upon the merits" the court determined
*2Id. (quoting First Empire Bank v. FDIC, 572 F.2d at 1371).
83 526 F. Supp. at 400.
4 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1976).
*5 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d) (6) (A) (1976).
VePub. L. 89-695, tit. I. § 101(a), 80 Stat. 1028 (1966).
8T 526 F. Supp. at 350.
s12 U.S.C. 0 1464(d) (6) (A) (1976) (emphasis added).
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that the association could develop all of the facts that bear upon the merits
of the issues to be decided.89 This allows the development of a broad judicial
record since the only limitation is that "upon the merits is not subject to
the construction that it grants a trial de novo with the 'opinion' of the Board
wiped clean"
In a memorandum issued by the court, the Board was required to "assume the initial burden of placing on the record the factual results of any
investigation or analysis of the financial condition and business practices of
Washington Federal and any other findings upon which the Board based
its opinion.""
Thus, the court elected to have the record of the Board's decision reconstructed at trial. The court held that the administrative record should
include transcripts of verbatim tapes of participants' oral statements and
proceedings of the various Board meetings. The court also included the
testimony of staff members recounting any briefing sessions held preceeding
a Board meeting and attended by Board members, their assistants, and staff
members. The testimony of staff members was limited to their own statements at briefing sessions and staff members were not permitted to testify
as to what others said at the briefing sessions."
Washington Federal argued that oral recollections of Bank Board
witnesses as to what they said at briefing sessions should not be part of
the administrative record since they were not part of the basis upon which
the Bank Board acted. The district court held otherwise, relying on Home
Box Ofice, Inc. v. F.C.C 3 In Home Box Office, the court remanded the
administrative record to the commission to hold an evidentiary hearing "to
determine the nature and source of all ex parte pleas and other approaches
that were made to the commission or its employees."9 The Washington Federal court stated
An evidentiary hearing "to determine the nature and source of all
ex parte pleas and other approaches that were made to the commission
or its employees" conveys a pertinent message. Provided the ex parte
comments of non-agency persons to members or employees of an
agency are disclosed and identified, they may become a part of an administrative record in an informal agency action. Broader that this
court's ruling, Home Box Office supports this court's ruling. Here,
only comments by staff members (no outsiders) to agency Board
members are held to be a part of the administrative record."'
"526 F. Supp. at 350.
"Id. at n. 2.
91 Id. at 350.

"Id. at 351-52.
"567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
Id. at 58.
95 526 F. Supp. at 352.
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Since section 1464(d) (6) (A) no longer requires the procedure of
developing an administrative record, a reviewing court must reconstruct
an administrative record at the trial in order to determine the basis for
the Board's action. This presents a difficult situation for any association
attacking the appointment of a receiver because an after-the-fact reconstruction of an administrative record, which includes oral recollections by
witnesses as to what they said at briefing sessions, can not assure the accuracy of the record as well as the creation of the administrative record
at the time the statements were actually made.
One possible alternative approach to such reconstruction might have
been to remand the case to the Board for a detailed explanation and clarification of its decision, as was done in City Federal Savings and Loan As8 a case reviewing the Board's
sociation v. Federal Home Loan Bank Board,"
denial of a branching application. At least one commentator has suggested
a statutory and a policy argument for such remand:
[S]ection 706 [of the Administrative Procedure Act] requires judicial
review based on the "whole record" as developed by the agency. There
can be no review when there is no record before the court, as the Supreme court observed in Overton Park ....
Policy considerations shore up this statutory analysis, however.
Without an explanation of an agency's action, the reviewing court
must either replace the agency's judgment with its own or abdicate
the reviewing function by accepting the agency's judgment without
inquiry . . . The result [of remand] preserves the court's role without
extending it beyond natural boundaries."7
Application of this rationale to cases such as Washington Federal will require overcoming the court's specific finding that section 706's requirements
of an administrative record are inapplicable to a receivership action. Given
section 706's specific language and section 1464(d) (6) (A)'s lack thereof,
the two could arguably be welded in later cases, at least to some extent.
2. The Failure to Show Causal Relationship Between the Board's Action and Washington Federal's Financial Condition
One of Washington Federal's prime contentions was that the actions
of the FHLBB in the months preceeding the appointment of the receiver
actually caused the financial condition in March, 1980.8 Specifically, plaintiff argued that the Board's regulation of the participation in the forward
commitment market," together with the Board's silence as to how Washington Federal was to comply with the regulation, led to its precarious
"2600 F.2d 681 (7th Cir. 1979).
97 65 CORNELL L. REv. 449, 463-64 (1980).
"526 F. Supp. at 390.
"12 C.F.R. § 563-17.3 (1979).
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position. The complicated nature of the Board's activity requires an in-depth
analysis of the events leading up to the appointment of a receiver.
In 1977 Washington Federal ranked first among the 1,000 largest associations nationally in terms of return on average assets; in 1978 it ranked
third and in 1979 it was approximately 160th. 1 ° Much of this success
was attributable to its participation in the Government National Mortgage
Association (hereinafter GNMA) standby or forward commitment market.' In this market Washington Federal could, for a fee, "sell" a standby
contract to another party, under which Washington Federal was committed to standby to purchase a GNMA security of a particular coupon at
the agreed upon price. On the agreed upon date the other party could exercise its option to deliver the GNMA or it could choose to let the delivery
option pass. This type of contract is referred to as a "buy" or a "long,"
since under the contract Washington Federal is obligated to buy the GNMA
if the delivery option is exercised. Washington Federal could also obtain
a standby commitment from another party for a fee paid by Washington
Federal, which under the terms of the contract, Washington Federal could
deliver to the other party a GNMA security of a particular coupon at the
agreed upon price. Then Washington Federal could exercise its option to
deliver on the agreed upon date or it could choose to let the delivery option
pass. This type of contract is referred to as a "sell" or a "short," since under
the contract Washington Federal may choose to sell the GNMA.'"
On June 1, 1979, a regulation' 01 went into effect which placed limitations on the amount of outstanding forward commitments to purchase
securities (buys) that an association could be involved in. Under this regulation Washington Federal was limited to $29.9 million in outstanding
forward commitments. At this time, however, Washington Federal's forward
commitments totaled $727 million which exceeded the limitation by $697
million.0 Washington Federal was "grandfathered" as to the excess and the
regulation in no way limited the buying of forward commitments from
others (sells). 0 5
In July of 1979, Washington Federal met with a Board supervisory
agent and presented a plan which projected compliance with the forward
commitment regulation within five years and made a request for a waiver
from the regulation during that five year period. At the meeting's end,
the Regional Director stated his opposition to the waiver request but promised to take it up with his superiors in Washington.'
200

id. at 355 n. 7.

102 Id. at 355.
o2 lId. at 355 n. 8.
103

12 C.F.R. § 563.17-3 (1979).

104 526 F. Supp. at 357.

103 Id.

106 Id. at 358.
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Soon after the meeting, Washington Federal received a call from the
supervisory agent who asked that a written waiver request be submitted
by Washington Federal. The waiver request was submitted in writing by
Washington Federal on September 7, 1979.111 The request contained projections and six sets of pro-forma financial statements each based on different economic assumptions. On September 25, the supervisory agent of the
Board sent a memorandum to the Regional Director of O.E.S. recommending that the Associations request be approved subject to certain listed
limitations and/or conditions." 8
Ten days after the July 6 meeting, the Regional Director of the
O.E.S. requested the assignment of a different examiner to perform the
next supervisory examination scheduled for late July of 1979. He stated
that the Association had requested a waiver from the new regulations on
forward commitments and that he wanted the new examiner to "rigorously
analyze [enclosed] projections and the assumptions upon which they are
based and advise us whether they are reasonable."' 10 9 The new examiner
filed an interim report and on October 29, 1979, his full report was filed
with the Supervisory Agent. The interim report found that "the projections
were deemed reasonable,""' but the final report merely stated: "[tihe
basic assumptions were reviewed for reasonableness.""' 1 The Supervisory
Agent received the reports and continued his recommendation, in the final
report, that the request should be granted subject to certain limitations.""
By October 1979, the Regional Director of O.E.S. had the supervisory agent's recommendation for approval and the examiner's report which
found the Association's projections reasonable. The Regional Director,
however, took no further action on the Association's request for waiver until
January of 1980. On January 9, 1980, he submitted a request to the Director
of the Office of Finance, for "comments . . . on the merits of the Association's request.""' On February 8, 1980, the Regional Director received
back a two page memorandum which stated the Association's request had
no merit for several reasons. The Regional Director finally submitted a
memorandum concerning the request to the Deputy Director of O.E.S.
The Regional Director listed various reasons why he did not process
the Association's request to the Bank Board immediately. He claimed that
"there was insufficient information for his personal evaluation of the As107 Id.
108 Id.
109 Id.

•10 Id. at 359.
111 Id.

Is Id.
us Id. at 368.
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sociation's projections.""11 He also said that he "did not find the examiners
conclusion to be too reassuring in light of their consistent disregard of the
seriousness of the Association's situation."' 1 5 His second reason was that
"the Association's projections became quickly obsolete."'1 8 Finally, he
stated,
I did not believe that there was any great urgency in submitting the
Association's request to the Bank Board. I believed that the requests
were without merit. It was inconceivable to me that the bank board
would permit the Association to violate its recently adopted Regulations."1
The court found none of these excuses persuasive and stated: "In effect,
he arrogated to himself the right to decide how the Board would rule on
the Association's waiver request. This was arbitrary.""1 8 The court, however, ruled this arbitrary action was immaterial, stating:
Plaintiff submits no evidence that expressly shows, or from which it
may be inferred, that the absence of Board action on the request for
waiver until the meeting of March 14, 1980 contributed to the true
financial condition which Washington Federal faced in March. In
the absence of such evidence, Mr. Arnall's arbitrariness becomes an
immaterial factor in terms of the final result."'
In Washington Federal, the evidence indicates that the Board's failure
to rule on the Association's waiver request, if anything, helped prevent
further losses by the Association, since, during the time of the Board's
inaction, GNMA prices continued to decline. This decline probably would
have caused additional purchase commitments by the Association, resulting in additional losses.
We must look beyond the particular fact in Washington Federal,however, since the reasoning of the court regarding the Board's delay may
prove pivotal in future cases of this nature. By finding the arbitrary action
of the Board immaterial because the Association did not offer evidence
to show, or infer, that the delay contributed to the true financial condition
of the Association in March, the court implies that if such evidence had
been shown, the opposite results would have been reached.
It is therefore essential that an association compile evidence to show
that arbitrary actions, or inaction, by the Board contributed to the financial
position they were in at the time a receiver was appointed. This will require
an association to be farsighted in their dealings with the Board. If an asI'd Id.
1s Id.
'is Id.
117 Id. at 368-369.
a id. at 369.
119 Id.
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sociation waits until they are placed in receivership before they think about
how to overturn such an action, it may be too late.
Even though an association does not know in advance that the Board
is going to appoint a receiver, they certainly should forsee when there is
a possibility they may encounter serious financial difficulty. It is at this
time that they should make contingent plans on how to get a receivership
action overturned. An association should go further than merely compiling
enough documentation to support their proposal to the Board. After they
have presented their proposal to the Board, the association must keep track
of how their financial condition would have changed had the proposal
been granted on a timely basis. In this manner, if, at a later date, the Board
is found to have taken arbitrary action, the association can show exactly
what their financial position would have been had the Board granted the
proposal. This figure can then be used to get an approximation of damages
incurred by the association due to the Board's arbitrary action or inaction.
For this approach to be successful, it must be shown that the arbitrary
action of the Board contributed to the true financial condition which led
to the appointment of a receiver. Therefore, if (as in Washington Federal)
it is shown that the approval of the proposal would only have led to
additional losses, the Board's actions will be immaterial.
3.

Substitution of Court's Judgment for that of the Board
On March 13, Washington Federal officials met with Bank Board
staff. At this meeting Washington Federal distributed documents showing
their commitment position, cash/collateral needs, and their March cash
requirements. 2 ' The document, entitled "Pro Forma Analysis of Cash/
Collateral Needs," contained three alternative plans; each of the plans
required differing amounts of cash advances and guarantees by the Board.
The Association members explained each of the plans at the meeting so
that the Board could choose any one of the alternatives. The highest dollar
amount of guarantees required under any of the plans was shown as
$84,526,524.1"
The following day a Board meeting was held during which the Board
voted on Washington Federal's proposal. The Board was told by its staff
that Washington Federal's proposal required a guarantee of $5 10,000,000.112
The Board was not shown or informed of the three proposed plans of
Washington Federal. The Board after being shown only one plan and after
being told it required a $510 million guarantee and forbearance of accounting techniques on reverse repos, voted against the proposal made by
Washington Federal.
130 Id. at 372.
In Id. at 374.
12
Id. at 375.
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol15/iss3/3
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In resolving the controversy concerning the amount of guarantee requested by the Association the court stated:
Yet the need continued to assure the dealers on the street that the
outstanding dollar reverse repos and the outstanding standby commitments held by them (purchase price of $588,000,000 as of February
29, 1980) would be funded when any of the commitments came due.
Because of this continuing reality, despite the maximum guarantee
figure in the plans, an association request for a commitment guarantee
of $510,000,000 (gross $588,000,000 as testified to by Messrs. Timmins and Hall) is determined to be rationally based in fact."'
After finding a rational basis to the Board's use of $510,000,000 as the
amount of guarantee required, the court said, "[w]hether the Board would
have approved any one of the three plans (Assumptions A, B, and C), assuming they had had the physical plans before them, probably would have
depended upon the willingness of the Board to accept and approve the
1 ' The court then went on to list reasons why
plans' express assumptions.""
it felt the Board would not have approved any of the alternative plans
if they had been aware of them.' The court implies that even though the
Board should have been given all three proposals to vote on, it was immaterial that they were only aware of one since, in the court's judgment, the
Board would have denied all three proposals if they had been aware of
them.
The Supreme Court in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe'26
stated, "[a]lthough this inquiry into the facts is to be searching and careful,
the ultimate standard of review is a narrow one. The court is not empowered
to substitute its judgment for that of the agency."1'27
28

In Asarco, Inc. v. United States Environmental Protection Agency,
the court said, "If the court determines that the agency's course of inquiry
was insufficient or inadequate, it should remand the matter to the agency for
further consideration and not compensate for the agency's dereliction by
12
undertaking its own inquiry into the merits.""
The courts reasoning in Washington Federal of why the Board would
have rejected the two plans which it was unaware of appears to be a substitution of its judgment for that of the Board which is prohibited by Overton
Park and Asarco.
Id. at 374.
2' Id. at 376.
126 ld. at 376-77.
236401 U.S. 402 (1971).
livid. at 416.
is$616 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1980).
ISO Id.
1160.
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The court reviewed various background material on Washington Federal which would have made the Board better informed if they would
have had it at the March 14 meeting. The court, while finding such background material would have been helpful, did not find its use mandatory.
The court reasoned that,
[S]ince the true condition of the association in March 1980 is the
relevent factor to be considered under the first ground upon which
the Board based the receivership, the question is whether the Board
was sufficiently informed as to its true condition in the meetings of
March 14 and March 18, 1980.30

mH.

STATE SUPERVISION OF SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS

A.

Statutory Scheme in Ohio
The Ohio superintendent of building and loan associations may take
possession and control of the assets of an insolvent building and loan association upon finding:
that [its] affairs . . . are in an unsound or unsafe condition, that it is
conducting its business in whole or in substantial part contrary to
law, that it is failing to comply with the law, or that its affairs are
not being conducted for the best interests of its depositors, shareholders, or creditors.'
Prior to 1975, the superintendent's authority to take possession of
a building and loan association was subject to the prior written approval
of the Director of the Division of Commerce, 2 who appointed the superintendent.' Legislation passed in 1975 however, authorized the Governor
to appoint a superintendent to a four-year term.' Today, superintendent's
authority is concurrent with that of the Director of the Division of Commerce.' Thus, it appears that the superintendent now has the authority to
take possession of a building and loan association "forthwith," without
prior approval from the Director.
Section 1157.03 of the Ohio Revised Code specifies the action a
130 526 F. Supp. at 378.
1 OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 1157.01 (Page Supp. 1981).
2 Id. (amended 1975).
aMd. § 121.08 (amended 1975).

6Id. § 121.08 (Page Supp. 1981).
6 ld.
aid. § 1157.03 (Page 1968) provides:

The building and loan association named in the title of the proceedings provided
for in section 1157.02 of the Revised Code may, within seven days after filing of the

notice provided for in division (C) of such section, make application to the court with
which such notice was filed for an order requiring the superintendent of building and
loan associations, within such time, not exceeding fifteen days, as is fixed by such
court, to file in such court a bill of particulars specifying the grounds named in section

1157.01 of the Revised Code on which he has taken possession of its business and 38
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building and loan association can take when it believes the superintendent
has taken possession without proper grounds or authority. This section
indicates the type of pleadings which must be filed, specifies a determination
of the issues by the court, and allows for an appeal.
Within seven days of the superintendent's filing of the notice of takeover, a building and loan association may apply to the court in which the
notice was filed for an order requiring the superintendent to file a bill of
particulars.' The bill must specify the grounds enumerated in section
1157.01 of the Ohio Revised Code upon which he based his decision to
take possession of the business and property. It must also indicate the
operative facts regarding the taking of possession.8 The superintendent
must reply to this request within the time fixed by the common pleas
court. The time period must not exceed fifteen days." If the superintendent
fails to comply with the order within the designated time period, the liquidation proceedings against the building and loan association will be dismissed'10
If, after examining the issues, the court finds the bill of particulars
insufficient, the liquidation proceedings will be dismissed. The proceedings
will also be dismissed if the court finds that the superintendent exceeded
or abused his power or discretion. In such a situation, the superintendent
will be ordered to surrender the assets back to the control of the association."' The association, however, bears the burden of proving that the
superintendent abused his discretion. Such proof may be difficult to establish conclusively.

property and the operative facts found by him with respect to such taking of possession.
If the superintendent does not comply with such order within the time so fixed, the
liquidation proceedings shall be dismissed. Within fifteen days after the filing of such
bills of particulars, the association may file an answer and cross-petition in such
proceedings, joining issue on the allegations set forth in the bill of particulars. If issue is so joined, such court, or a judge thereof in vacation, shall set the
proceedings down for immediate hearing upon such issue. If the court finds that the
bill of particulars is insufficient in law or that the superintendent has exceeded or
abused his power and discretion, it shall dismiss the liquidation proceedings and direct
the superintendent to surrender such business and property to the association and the
decree and order of the court shall operate to revest the title of all such property in
the association as of the time specified in such decree and order. An appeal may be
taken from the final order of the court as in other chancery cases. An appeal by the
superintendent from a final order dismissing such proceedings shall operate as a
supersedeas thereof. The perfecting of such an appeal by the superintendent shall be
governed by section 2505.12 of the Revised Code.
Tld..
aid.

'Id.
10 Id.
hid.bySee
Mutual Home & Say.
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Insolvency of a building and loan association must be proved to the
court by a preponderance of the evidence. 1 2 The building and loan association is deemed to be insolvent only when the totality of its assets are insufficient to meet the claims of general creditors or are insufficient to repay
the contribution of association stockholders." In this respect, savings and
loans differ from other corporations. In general, the solvency of a corporation is determined without regard to the liability of the corporation to
its stockholders on its capital stock. 4 A savings and loan, on the other
hand, has few creditors other than the shareholders. Thus, "[a]n insolvent
association is one that, after paying its general creditors, cannot pay back its
shareholders, dollar for dollar, the amount of contributions."'"
In determining whether or not sufficient grounds exist for taking possession of a savings and loan association, the superintendent may not
substitute his business judgment for the judgment of the association's
elected officers. The association officers also have discretion to determine
what expenses shall be incurred in carrying out the association's business
affairs. An example of such an expense would be the commissions paid
to the procurer of a profitable loan. This "exception" to the superintendent's normal judgmental discretion applies only as long as the incurred expense does not result in the insolvency of the association or in impairment
of its capital.'
To escape a determination of insolvency, a building and loan association need not have liquid assets to meet possible demand; it need only
be a "going concern," which will eventually pay off its indebtedness." A
logical corollary is that an association should not be required to hold its
assets in immediately available cash simply to meet all conceivable obligations." Therefore, when considering a building and loan association's in'2 North Fairmont Bldg. & Say. Co. v. Rehn, 6 Ohio N.P. 185, 193 (Sup. Ct. 1898).
isSee Perletto v. Lancaster Ave. Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 353 Pa. 366, 371, 45 A.2d 10, 13 (1946);
In re Bell, 339 Pa. 445, 448, 15 A.2d 350, 382 (1940).
14 McPherson v. Railway Say. & Bldg. Ass'n, 93 Colo. 135, 25 P.2d 388' (1933).
These associations are essentially corporate copartnerships. They have no function
except to gather together, from small, stated contributions, sums large enough to justify
loans . . . They have no debtors or creditors except the stockholders, and whether a
stockholder is creditor or debtor depends on whether he has exercised his privilege of
borrowing money from the common fund. The insolvency of such an institution is sui
generis. There can be, strictly speaking, no insolvency, for the only creditors are the
stockholders by virtue of their stock. The so-called insolvency is such a condition of
the affairs of the association as reduces the available and collectable funds below the
amount of the stock already paid in.
Id. at 138, 25 P.2d at 390 (citing Towle v. American Bldg. Loan & Inv. Soc'y, 61 F.446,
447 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1894).
is Harr v. Hirsch-Luria Bldg. & Loan Ass'n of Reading, 26 Pa. D. & C. 643, 646 (C.P.
1936).
'e Glendale Say. Ass'n v. Sander, 9 Ohio Op. 221, 222 (C.P. 1937).
IT Caruso v. Members Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 115 Pa. Super. Ct. 212, 175 A. 304 (1934).

'8 Shaw v. Hinton, 31 S.W.2d 478 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930).
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol15/iss3/3
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solvency, all of its assets and resources should be taken into consideration,
not simply the money in the association treasury.
In Ohio, the superintendent of building and loan associations has exclusive control over the process of liquidation. This control is subject to
judicial review only if the association challenges the process pursuant to
the provisions of the Ohio Revised Code."
A careful study of all of the legislation relative to the Superintendent of Building and Loan Association convinces us that the
process of liquidation have been properly conferred upon him and
the procedure has been made exclusive in that the legislation sets
up definite procedure to be followed by all parties interested in a
building and loan association properly within the control of the superintendent for the purposes of liquidation."0
Only parties with a claim against the association may intervene in
the liquidation proceedings under section 1157.02 of the Ohio Revised
Code. Parties entitled to intervene are: creditors, stockholders, depositors,
or claimants of any kind against the association being liquidated. Generally,
this intervention right cannot be based on an alleged title acquired by
purchase. An example of an individual who would be ineligible to intervene would be a buyer of the association's assets at liquidation by the
superintendent.2
When a building and loan association's board of directors contest
the action of the superintendent in taking possession of the association,
the board's attorneys' fees may be recovered from the assets of the association. This rule holds true regardless of whether the superintendent already
has possession of the business or not. Attorneys' fees are recoverable as
long as the board of directors' action was based upon reasonable grounds
and taken in good faith. Such fees are considered an integral part of
the administrative expenses of the building and loan association, even if
the contested action against the superintendent ultimately proves unsuccessful. -

If an association's board of directors, officers, shareholders, agents,
and attorneys were restrained or enjoined from doing anything which
might directly or indirectly affect the association's assets after a takeover,
the association and its directors would be deprived of all power and authority to enter into any type of contract. This would necessarily bar them
from employing an attorney to represent the association in a good faith
20 Ouxo REV. CODE ANN. § 1157.03 (Page 1968).
20 Seekamp v. Warner, 53 Ohio App. 166, 171, 4 N.E.2d 406, 409 (1935).
21
Wargo v. Superintendent of Bldg. & Loan Ass'ns, 119 Ohio App. 243, 199 N.E.2d 16
(1963).
22Pickeral, Schaeffer, & Eberline v. Merion, 45 Ohio LaW Abs. 23, 28, 66 N.E.2d 273, 276

(Ct. by
App.
1943).
Published
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contest of a takeover by the superintendent. To prevent such an abuse,
the superintendent's discretion is subject to the control of the courts."
Liquidation proceedings against insolvent savings and loans have been
analogized to liquidation proceedings instituted against delinquent insurance
companies by the Insurance Commissioner," whose duties as conservator
are in the nature of those of a trustee or receiver.25 Since, in that setting, attorneys' fees are recoverable against the assets of the insurance company,
they may be recovered in a liquidation proceeding against a savings and
loan association.
When the association becomes insolvent and is taken over by the
superintendent, whose duties are analogous to those of a receiver, the rights
and liabilities of the members or stockholders are affected. The insolvency
of a building and loan association reduces available and collectable assets
below the level of stock paid in by its shareholders. Therefore, the association may be able to pay its debts but it is unable to repay the contributions of its shareholders.2" Once the association is dissolved, the shareholders, have no hope that their contributions might be returned through
the investments and reinvestments of the association.
The stockholder has no further duty to make regular stock payments
since all membership duties end with the association." However, if members have borrowed money from the association and are repaying it in installments, they may be compelled to pay immediately the balance due
when the association is deemed insolvent and dissolution proceedings are
commenced."5
This accelerated liability to association members could have staggering consequences because many association members might be unable
to pay back unpaid balances on notes payable to the association. It appears,
however, that the debts of the members become immediately due and collectible regardless of the time payments specified in their contracts.
If an association has assets which will permit an interest payment
to depositing creditors at the time of liquidation, such payment will not
be made under the terms of the original contract. The association's insolvency renders the original contract null and void. The payments will, however, be made under the general statute governing the rate of interest
payable on claims such as the depositors have against the association. 9
23 Id.at 30 (citing Assets Realization Co. v. Defrees, 225 Ill.
508, 512, 80 N.E. 263, 264

(1907)).
2

1'Id. (citing Anderson v. Great Republic Ins. Co., 41 Cal. App. 2d 181,
(1940)).

106 P.2d 75

2
5Warner
2

v. Mutual Bldg. & lnv. Co., 128 Ohio St. 37, 43, 190 N.E. 143, 146 (1934).
eld. at 45, 190 N.F. at 147.
R Id.
28 U
2
Goldzwis
v.
Merion,
45
Ohio
Law Abs. 270, 67 N.E.2d 723 (1943).
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This will be true even if the rate of interest stated in the contract is less
than the statutory rate." Recent economic conditions, however, make this
situation unlikely to occur.
If a building and loan association cannot pay interest to depositing
creditors because of insufficient assets, such payments will be sacrificed.
Furthermore, the creditors may be forced to relinquish their investment
if the association lacks deposit insurance.
A building and loan association stockholder may also be a depositor
with the same association. After association insolvency, the superintendent
could attempt to hold such a stockholder liable for the unpaid part of his
stock subscription. Should such an event occur, the stockholder could be
entitled to set off this claim with a claim for the money he has deposited
with the association.31 This could be an effective limitation on stockholder
liability for unpaid stock subscriptions.
The Ohio Revised Code indicates that an immediate transfer of title
and possession of all association assets occurs when the superintendent posts
32
takeover notices on the building and loan association's doors. The possession
of association assets and title is immediately transferred to the superintendent. 3 The notice posting itself, without the execution or delivery of any instruments of conveyance, assignment, transfer, or endorsement, vests the title
3
to all such assets in the superintendent of building and loan associations. '
This vesting of title operates as a bar to any attachment, garnishment, execution, or other proceeding against the association or its assets or liabilities."
Insolvency of a building and loan association does not affect prior
completed transactions. Subsequent to the takeover, however, it does prevent withdrawal by a member, as well as barring perfection of an imperfect
withdrawal.
The privilege of withdrawing stock deposits or matured stock
shall cease as of the time of such posting and all withdrawal values
shall be then fixed; and interest on deposits shall thereupon cease
to accrue at the rate specified in the contracts of deposit, but without
prejudice to the rights of depositors to receive interest, with other
creditors, from the date of such posting, out of the funds produced
by the liquidation of such association, before distribution thereof is
made to shareholders on their shares. Such posting shall also terminate
the authority of such building and loan association to issue or sell
SOWeinreich v. Franklin Say. & Loan Co. 77 Ohio App. 1, 9-10, 63 N.E.2d 38, 41 (1945),
appeal dismissed, 146 Ohio St. 127, 64 N.E.2d 322 (1945).
31 Niles v. Olszak, 87 Ohio St. 229, 237, 100 N.E. 820, 823 (1912).
, 2 Omo Rsv. Coon ANN. § 1157.04 (Page 1968).
ald.
" Id.
35 Id.by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1982
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its stock or receive subscriptions therefore or payments thereon, or
to receive deposits. 36
After insolvency, a member's notice of withdrawal to a building and
loan association has no effect." This prevents a stockholder in an insolvent
association from attempting to change his status from stockholder to
creditor by withdrawing from the association. Any attempt to withdraw
must be started and completed before the superintendent posts notice of
takeover on the doors of the building and loan association. 8 If the withdrawal is effected before insolvency, the rule precluding the withdrawing
association member from assuming the position of a creditor does not come
into effect.39 In a suit by the shareholder on a withdrawal certificate, insolvency of the association can be a bar to the shareholders' full recovery."
After an association has made payments to a withdrawing member or an
obligation due by the association, the money paid cannot be recovered. Any
right of action for recovery rests in the association's remaining stockholders."
An interesting situation occurs when the liquidated building and loan
association has ample assets to pay dividends to the depositors and creditors
equal to the principal sum of their respective claims. "2 These depositors and
creditors are also entitled to interest on their principals which they have
already been paid. This interest is payable out of the assets still remaining
in the hands of the liquidating agent (superintendent) before distribution
may be made to the stockholders. If the extra funds are present because
of payments of super-added liability by the stockholders, equity would
require that the stockholders participate in the distribution of the funds
made available by the reason of payment of their liability. At least one
Ohio court however has decided the issue differently:
The provisions of the Constitution impose an additional liability against
stockholders of corporations authorized to receive money on deposit
to the extent of the par value of stock, in addition to the amount invested "for all contracts, debts, and engagements of said corporation."
The relationship between the depositors and the bank is that of
creditor and debtor. The general interest statute provides that the
creditor shall be entitled to interest at the rate of six percent per
annum, and the provisions of the statute are broad and inconclusive
in their terms. The amounts due and owing by the bank to its depositors and creditors, when it is taken for legislation, are debts within
the meaning of the Constitutional provision. The fund having been
8

30mo GEN. CODE § 687-3 (current version at Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 1157.04).
37

Fuzzy v. Dept. of Fin. Inst., 109 Ind. App. 601, 609, 37 N.E.2d 24, 27 (1941).

39 ld.
89
0

id.

4 In re Natl Bldg., Loan & Provident Ass'n, 12 Del. Ch. 93, 107 A. 453 (1919).
41 Young v. Stevenson, 180 Ill. 608, 54 N.E. 562 (1899).
S2in re Sun Say. Bank Co., 4 Ohio Op, 519 (C.P. 1936).
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created by the stockholders, not as a voluntary contribution, but by
reason of an obligation imposed upon them by law and for the purpose
of satisfying and discharging all contracts, debts, and engagements
of the bank, it seems quite clear that no doctrine of equity is applicable
here requiring a refund to the stockholders until the claims of the
depositors and creditors have been satisfied in full, including interest3
authorized to be paid under the terms of the general interest statute.'
As previously stated, when the superintendent takes over a building
and loan association for liquidation, any contract between certificate of
deposit holders and the association regarding the rate of interest paid by
the association of the certificate is rescinded. Thereafter, the general interest statute" takes effect. Any resolution adopted by the association during
liquidation, calling for the payment of the balance due depositors with interest at the respective contract rates on all claims of deposit to be effective
as of a certain date, cannot reinstate any of the contract rates of interest
3
entered into by the association prior to its original insolvency.'
An association under liquidation can offer partial payment to its
certificate of deposit holders. Partial payment would be any payment less
than the full amount due the holder. The holders can accept the partial
payment, but such acceptance will not be treated as an accord and satisfaction." This will not prevent the creditor from proceeding to recover
the full balance of his claim. If a contract has been executed pursuant to
the partial payment agreement, however, there would be an accord and
satisfaction which would release the association from liability on the balance." A creditor may repudiate this contract to avoid the recovery limitations of an accord and satisfaction.
Prior to 1975, section 1151.33 of the Ohio Revised Code provided
that a building and loan association could accumulate reserves from its
earnings for the payment of losses and an undivided profit fund. This accumulated reserve could be loaned and invested in the same manner as the
associate's other funds."1 This section was amended in 1975. It now requires
that a building and loan association implement and maintain loss reserves
and net worth accounts in adequate amounts to assure the association's
solvency. "
After an association has been in corporate existence for twenty years,
it is required to maintain a minimum balance of five percent of its aggre'AId. at 520.
44 OHro REv. CODE ANN. § 1343.03 (Page Supp. 1981). (The current rate is eight percent
per annum).
45 Weinreich v. Franklin Say. & Loan Ass'n, 77 Ohio App. 1, 7, 63 N.E.2d 38, 42 (1945).
4eId.

41 Id.
48 OMO
49Id.

RV. CODE ANN. § 1151.33 (amended 1975).

§ 1151.33 (Page Supp. 1981).
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gate savings account balances. The aggregate balances are determined on
the annual closing date after the association's twentieth year, or the average
of such aggregate on such date, and the one to four consecutive closing dates
immediately preceding such date.5" The sole purpose of maintaining this
net worth account is to absorb losses that are, or could be incurred by the
building and loan association."'
The superintendent has the authority and the duty to issue regulations
providing a uniform schedule of minimum reserve account levels to be
reached by an association during the first twenty years of its existence."'
This schedule enables the association to achieve an orderly accumulation
53
of the reserve account.
The superintendent appears to have discretionary power to permit an
association with a reserve account deficiency to remedy the deficiency. This
is accomplished by requiring the board of directors to earmark pledged
savings accounts, capital stock, contributed surplus, or undivided profits
as part of the reserve account in an amount necessary to compensate for
the deficiency.'
Unlike its predecessor, present section 1151.33 expressly prohibits an
association from paying dividends or interest from the reserve account or
other funds earmarked for the purpose of meeting the reserve account requirement. 5
Section 1151.33 (B) of the Ohio Revised Code requires each building
and loan association to calculate its total net worth at each annual closing
date. This is accomplished by the application of the schedule of percentages
to the several categories of assets in which the association has invested its
funds. 6 The superintendent is required to issue a rule providing for a uniform schedule of percentages to be used for the purposes of this computa57
tion.
The amount of the loss reserve and other net worth accounts an association will be required to maintain will be the greater of either the required reserve of division (A) of section 1151.33 or the net worth requirements of division (B). 8
Maintenance of the required loss reserves and net worth accounts ac5O Id. § 1151.33 (A).
IlId.
82

Id.

" id.

" Id.
"Id.
so Id. § 1151.33 (B).

"ild.
is Id,
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superintendent's percentage schedules appears to be crucial
the statutory solvency of the building and loan association
the required reserves quickly indicates to the superintendent
financial health.

If a superintendent finds that a building and loan association is in an
"unsafe or unsound condition, or that it is conducting its business in whole
or in substantial part contrary to law,"5 he has two alternatives to taking
possession and control. He may order the association to self-liquidate, or
he may require rehabilitation and reorganization.
Section 1157.23 of the Ohio Revised Code authorizes self-liquidation
by order of the superintendent. The issuance of such an order has the effect
of an election by all association stockholders to dissolve."0 After such action, the association can no longer accept deposits, issue stock, or pay withdrawals of stockholders or creditors."' During self-liquidation, the board of
directors is still entitled to exercise all other powers vested by sections
1701.01 to 1701.98 inclusive, of the Ohio Revised Code, in the directors
of a corporation electing to dissolve.5" The written consent of the superintendent must be secured by the board to validate the exercise of any
other such power, except the collection of debts due the association."'
The superintendent supervises the self-liquidation process and, at his
discretion, may require periodic progress reports from the association. "
Should the superintendent discover that the self-liquidation is being accomplished improperly, he may take possession of the association's business and
property and complete the liquidation himself, as provided in sections
1157.01 to 1157.29 inclusive, of the Ohio Revised Code. 5 All expenses
incurred by the superintendent in supervising the self-liquidation are assessed to, and payable by, the association.6
If the affairs of an association could be put back in a "safe and sound
condition" by adjusting or sustaining the association's capital structure,
the superintendent could order the association to reorganize or rehabilitate
as provided in sections 1157.24, 1157.25, and 1151.61 of the Ohio Revised Code. Upon the issuance of such an order, the association would
no longer be authorized to receive deposits. A trustee, however, could be
appointed by the superintendent to preserve deposits if the association so
elected. 6'
91d. 1 1157.01.
old. § 1157.23 (Page 1968).

01 Id.
a Id.
"I d.
64 Id.
'AId.

"Id.

6IId.
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The superintendent must approve a plan for rehabilitation or reorganization submitted by the board of directors." If the superintendent
approves the plan, the board is required to carry it into execution. 9 If the
board of directors fails to execute a rehabilitation plan during the time
fixed by the superintendent, he may institute proceedings for the liquidation
of the association under sections 1157.01 to 1157.29 inclusive of the Ohio
Revised Code, without any further examination."0 Regardless of the implementation of either of these two options by the association, the superintendent
may still take possession of the association business and property at any
7
time. 1
By necessity, the superintendent of building and loan associations in
Ohio performs multiple functions. Above all, the superintendent serves as
an administrator. The office supervises, regulates and oversees the entire state
building and loan industry. The authority and responsibility delegated to the
office is awesome, given the size and importance of the industry. Every
decision the superintendent makes affects the banking public. Stability of
the building and loan industry is crucial to Ohio's economy. Creditor, depositor, and stockholder confidence in the stability is of vital importance.
Rising inflation, unemployment, and interest rates certainly do not
make the job of the superintendent any easier. It is a monumental responsibility to make certain that a banking citizen's reliance and confidence in
his local building and loan association is not misplaced.
When the superintendent has reason to believe that an association is in
an unsafe or unsound condition, or that it is conducting its affairs contrary
to law, an important decision must be made. The interest of the superintendent in stability of the local institution must be balanced against the stability
of the entire building and loan industry. Taking possession of a building
and loan institution has an impact on the industry at large.
When the superintendent decides that circumstances dictate the taking
of possession, this action must be taken decisively, quickly, and without
undue delay. Due process rights of the association, its stockholders, creditors,
and depositors are preserved by judicial review of the superintendent's action after possession. Judicial review is provided for before any "final determination" that the association should be dissolved or liquidated can be
made by the superintendent.
Due to recent economic developments in Ohio and nationwide, the
importance of the superintendent's actions will increase. Necessarily, the
"id.
U

Id.

To ld. I 1157.2S.

n Id.
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decisions made by the office will be scrutinized much more carefully. This
scrutiny will ultimately be accomplished through the use of the courts.
B.

Due Process and JudicialReview
In Ohio, the superintendent of building and loan 2 associations is authorized by statute"' to summarily take possession of an insolvent statechartered savings and loan institution. The purpose of this article is to familiarize the reader with the statutes that give the superintendent this power
and to examine the case law which interprets some of these statutes." Due
to the unique nature of the subject, however, Ohio courts have had few
opportunities to address the issues examined here and any opinions that were
written on the subject are now four or five decades old. Although the courts
have upheld the superintendent's authority to take possession of a savings
and loan without a prior hearing, changes in the field of constitutional law
over the past forty or fifty years may provide an opportunity to challenge
the superintendent's authority.
This article will analyze some of the arguments that have been used
to attack a superintendent's summary proceeding and give the reader an
idea of how the courts have treated these arguments. Also, the pertinent
Ohio statutes will be examined in order to outline the extent of the superintendent's power and to highlight the legislature's provisions for judicial
review of the superintendent's actions.
1. Statutory Authority
The powers of the Ohio superintendent of building and loan associations
seem, at first glance, to be clearly delineated in the statutes. The superin5
tendent's office heads the Division of Building and Loan Associations
which is an agency within the Department of Commerce."' The Revised
Code explicitly provides that the authority of the superintendent is not subject to that of the Director of Commerce." Rather, the legislature has mandated that any delegation of power to the superintendent is to come only from
the statutes."
ent.'

The Code outlines some specific powers and duties of the superintendThese powers include conducting special examinations of building

T?This is considered a variety of savings and loan association. Bi.ci's LAw DiCTIONARY 176
(rev. 5th ed. 1979).
IsOmo Rnv. CoDE ANN. § 1157.01 (Page Supp. 1981).
7,Omo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 1157.01-.29 replaces OHno GEERAL CODE §§ 687-678.23. Since
all the Ohio case law cited in this article predates the adoption of the Revised Code, the
opinions refer to § 687 of the General Code.
I$ Ono Rav. CoDE AN. § 121.08 (Page Supp. 1981).
Is Id.

91 Id.
IsId.
19Id. ch. 1155 (Page 1968 & Supp. 1981).

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1982

49

Akron LawAKRON
Review,LAW
Vol. 15
[1982], Iss. 3, Art. 3
REVIEW

[Vol. 15:j,

and loan associations at the superintendent's discretion,8" requesting reports
on the financial status of such associations," and making the results of these
examinations available to the public." The superintendent is required by law
to make an annual examination of the member associations, the results of
which he must report." Under these statutes, the legislature has clearly defined the limits of the superintendent's authority to regulate the industry.
The supervisory and enforcement powers are not as specifically defined
in the statutory provision giving the superintendent the authority to take
possession of an association.8" This lack of specificity, along with the fact
that the superintendent's action is not reviewable until after the seizure, has
been the basis of many of the suits concerning this type of proceeding. The
following are some of the arguments which have been tendered on behalf
of savings and loan associations whose assets have been seized.
2.

Due Process
It has been argued that a statute such as section 1157.01 is void because
it is violative of the rights guaranteed the association, its directors, shareholders, depositors, and creditors under the due process clause. 5 In particular, the summary nature of the superintendent's action under this statute
has come under fire. Although a hearing before a court of common pleas
to contest the seizure and ensuing liquidation is provided for," the legislature
has not made the hearing available until after the damage is done, in other
words, after the association and its assets have already been seized. Notice
of the superintendent's action is given at the time possession is taken,8" but
there is no opportunity for the association to halt the takeover.
The United States Supreme Court has held that, in instances where
an individual's property is to be taken, the individual must first be given the
"opportunity to be heard." 8 Furthermore, the Court has stated that the
901d. § 1155.10 (Page Supp. 1981).
81

1d. § 1155.07 (Page Supp. 1981).
82d. § 1155.12 (Page 1968).
83 d. § 1155.09 (Page 1968).
84 Omo Rv. CODE ANN. § 1157.01 (Page 1981), provides that:
If upon examination the superintendent of building and loan associations finds that the
affairs of a domestic building and loan association are in an unsound or unsafe condition,
that it is conducting its business in whole or in substantial part contrary to law, that
it is failing to comply with the law, or that its affairs are not being conducted for the
best interests of its depositors, shareholders, or creditors, he may forthwith take possession of the business and property of such building and loan association.
85 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
MeOmo REv. CODE ANN. § 1157.03 (Page Supp. 1981).
87 Id. § 1157.02 (Page 1968). According to this section, notice of the possession and liquidation must be given to all interested parties by posting such notice on the door of the
association being seized, by publication, and by filing with a court of common pleas. All

persons having assets in the association must be served personally or by registered mail or
telegraph.
sBGrannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914).
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requisite hearing must "be granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful
manner."8 In a recent procedural due process case, Goldberg v. Kelly, 0
the Supreme Court interpreted this phrase to mean that the hearing must
be at such a time as to allow the owner allegedly being deprived of his
rights or property to present his side of the case before the other side takes
any action."1 When something as important as a person's property is involved, the Court has found that a non-adversial determination of the facts
will not suffice under the Constitution. A decision can be reached only after
both parties have had an opportunity to present evidence, make arguments
on their behalf, and cross examine adverse witnesses. 2
Clearly, this opportunity is not available to the savings and loan institution under chapter 1157 of the Ohio Revised Code. The due process
argument has added impact in this particular situation because the decision
to take possession is left to the discretion of one person. The property rights
of all those owning the assets of the association are subject to the discretion
of the superintendent and they may not present facts or evidence which
might show that that government official was wrong.
The counter argument in procedural due process cases is based on a
balancing test. Although it may be conceded that there is a deprivation of
rights or property without a hearing, the argument is that the rights of
the individual are outweighed by the interest the state has in taking the
property or the right. In Goldberg, which involved the termination of aid
to dependent children, the state's interest was not found to outweigh that
of the individual,"3 but the Court, quoting its opinion in Cafeteria and
Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy," stated that, "consideration of
what procedures due process may require under any given set of circumstances
must begin with a determination of the precise nature of the government
function involved as well as of the private interest that has been affected by
governmental action." 5
In another procedural due process case, Fuentes v. Shevin, 8 the Court
elaborated on the circumstances in which it felt the state's interest in upholding the challenged taking outweighed the interest of the individual. The
circumstances are those in which,
the seizure has been directly necessary to secure an important governmental or general public interest. Second, there has been a special
89Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).

"0397 U.S. 254 (1970).
91 Id. at 266.
told. at 267-268 (Harlan, J., concurring).
98
The state's interest was in easing its financial burden by not paying ineligible persons.
04367 U.S. 886, 895 (!961).
95 397 U.S. at 270.
"407 U.S. 67 (1972).
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need for very prompt action. Third, the State has kept very strict control over its monopoly of legitimate force: the person initiating the
seizure has been a government official responsible for determining,
under the standards of a narrowly drawn statute, that it was necessary
and justified in the particular instance.9 7
This test would allow the summary seizure of an association by the
superintendent under chapter 1157 of the Ohio Revised Code if Ohio
courts continue to decide these cases as they have in the past. Although the
Ohio opinions make no mention of procedural due process as such, the
decisions are clearly the result of the courts' balancing the rights of the association against the interests of the public.
Czech Catholic Union v. East End Building and Loan Association"
illustrates the rationale Ohio courts have used in upholding summary actions
by the superintendent. In Czech, the creditors of the association attempted to
enforce the double liability of the shareholders of the institution before the
superintendent had taken over the institution for liquidation." The court held
that the creditors' action would have to "give way to the superior rights of
the superintendent."'' 0 The court reasoned that,
Because of the nature of their business in dealing with the public's
money, state building and loan associations and banks are quasi-public
institutions. They are wholly creatures of statute and transact business
by legislative sanction. They are subject to state regulation and control, not only by virtue of constitutional provisions but also because of
the state's inherent police power. 0 1
The Ohio Supreme Court's approach to the issue is similar to the
Fuentes test. The Ohio court used the concept of "police power"'1 2 to justify
the state's infringement on the creditors' rights, which is what the Fuentes
Court seemed to address when it spoke of seizing property in the name of
"general public interest."'0 3 Both courts also attached great importance to
the fact that the seizure was sanctioned by the legislature.'" This legislative
sanction carries with it a presumption of constitutionality and if the statute
is found to be "narrowly drawn," any allegations that the administrative
agency is, in effect, acting in a judicial capacity, will likely be rejected."0 '
Id. at 91.
99 140 Ohio St. 465, 45 N.E.2d 300 (1942).
-Id. at 466-67, 45 N.E.2d 301. Eight years prior to this takeover, the same association had
been taken over for liquidation and subsequently restored to its corporate rights. The
creditors of the association claimed they should have been paid after the first takeover.
100 Id. at 471, 45 N.E.2d at 302.
101 Id. at 470, 45 N.E.2d at 302. See Allen v. Shaker Heights Savings As'n, 68 Ohio*App.
445, 39 N.E.2d 747 (1941).
102-ld. .
2a 407 U.S. at 91.
204 Id. at 96; 140 Ohio St. at 470, 45 N.E.2d at 302.
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol15/iss3/3
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The Fuentes requirement that there must be a "need for very prompt
action"' 6 is met in a situation involving a superintendent taking over an
insolvent savings and loan. When the Czech court upheld the suspension of
the rights of the association's creditors, it did so because "the nature of
their [savings and loan associations] business in dealing with the public's
money,"" ' warranted prompt action. A summary action is necessary so
that whatever assets are left in an insolvent association can be used to pay
off at least some of the association's debts to its creditors. If creditors of a savings and loan are not paid, the institutions will lose the support of the creditors
in the future. The loser is the public in general, which depends on savings
and loan associations to finance its building ventures and its purchase of real
property. This is why the courts have characterized savings and loan institutions as "quasi-public institutions" which are subject to the state's
police power." 8
Ohio decisions such as Czech would likely stand up under a procedural
due process attack today. Another possible argument, closely related to
the due process argument, is that chapter 1157 is unconstitutional in that
it represents an unlawful delegation by the Ohio legislature of a judicial
function to an executive agency, the Division of Building and Loan Associations.
The framers of the United States Constitution were careful to provide
for a separation of powers between the executive, legislative, and judicial
branches of government. They sought to eliminate the possibility that any
one branch would usurp the powers of the other two branches. When a
legislative body enacts a law which is too broad in its effect, the law may
be found to be unconstitutional because it facilitates an encroachment
by the legislature upon powers traditionally unique to the courts.
The Fuentes test takes into account this concern, in that it requires
that a statute be "narrowly drawn.""' A narrowly drawn statute is necessary
in order to prevent an administrative agency from exceeding its executive
powers. 1 In particular, the concern is that a government official such as
the superintendent, in a summary administrative action under chapter
1157, should be limited by the statute to the determination of legislative
facts and should be prevented from taking an action based on his determination of adjudicative facts.
One commentator"" distinguished these two types of facts. He ex206407 US. at 91.

207 140 Ohio St. at 470, 45 N.E.2d at 302.
108 Id. at 470, 45 N.E.2d at 302.
100 407 U.S. at 91.
.
uOld. at 90-91.
ut Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55 HAHv.
L Rnv.
364 (1942).
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plained that adjudicative facts are facts about the parties and their activities, businesses, and properties.11 Adjudicative facts usually answer the
question of who did what, where, when, how, and why, with what motive
or intent; adjudicative facts are roughly the kind of facts that go to a jury
in a jury case.113 Legislative facts do not usually concern the immediate
parties but are general facts which help the tribunal decide questions of
law and policy and discretion." '
It could be argued that the question of whether or not an association
is in fact insolvent (thereby warranting a takeover by the superintendent)
is an adjudicative fact - that is, one that is normally a question for the
jury. In an action under chapter 1157, the superintendent not only sits as
judge and jury but once he makes a determination of law and fact, he is
empowered to enforce the law by taking possession."' Although a superintendent's power must be general enough to allow him to make decisions
regarding a number of different situations, it must not be so vague as to
give him relatively unlimited power to determine adjudicative facts. An
argument could be made that the powers given to the superintendent in
chapter 1157 are so vague as to be unconstitutional and violative of the
aggrieved association's due process rights.
Administrative agencies, however, must not only "legislatively make
rules, but they must regulate and supervise and direct and control and
investigate - in such ways as to defy separation-of-powers labels."11
There is no clear-cut answer to the question of whether the superintendent's
powers are executive or judicial in nature, and in a challenge to the constitutionality of chapter 1157, the argument must be made that they are
essentially judicial powers.
Unfortunately, for those representing savings and loans, the United
States Supreme Court has held, in Fahey v. Mallonee,1'7 that a statute
similar to chapter 1157118 does not constitute an unconstitutional delegation
of a judicial function. The Court based its decision on reasoning similar
to that of the Ohio court in the Czech case. The United States Supreme
Court also pointed out the importance of an explicitly drawn statute but
found that the federal statute was sufficiently explicit, especially when considering the role the government traditionally had taken in the supervision
of the savings and loan industry." '
112 Id.at 402.
118 Id.
114 Id. at 403.

1150m,-o REv. CODE ANN. § 1157.01 (Page Supp. 1981).
"0 See Davis, supra note 111, at 366.
117332 U.S. 245 (1947).
11
sHome Owners Loan Act of 1933 § 5(d), 48 Stat. 133 (1933)

U.S.C. § 1464(d) (1980)).
119 332 U.S. at 250.
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol15/iss3/3
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The Ohio Supreme Court, in State ex rel. Bettman v. Common Pleas
Court,"'0 added another reason for upholding the summary action, when
it held that a common pleas court could not intervene in the receivership
process undertaken by the superintendent. 1 The Ohio court not only
mentioned the specificity of the statute's provisions, but stressed that "the
adequacy of the remedy provided to protect and preserve the interests of
The remedy
all concerned argues convincingly for its exclusiveness." '
association's
the
of
payment
superintendent's
the
is
of
the court speaks
creditors.
Another factor which is considered in determining whether a summary
administrative proceeding is constitutional is the extent to which decisions
3
made during the proceeding "rest solely on inspections, tests, or elections."'
A federal court of appeals has held that the constitutional procedural requirements do not apply to decisions "as to which there is little room for
difference of opinion, or else upon technical facts like the quality of tea or
the condition of airplanes, as to which administrative hearings have long
been thought unnecessary.""' '
Whether or not a savings and loan is insolvent is not a matter which
might involve a difference of opinion since the criterion for determining
insolvency is well defined.' The determination is broken down to a computable minimum level of reserve funds." Of course, a party might challenge
on the grounds of arbitrariness the legislature's authority to set that particular level.
To summarize, any attack on the constitutionality of chapter 1157 of the
Ohio Revised Code based on unlawful delegation of legislative functions
most likely would be unsuccessful. The United States Supreme Court, Ohio
courts, and the courts of other states"127 have all upheld discretionary summary proceedings of this sort. Since the chances are not good that the
statute enabling this type of action will be declared unconstitutional, the
challenging party must resort to judicial review of the superintendent's proceeding.
Judicial Review
The right of an association to have the actions of the superintendent
reviewed by a common pleas court is found in section 1157.03 of the Ohio
3.

124 Ohio St. 269, 178 N.E. 258 (1931).
Id. at 281, 178 N.E. at 262.
122 Id. at 277, 178 N.E. at 261.
128 Administration Procedure Act of 1966, 5 U.S.C. § 554(a)(3) (1976).
224 Door v. Donaldson, 195 F.2d 764, 766 (D.C. 1952).
Dlo REV. CODE ANN. § 1151.33 (Page Supp. 1981).
25s

120

121

126
2

Id.

1 7 See North Am. Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Richardson, 6 CaL. 2d 90, 56 P.2d 1221 (1936);
State Bank of Minneapolis v. Jones, 184 Minn. 498, 239 N.W. 144 (1931).
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Revised Code." 8 This section provides that certain steps must be taken
by the association before it may have the court review the action. The
process of review must be initiated by the association.""8 Under section
1157.03, the superintendent is required to file with the court a "bill of
particulars specifying the grounds named in section 1157.01" and the "operative facts found by him."1 ' The superintendent is obliged to do this
only if the association has first filed a notice of request for such bill within
seven days after the superintendent has fied his notice of the takeover with
the court. 31 It is important that the association request this bill of particulars if it plans to challenge the action.
Once the association requests the bill of particulars, it may succeed in
having the liquidation of the association dismissed and title to the associations property revested in the association. The former will happen if the
superintendent fails to file the bill within fifteen days after the association
filed its request.'32 The latter remedy becomes a possibility if the superintendent files the bill and the association files an answer and cross-petition
taking issue with the allegations made by the superintendent.' The court
will then set a date for an immediate hearing of the case.' Liquidation proceedings will be dismissed and the title to property will be revested in the
association if the court determines that the "bill of particulars is insufficient
in law or that the superintendent has exceeded or abused his power and
discretion . ..
A party may appeal the finding to the common pleas court.'8" Under
rule 7(B) of the Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure, it seems that a stay
of the trial court's order may be conditioned on the posting of an appeal
bond.3 7 It is unclear whether that requirement applies to both parties. Section 1157.03 states that section 2505.12 of the Revised Code, which provides
that the posting of an appeal bond is not required of a governmental official,
applies in the case of an appeal fied by the superintendent.
Notice should be taken of certain other sections in chapter 1157.
For instance, creditors of the association should be familiar with sections
1157.10 to 1157.12, which give extensive power to the superintendent
128

As affected by Omuo App. R. 7(B).
Rnv. COD ANN. § 1157.03 (1981).

1290Oo

'so Id.
$13
Id.
12

Id.

183

Id.

134 id.
185 Id. See Mutual Home & Say. Ass'n v. Merion, 67 Ohio App. 439, 443, 37 N.E.2d 109,
114 (1941).
See Warner v. Mutual Bldg. & Inv. Co., 128 Ohio St. 37, 190 N.Y. 143 (1934).
UT Omo -Rv.
CoDE ANN. § 1157.03 (Page Supp., 1981), as affected by Omo App. R.
7(B).
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in the liquidation of the association's assets. A creditor should be aware
of the rights he has under the statutes to protect his interests. Although the
superintendent's power under section 1157.10 is extensive, it is subject to
the review of the court of common pleas and, according to the official
comment to that section, "if all or a substantial part of the assets and property [of the association] are to be sold, exchanged or disposed of, the
assent of the holders of two-thirds in principal amount of the claims of un38
secured creditors, depositors and shareholders must be obtained.'
Under section 1157.11, regarding the requirement of hearings concerning the superintendent's liquidation proceedings under section 1157.10,
it is important to note the requirements of notice to unsecured creditors,
depositors, and shareholders of an association. These parties have the right
to be heard at such hearings, and the order entered at the end of the hearing
is not necessarily binding on all parties. A party found to be aggrieved by
the order has the statutory right, with leave of the court, to file an independent suit within ten days after the hearing, challenging the order,
unless two-thirds of such unsecured creditors have already assented to the
order.
Likewise, a debtor of the association should realize that the superintendent is empowered to require the debtor to provide a statement of
his financial condition in order to enable the superintendent to ascertain
the value of the association's assets."' The superintendent, on the other
hand, must give notice of the association's claims to the alleged debtors by
filing with the court of common pleas and by publishing the notice in a
local newspaper.1 4 The creditor then has fifteen days in which to file an
objection to the claim or he is "forever barred from objecting."141
IV.

STATE DEPOSIT GUARANTY FUNDS

Statutory Analysis
As a result of general public mistrust of financial institutions after
1929, the Federal Government created the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation 1 (hereinafter FSLIC). This corporation insures the
accounts of depositors up to a specified amount. Membership in the FSLIC
is available for both federal and state chartered savings and loans. However, when a state chartered savings and loan becomes a member of the
FSLIC, it is required to abide by the federal regulations that apply to fedA.

88 OHo REv. CODiANN.
1891id.§ 1157.05.
140 d. § 1157.06.
Z61

comment to § .1157.10 (Page 1968).

Id.

§§ 1724-30f (1976).
12byU.S.C.
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erally chartered institutions. Since this federal agency was not always sensitive to the needs of the state chartered institutions, a few states opted to
pass legislation enabling the formation of state guaranty associations which
would be an alternative to, and sometimes a supplement to, the FSLIC.
In 1932, Massachusetts took the initiative by forming the Co-operative Central Bank, a part of which was the Share Insurance Fund.2 It was
not until 1957, that Ohio followed the lead and formed a state guaranty
association. Since that time, three other states have created state guaranty
associations: Maryland (Maryland Savings-Share Insurance Corporation,
hereinafter MSSIC) in 1962; North Carolina (The North Carolina Savings
Guarantee Corporation, hereinafter NCSGC) in 1967; and Pennsylvania
(The Pennsylvania Savings Association Insurance Corporation, hereinafter
PSSAIL) in 1979.
As of 1980, only one of these state programs had experienced a loss.
In Massachusetts, the losses amounted to $2.6 million and resulted from
the effects of the 1929 Depression on the Industry.' However, the losses were
easily covered by the state insurance program despite the fact that the program had been in operation for a short time. The principal reasons for
the establishment of these state institutions were many. First of all, state
associations were dissatisfied with the FSLIC because some state saving
institutions experienced difficulties in qualifying for membership in the
FSLIC.' Furthermore, there was an alleged discrimination by the FSLIC
against state chartered institutions and a perceived over-regulation by the
FSLIC. In addition, there was dissatisfaction with the limited liability of
the FSLIC insurance. These feelings of dissatisfaction with the FSLIC were
supplemented by a belief that state programs would be more responsive to
the needs of both state chartered institutions and the general public.5
Two types of statutory schemes were formed by the states; one which
creates an entity which is referred to as the "insurance corporation" or
"corporation" and the other which allows the formation of more than one
insurance corporation in a state. Massachusetts, Maryland and Pennsylvania
have opted to create the single insurance corporation. On the other hand,
North Carolina and Ohio, allow the formation of more than one insurance
corporation. '
The purposes of these insurance corporations, as set forth in the statutes, are basically the same. The major purpose is three-fold: 1) promote
2 Burns, Massachusetts' Share Insurance Fund, 6

THE

aHazelton, 5 States' Alternative to the FSLIC, 7 THE

STATE ADVISOR 22
STATE ADvIsoR 11,

(Feb. 1979).

14 (May 1980).

4Id. at 14.
8Id.
4 As of this date, however, in both Ohio and North Carolina, only one association has been

formed.
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the elasticity and flexibility of the resources of the members; 2) provide for
liquidity of members through a Central Reserve Fund; and 3) insure the savings accounts of members." The unstated purpose for the creations of these insurance corporations seems to be to rid the state savings and loans of federal
control by presenting them with an alternative guarantee association. Presumably, the state control allows their needs to be met with greater flexibility.
Generally, the respective state legislatures granted these insurance corporations several powers to fulfill their purpose. These corporations were
granted power to: 1) give financial assistance to members; 2) buy and sell
property; 3) invest any of their funds; 4) borrow or secure credit; and 5)
except as otherwise provided, they have all the powers, privileges, and immunities granted to other state corporations under the law of individual
states."

The statutory qualifications for membership differ slightly among the
insurance corporations. In Maryland, an institution may become a member
of the corporation by satisfying a two-pronged test. First, after review of
an application, the Director of the Division of Savings and Loan Associations must approve the financial affairs, solvency, management and the
board of directors of the association. In addition, the board of directors
of the corporation may deny membership for good cause shown."

Pennsylvania's statutory language is similar in that it allows membership when the Secretary of Banking approves the quality and soundness of
the association's financial affairs and certifies its solvency, management, and
directorship. The board of directors of the corporation must accept the
association's formal application except that the application may be denied
for good cause shown regarding the soundness of the applicant's financial
affairs, solvency, management or directorship.1 0
North Carolina will not allow membership to NCSGS unless the savings and loan is certified to the corporation by the proper supervisory authority as eligible for insurance of accounts. The supervisory authority also
must not be aware of any reason why said institution should not be insured.
Furthermore, the Board of Trustees of the Corporation have the sole right
to admit additional members to membership in the Corporation on such
terms and conditions as the Board may prescribe.1 Massachusetts allows
GEN. STAT. §§ 54B-244 (Supp. 1981); 7 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6503(a) (Purdon
Supp. 1981); MD. FiNANCAL INST. CODE ANN. § 10-104 (1980); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch.
?N.C.

170 app. § 2-3 (West 1971).
NC. GEN. STAT. § 54B-244 (Supp. 1981); 7 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6503(b)

BSee e.g.

(Purdon Supp. 1982); MD. FINANCIAL INST. CODE ANN. § 10-104 (1980); MASs. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 170 app. § 2-3 (West 1971).
*MD. FINANCL INST. CODE ANN. § 10-107 (1980).
107 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 6505 (Purdon Supp. 1981).
AND REsTATED CHARTER OF NCSGC Art. V § 1 (1980).
OF AMiDmENT 1982
2"Aana.L
Published
by IdeaExchange@UAkron,

59

REVmW
Akron LawAKRON
Review,LAW
Vol. 15
[1982], Iss. 3, Art. 3

[Vol. 15:3

members to join subject solely to the discretion of the Co-operative Central
Bank and the commissioner.12
Additional membership qualifications are enumerated in the by-laws
of the individual state corporations. 3 The by-laws of PSAIC indicates that
that association may not become a member unless it has its principal office
in the Commonwealth and has invested 75% of its total assets in the Commonwealth. In addition no applicant can become a member until its application has been approved by a majority vote of the whole board of directors.
Any applicant whose application has been rejected by the board may, upon
satisfying the requirements of the Rules and Regulations, have its application reviewed by the membership of the Corporation. "
Likewise, the MSSIC requires that the
applicant maintain a principal
office in Maryland and that it have invested 75% or more of its assets in
Maryland. 5 The MSSIC's procedure for admission consists of an initial
screening by the membership committee before the board approves or disapproves of the application."0 The application then is reviewed by the Director
of Savings and Loans before being referred back to the membership committee for a final evaluation."
NCSGC has a similar review procedure for the admission of members.
First of all, the application is reviewed by the Corporation staff under the
direction and supervision of the President of the Corporation which makes
its recommendation of approval or disapproval to the Board of Trustees.
The applicant is given an opportunity to state its case before the Board
of Trustees makes its final decision. Approval of the application requires the
affirmative vote of two-thirds of the Board of Trustees. Said approval may
be with or without conditions.1 "
PSAIC, MSSIC, and NCSGC provide for an avenue of appeal when
an application has been rejected.1 9 NCSGC indicates that an applicant whose
application has been disapproved may appeal the decision to the Administrator of the Savings and Loan Association. o
MSSIC's appeal procedure seems to be a stricter standard for admission
12

MASS. Gm. LAw ANN. ch. 170 app. § 2-11 (West 1971).
3 The Massachusetts Share Insurance Fund refused to supply a copy of its by-laws, indicating that its policy was not to distribute its by-laws to the public. All discussion of this
fund, therefore, is limited to those materials contained in the Massachusetts General Laws.
24 BY-Lws oF PSAIC, Art. V § 1 (1980)
(hereinafter PSAIC).
15 RuLEs AND REGULAtONS OF MSSIC, tit. m, subtit. I § 3-101 (1962).
1eId. § 3-103 (A), (B).
17 id. § 3-103
(C), (D).
18
ISTANDA)DS AMD PRocEuRS oF WCSGC, Art. H1§ 3 (1969).
1
' RuLjs AND REGULATIONs OF MSSIC, § 3-105(2); STANARDS AND PROCEDURES OF NCSGr,
Art. I § 4; RULES AND REnULATIONS OF PSAIC, Art. I § 5.
0 ST.NDAnDS Am PaEocmums or NCSGC, Art. I § 5.
1
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after membership is denied by the Board. The applicant may become a
member of the corporation and obtain all the benefits provided thereby
upon meeting the following conditions: 1) the applicant is certified as eligible for insurance by the Supervisor pursuant to the provisions of state
law; 2) four members of the board of directors must issue a call for a special
meeting of the membership of the corporation; 3) at this special meeting, the
application is accepted by at least 60% of the members entitled to vote
and by members having free share accounts equal to 75% or more of all
free share accounts then insured by the Corporation. 2 ' PSSAIC simply requires the applicant to satisfy the requirements of the Rules and Regulations before review will be made by the Board.Y
All the by-laws include a clause whereby the applicant agrees as a condition precedent to membership to abide by the rules and regulations and
by-laws of each corporation. Generally, the financial institutions also agree
to: 1) abide by amendments to the by-laws; 2) allow examination and audit
reports; 3) allow the corporation free access to its records; 4) abide by the
5) pay all assessments; and 6) comply
rulings of the supervisory authority;
23
procedures.
underwriting
all
with
All the states' plans call for assessments of members in order to fund
the corporation. In fact, assessment is the basic means for raising money
for the funds. Members of the Share Insurance Fund are required to pay
one-half of one percent of all deposits and notes payable, as shown by the
last annual report, and other payments dictated by the Board of Directors
until the net fair value of the Fund's assets equals 3% of its aggregate liability. " Both MSSIC and PSAIC call for a capital contribution of 2% of
the total savings on deposits, with semi-annual adjustments.2 5 NCSGC requires an initial deposit equal to one and one-quarter percent of the member's deposit liability. Additional deposits, requested by the board of trustees,
of up to a maximum of three-quarters of one percent of deposit liability,
must be approved by a majority of members." None of the corporations
allow additional deposits without a seventy-five percent affirmative vote of
all members."'
Failure to make deposits on or before the due date may subject the
AND RGULATONS O' MSSIC, § 3-101.
OF PSAIL, Art. V § 1.
23 Id. § 2; RuLES AND REGULATIONS OF MSSIC, § 3-201. STADARDs AND PROCEDURES OF
NCSGC, Art. M § 1.
24
MAss. GEN. lAws ANN., ch. 170 app. § 2-1 (West 1971).
28RuLES AND REULATIONS OF PSAIC, Art. M § 1 (1980). See Maryland Savings-Share
Insurance Corporation v. United States, 308 P. Supp. 761 (D.C. Md. 1970), rev'd on other
groundi, 400 U.S. 4 (1970).
" STANDAPDS AND PtOCEUES OF NCSGC, Art. IV § 1.
AND REULATIONS OF MSSIC, § 3-304; RuLES AND REoULATIONS OF PSAIC, Art.
2'Rum
OF NCSGC, Art. IV § 2.
M 1 4; STANDA3D AND ftPRE

*'RuL

22 BY-LAws
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member to a penalty or termination. Usually excess deposits will be returned
to the member. MSSIC allows the capital deposit to be paid in installments.
One-half the total deposit is to be paid at the time of acceptance of the applicant as a member of the corporation while one-quarter shall be payable six
months thereafter and the final one-quarter payable twelve months later. 8
One of the services the corporations provide for their members is
financial assistance. Generally, the corporations provide financial assistance
by: 1) lending money to a financial institution; 2) guaranteeing, endorsing,
or acting as a surety on the obligations of the members; 3) establishing and
regulating the terms and conditions of any charges or loans; 4) creating a
central reserve fund; and 5) assisting financially in any other way allowable
by law.
Massachusetts statutory law provides that whenever it appears to the
commissioner that it is advisable or inexpedient for any member bank
to continue to transact the business for which it is organized without receiving financial assistance, he may, in his discretion, notify the corporation."
The Directors then must use their judgment to decide whether financial
assistance will reduce the risk or avert a threatened loss to the corporation."
They may, with the approval of the commissioner, do one or more of the
following: 1) purchase, in whole or in part, assets of the member banks; 2)
make loans to the member bank secured in whole or in part, in such amounts
and upon such terms and conditions as said directors with the approval of
the commissioner may determine; 3) pay to such member bank in accordance with an agreement entered into between such member bank and the
corporation, with the approval of the commissioner, any amount not in excess of the difference between book value of certain or all of its assets and
the fair value thereof, in consideration for which such member bank agrees
to write down such assets to fair value and pay over to the corporation so
much of any net proceeds realized from the sale as in excess of fair value;
4) pay into a guaranty fund or surplus account of such member bank, in accordance with an agreement entered into between such member bank and
the corporation, with the approval of the commissioner, an amount not
in excess of the difference between the book value of certain or all of its
assets and the fair value thereof as determined by the agreement.8 1
The means chosen to assist the member should coincide with the purposes of the corporation. The total financial assistance may not at anytime
exceed a sum equal to the greater of five percent of the share liabilities of
28 RULES AND RjGULATIONS OF MSSIC,
2 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.

§ 3-303.

ch. 170 app. § 2-3(a).

so id.

1Id,
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such institution or five hundred thousand dollars.32 Moreover, Massachusetts
provides for a compromise or settlement with regard to any unpaid balance
left after ten years."
MSSIC may offer financial assistance in order to 1) prevent default;
2) preserve the financial integrity of a member; or 3) restore a member in
default to normal operations as an insured member.3 The corporation may
assist the troubled member by making loans, buying assets at book value
notwithstanding that it may exceed the market value, or make capital contributions to such member in amount in excess of which the corporation
finds to be reasonably necessary to save the expense of liquidating an institution in default or to pay the net loss of any account transferred to such
association." NCSGC and PSAIC provide virtually the same methods for
assisting a member.
These corporations have the power to buy or sell property to further
any of its purposes. The corporations also are allowed to borrow money
and otherwise incur obligations for any of its purposes. Finally, the corporations may invest any of its funds. However, the investment rights are
limited to safe investments by the statutes. For example, Maryland allows
the corporation to invest any of its funds in: 1) cash or deposits in checking or
savings accounts with or certificates of deposits of any bank that is a
member of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation; 2) savings accounts
of any savings and loan association to the extent the accounts are insured
by the FSLIC; 3) obligations of the United States, any state or any of
their commissions, instrumentalities, agencies, authorities, or political subdivisions, and any corporation that is incorporated under the laws of the
United States or any state; 4) readily marketable, dividend paying shares
of any corporation that is incorporated under the laws of the United States
or any state except that it may not invest more than 10% of its total assets
in these shares nor more than 3 % of its total assets in the shares of any
one corporation; 5) any loan that it buys from a member if the loan is
secured by a safe mortgage on otherwise encumbered fee simple real or
improved leasehold property in the state; 6) ground rents in Maryland; and
7) loans secured by any of the above investments.3
One of the purposes of the state guaranty corporations is to enhance
the liquidity of member institutions. This purpose is critical because of the
financial structure of the savings and loans usually is composed of shortterm liabilities and long-term assets. The by-laws of NCSGC, PSAIC, and
S3lId.

" Id.
34 BY-LAWS OF MSSIC, tit. H, subtit. VII § 2-707.
3
3

Id. § 2-207.

6 MD. FINAN

L INST. CODE ANN. § 10-104 (E).
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MSSIC all provide for a certain amount of liquidity. MSSIC requires each
member to maintain a liquidity fund equal to six percent of its total free share
accounts" less the unpaid balance due on loans secured by the accounts. 8
The liquidity fund is the sum of: 1) the member's total cash and federal
funds; 2) the lesser of cost or market value of any obligations to the United
States or instrumentality thereof which have a maturity of ten years or
less; 3) GNMA-backed modified pass-through certificates with a maturity
of more than ten years, and such other instruments having a maturity of
more than ten years which are guaranteed as to principal and interest by
the United States, provided however that the aggregate not exceed twentyfive percent. 4) certificates of deposits issued by banks insured by the FDIC
provided, a) the total investment of certificates of deposit in any one bank
may not exceed one-quarter of one percent of the total deposits of that
bank or one hundred thousand dollars whichever is greater, b) the bank
has an aggregate net worth of at least five million dollars, c) the certificates of
deposit are negotiable or may be redeemed prior to maturity by the member
association at its option; 5) banker's acceptances discountable at the Federal
Reserve Bank; and 6) Central Reserve Fund capital funds."'
PSAIC requires an almost identical liquidity fund. However, it only
requires a fund equal to five percent of its total savings accounts.' ° It provides
that the liquidity fund be composed of: 1) a member's total cash and federal fund; 2) the lesser of cost or market value of any obligations of the
United States or instrumentality thereof of which not less than fifty percent
shall have a maturity of one year or less and the remaining fifty percent shall
have a maturity of five years or less; 1 3) certificates of deposit, provided they
are negotiable and freely marketable or may be redeemed prior to maturity
(not as many limitations as MSSIC); and 4) banker's acceptances discountable at the Federal Reserve Bank. "2 If the board raises the percentage beyond
five percent, an association may fulfill the requirements of two excess percentage points, by means of an unused line of unsecured credit, provided
at least fifty percent of the total unsecured line of credit remains unused.' 3 In
addition, PSAIC gives an association an opportunity, if it believes that there
are appropriate existing circumstances, to present its case to the board and,
upon good cause shown, have the requirements altered." The corporation may
37 RuLEs

AND REGULATIONS OF MSSIC § 3701 defines free share accounts "as the total
interest of a member of an association in the share capital of an association .
38 RULEs AN
391d.

REGUIATIONS OF MSSIC, § 3-210.

§ 3-210(A)(1)-(5).

11 § 10(a).
"MSSIC allows a ten year maturity date. RuLEs AND REGULATIONS OF MSSIC § 3-210
(A) (2) (a).
421d. § l0(a)(1)-(5).
43Id. § 10(a)(5).
4oRuLES An REGULATIONS OF PSAIC, Art.

#4d.
§ 10(c).
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order the member to refrain from investing until it complies with the liquidity requirements. 5
NCSGC also has a liquidity fund requirement of five percent of the
aggregate amount of the shares or deposits outstanding. The liquidity fund
is limited to the following categories: 1 ) obligations of the United States
or agencies thereof; 2) obligations of the government of North Carolina;
3) stock in the Federal Home Loan Bank; 4) bonds assured by the Federal Home Loan Bank; 5) certificates of deposit in the corporation; and
6) deposits in banks approved by a majority of the entire board of directors. "
The by-laws of MSSIC and NCSGC have net worth provisions for
members. Members of NCSGC are required to maintain a net worth of at
least five percent of savings." Net worth is calculated in this section as
total assets less liabilities and may consist of the general reserve for losses,
undivided profits, capital stock, additional paid-in capital and mutual capital certificates.48 Any member failing to meet this requirement must advise
the corporation in writing of its reasons for failing to meet the requirements
and existing circumstances which may justify its position. The corporation
has the discretion to take whatever action it feels necessary.4 9
MSSIC requires only that its members have a total net worth equal to
four percent of the aggregate withdrawal value of its free share accounts.5"
If an association fails to meet the net worth requirements, the corporation
has the option to impose one of the following sanctions: 1) convene a
meeting of the board of directors; 2) restrict or eliminate entirely advertising by the member association; 3) increase its liquidity and maintain such
increased liquidity at specified levels; 4) limit the issuance or renewal of
certificate accounts; 5) reduce the rate of earnings that may be paid on
savings accounts or certificate accounts; 6) limit or cease entirely the
granting of new mortgage commitments and/or the purchase of mortgage
loans, or participation therein; 7) limit operations expenditures to specified levels; 8) take such other actions as the corporation may deem
necessary or appropriate. 5 If total net worth declines to three percent,
the member is required to enter into an assistance agreement.5" Just as
in the PSAIC, the board of MSSIC may waive the net worth requirement
53
for good cause shown.
Id.
46 STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES OF NCSGC, Art. II §
4

7

13.

Id. § 11.

48 Id.
'9 Id.
50
RuLES AND REGULATIONS OF

52Id. § 3-211(C)(1)(a)-(h).
521d. § 3-211(C)(2).
1531d. § 3-211(D).

MSSIC, § 3-211(a)(1).
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Another major impetus in the formation of the state guaranty associations is the insurance of accounts. The state associations sought full insurance, rather than the limited insurance offered by the FSLIC. Massachusetts does not set specific limits as to insurance of accounts. Massachusetts
allows a member to become a member of the FSLIC at the same time. No
member bank, however, may become a member of the FSLIC as long as
any financial assistance granted by Share Insurance Fund to the member
remains unpaid or has not been compromised or settled.' It appears that
the Share Insurance Fund covers all deposits that are above the FSLIC
limit. 55
The statute forming the MSSIC states that the corporation may set
insurance limits in the by-laws, but those limits may never exceed current
FSLIC limits plus ten thousand dollars.5" MSSIC adopts the exact statutory
language in its by-laws.5 MSSIC requires an "event of default" as a condition precedent to its payment of insurance.5 8 Event of default means for
any member: 1) its adjudication in bankruptcy in accordance with any applicable law of the United States; 2) the appointment of a conservator for
its affairs by a court of competent jurisdiction in accordance with the laws
of this state or any other state in which such member is domiciled; or 3) the
appointment of a receiver for its affairs.5
The Pennsylvania statute makes no mention of the limit of the corporation's liability. However the by-laws indicate that the limit of liability
for which PSAIC may be required to pay for each separate account shall
be the amount of the prevailing insurance available from the FSLIC. °
Just as in Maryland, no payments shall be made unless an event of default
occurs. 1 However, "event of default" is defined as the taking of possession
of the association by the Department of Banking or the Secretary of Banking pursuant to the Code of Banking.6"
NCSGC insures members' accounts up to the FSLIC limit.6 The
liability occurs in the event of default or liquidation. Default is defined as
"the inability of a member of satisfy its obligations to its depositors" as
determined by the President of the Corporation, subject to the approval
of the Administrator of Savings and Loan Associations.'
54

MAss GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 170 app. § 2-14(b).

5

5 Id. § 2-16.
56

MD. FINANCIAL INST. CODE ANN. § 10-105.

5? BY-LAws

or MSSIC, § 2-702.
5S Id. § 2-703.
59 ld.
e0 BY-LAws or PSAIC, Art. VII § 2.
61 Id. § 3.
62
Id. PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6020-224 (Purdon Supp. 1981).
" STANDARDS AND PRocFums oF NCSGC, Art. VII § 1(a).
" Id. § 2(a).
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Only Massachusetts mandates that the associations become members of
the corporation.65 However, Maryland requires any state chartered institution
to be a member of either MSSIC or FSLIC."0 The other states permit a
voluntary withdrawal with a few limitations. MSSIC allows a member to
withdraw after giving twelve months notice in writing." Additionally, the
member may not be in default of any of its obligations at the time of notice
or withdrawal."8 The corporation may, upon the affirmative vote of seven
(of eleven) members of its Board of Directors, at a meeting called to consider a notice of withdrawal, permit the member to withdraw at the
end of such period less than twelve months from the date of giving such
notice as may be specified by the board. 9 Upon resignation, the member
is entitled to its proportionate share of the fund (i.e. its deposits and any
interest thereon). The withdrawing member is required to notify each of its
free shareholders of the termination, and the withdrawal of any assets
will not be allowed until the member gives proof of such notice. 0 In the
event the member fails to give notice as required, the corporation, after
sixty days, will give such notice at the expense of the withdrawing member. 7 '
PSAIC provides for a procedure of withdrawal which is virtually identical
to that of MSSIC. 2
Likewise, NCSGC requires a twelve month written notice of a member's intent to withdraw. The member must not be in default and must
have repaid any obligation owing to the corporation.7 3 The withdrawal may
be accelerated upon a vote of the members whose deposit liability equals
seventy-five percent of the total deposit liabilities of all members. Upon said
approval, the member may be permitted to withdraw after a two month
period." The member must give notice to its depositors in a way and manner determined by the corporation."
All the insurance corporations provide in their by-laws for the expulsion of any member and any termination of insurance. MSSIC will
expel a member if: 1) it is violating any provisions of the laws of Maryland;
2) it is conducting unsafe or unsound business practices in the practicing of
its business; 3) it is in violation of any of the by-laws, rules, or regulations
e3 MASS. GEN,. LAws ANN. ch. 170 app. § 2-1.
6
6 MD. FINANCuIL IrsT. CODE § 9-426.
87 RULEs AND REGULATIONS OF MSSIC, § 3-501.

§ 3-501.
eId. § 3-502.
T0 id. § 3-504.
71 Id. § 3-504.
T RuLES AND REGULATIONS OF PSAIC, Art. V §§ 1-4.
T
STrtRDS AND PRocED tRS Op NCSGC, Art. VI § 1.
68Id.

74Id. 1 1.
"Iid. § L.
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of MSSIC; or 4) it has had any insurance terminated by the FSLIC."0 If
the corporation is contemplating expulsion of a member, it will furnish
such member a statement outlining the violations. The member has thirty
days to solve the problem. If a satisfactory correction has not been made,
the Board will grant the member an additional thirty days to correct the
problem. A hearing will be held and the member may be expelled upon the
affirmative vote of seven members." The member, upon termination, is
required to notify its depositors and if it fails to do so, the corporation will
do so at the member's expense. PSAIC follows MSSIC's expulsion procedure
verbatim except that the provision whereby a membership may be terminated
if the member has had its FSLIC insurance terminated has been deleted."'
The Board of Trustees of NCSGC may, by the affirmative vote of
two-thirds of the entire board, terminate a member's membership in the
corporation for a violation of any of the corporation's rules and regulations."9
The member must notify its depositors of the termination. However, it has
a right to appeal to the supervisory authority.8"
The guaranty associations are given perpetual existence. North Carolina, Maryland, and Pennsylvania have no provisions for dissolving the
associations. In Massachusetts, if eighty percent of all members who are
not also members of FSLIC, vote affirmatively to dissolve the corporation,
the Fund will be dissolved."
The survey of four state alternatives to FSLIC shows that there are
many common areas in the schemes. Their purposes and powers are similar.
Supervision by someone at the state government level is required by all
four schemes. The statutes of Maryland and Pennsylvania are very similar.
In conclusion, all the state schemes attempt to be more responsive to
the needs of the state chartered associations. The advantages of the dual
system of regulation are that it provides an option of regulation at the
federal or state level, prevents regulatory agencies from abusing their powers, and permits greater diversity within the overall national financial system."l The stability and viability of the state guaranty corporations will be
scrutinized by many other state legislatures. The state-authorized deposit
insurance corporations represent a viable option, if the structure of the
industry and the loss experience of savings institutions within the particular
state indicate that the estimated risks can be covered by a structure of
'IRuLS AD REGULATIONS OF MSSIC, § 3-601(A)-(D).

77Id. § 3-602.
78

RuLEs AND REGULATIONS OF PSAIC, Art. VI §§ 1-4.
STANDAr
S AND PROCEDURES OF NCSGC, Art. VI § 2.
e0Id. § 2.
-................
8
2 MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 170 app. § 2-9.
2Burns, supra note 2, at 11.
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assessments less than the existing charge for insurance being made by the
FSLIC. 3
Deposit GuarantyFundsas State Agencies
Whether a state or federal deposit guaranty fund or insurance corporation is considered an "agency" is an important consideration the scope
of review of the corporation's activity. All of the states in question and the
federal government have enacted some form of an Administrative Procedure
Act (hereinafter APA). The primary purpose of an APA, such as the
federal APA, is to insure that the "administrative policies affecting individual
rights and obligations be promulgated pursuant to certain stated procedures
so as to avoid the inherently arbitrary nature of unpublished ad hoc determinations."8 Thus, most Acts have procedures for promulgating rules,85 for
public disclosure of its records,"8 and for giving notice of its hearings.

B.

If a deposit guaranty fund or insurance corporation is an agency, its
procedures necessarily will be subject to strict review under the requirements of the specific APA. If, on the other hand, it is not an agency, judicial
review of its procedure might be more difficult. This segment will focus
on Ohio law to determine whether the Ohio Deposit Guaranty Fund (hereinafter ODGF) is a state agency. By way of comparison, an examination
of the Federal Savings and Loan Corporation (hereinafter FSLIC) and
other state funds will also be made.
Ohio Deposit Guarantee Fund
If an entity in Ohio is an agency 8 it must comply with Ohio's APA.8 9
An entity is considered an agency for purposes of the APA if it is specifically
named in the definition of "agency" as given in section 119.01 (A) of the
Ohio Revised Code, is subjected to the APA by the entity's enabling legislation or "has the authority of issuing, suspending, revoking or cancelling
licenses."8 "
1.

The Ohio courts, in determining whether an entity is an agency, have
held that if an entity does not meet any of the above-mentioned criteria,
it is not considered an agency.91 In Karrick v. Bd. of Education,2 the plainSId. at 15.
S4 Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 232 (1974).
85See e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976).
" See e4g., Id. § 552.
OT See e.g., Id. § 554.
"Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 119.01(A) (Page Supp. 1981).
9 Omo REV. CODE AtNr. §§ 119.01 to 119.13 (Page 1978 & Supp. 1981).
90 General Motors Corp. v. McAvoy, 63 Ohio St. 2d 232, 235, 407 N.E.2d 527, 529 (1980).
OSee Karrick v. Bd. of Education, 174 Ohio St. 466, 190 N.E.2d 256 (1963); Fair v.,
School Employees Retirement Sys., 44 Ohio App. 2d 115, 335 N.E.2d 868 (1975); In re
Lauderbach, 63 Ohio App 2d 157, 410 N.E.2d 773 (1978).
St. 466, 190 N.E.2d
02 174
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tiffs contended that certain rules enacted by the municipal school board were
void because they were not adopted in accordance with the Administrative
Procedure Act.9 3 The Ohio Supreme Court held that the municipal board
was not an agency as defined by section 119.01(A) of the Ohio Revised
Code because the "statutory language clearly indicates that only agencies
at the state level of government are covered by the act."9 Hence, the
municipalboard was not an agency.
The Ohio court of appeals in Fair v. School Employees Retirement
System, 5 has held that the School Employees Retirement Board is not a
state agency because it does not fall into the definition of "agency" in section
119.01 (A). In Fair, the plaintiff contended that he had a right to appeal
from an order of the School Employees Retirement Board under section
119.12 of the Ohio Revised Code."' But since the court found that the
Board was not an agency for purposes of Ohio's APA, the plaintiff did not
have a right of "appeal pursuant to R.C. 119.12, from any order or adjudication of the School Employees Retirement Board." ' 7
In General Motors Corp. v. McAvoy,98 the Ohio Supreme Court was
called upon to determine whether the Environmental Board of Review was
an agency for purposes of Ohio's APA. 9 The court looked to the definition
of agency contained in section 119.01(A) and the three alternative criteria mentioned therein. The court held that since the Board of Review is
not named in the definition, and does not have the authority to issue, suspend,
remove or cancel licenses, it is not an "agency" subject to the provisions of
the APA.
The Ohio court of appeals has indicated that although an entity may
generally be considered an "agency," it is not an agency for purposes of
the APA if it does not meet any of the criteria set forth in section 119.01
(A)."° In In re Lauderbach the court stated that "although the Department
of Agriculture is an agency within the broad sense of the word, it is not
an agency within the definition of R.C. 119.01(A)."'' This indicates
that it is necessary for an entity to come within the specific language of
section 119.01(A) in order to be considered a state agency.
Thus, the ODGF is an Ohio agency only if it meets one of the three
93 Id.

Id. at 469, 190 N.E.2d at 257. (emphasis added).
9544 Ohio App. 2d 115, 335 N.E.2d 868 (1975).
90Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 119.12 (Page Supp. 1981) provides that "(a)ny party adversely
affected by any order of an agency issued pursuant to any other adjudication may appeal to
the court of common pleas of Franklin county.
(emphasis added).
97 44 Ohio App. 2d at 117, 335 N.E.2d at 870.
98 63 Ohio St. 2d 232, 407 N.E.2d 529 (1980).
99 Id.
100In re Lauderbach, 63 Ohio App. 2d 157, 410 N.E.2d 773 (1978).
ld. at 161, 410 N.E.2d at 777.
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definitions of an agency. The ODGF is not specifically named in the
definition of agency" ° ' so it cannot be considered an agency on the basis
of the first definition.
The second possible way that ODGF could be considered a state
agency is if its enabling legislation 0 3 specifically makes the corporation
subject to Ohio's APA. Nowhere in the enabling legislation is it stated
that the ODGF is to be subject to the state's APA. The word "corporation"
rather than "agency" is used throughout the enabling legislation which
would seem to indicate that it is not to be considered an agency. Additionally, "deposit guaranty association" is defined as "an association organized under the provisions of sections 1151.81 to 1151.86, inclusive...
and not as an agency.
Therefore, the only way that the ODGF might be considered an
agency is if it has the authority to issue, suspend, remove or cancel licenses." "License" as defined by Ohio's APA "means any license, permit,
certificate, commission, or charter issued by the agency."'
In Home Savings & Loan Association v. Boesch,"' the Ohio Supreme
Court discussed the licensing function of the superintendent of building
and loan associations. The Falls Savings and Loan Association filed an application requesting that the establishment of a new branch office in Kent
be approved by the superintendent."0 8 The Home Savings and Loan Association opposed the application and appealed the approval in the Court
of Common Pleas pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act. The
Court of Appeals stated that the approval of a branch office by the superintendent "is a 'licensing function' sufficient to require the procedural safeguards of the Administrative Procedure Act."' 9 The Supreme court reversed.
The court distinguished the language used in section 1151.03 of
the Ohio Revised Code,"0 which deals with the certification of a proposed
building and loan association, with that used in section 1151.05,"1 which
deals with the approval required for branch offices. Section 1151.03 provides in pertinent part:
Upon receipt from the secretary of state of a copy of the articles of
102Omo

REv. CODE ANN. § 119.01(A)

(Page Supp. 1981).

103 Id. § 1151.80-.92 (Page 1968 & Supp. 1981).
104 Id. § 1151.80 (Page 1968) (emphasis added).
2051d. § 119.01(A) (Page Supp. 1981).
16id. § 119.01(B) (Page Supp. 1981).
10? 41 Ohio St. 2d 115, 322 N.E.2d 878 (1975).
108 Id.

209 id. at 117, 322 N.E.2d at 879.
110 OHIo REv. CODE AN. § 1151.03 (Page 1968).
ll Id. § 1151.05 (Page 1968).
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incorporation of a proposed building and loan association, the superintendent of building and loan associations shall immediately examine
into all the facts connected with the formation of such proposed corporation . . . and if it appears that such corporation, if formed,
will be entitled to commence the business for which it is organized,
the superintendent shall so certify to the secretary of state, who shall
thereupon record such articles.112
Section 1151.05 provides in pertinent part, "No building and loan association shall establish more than one office . . . except with the approval
of the superintendent of building and loan associations . . . (Emphasis
added) .11
The court held that since the word "certify" is used in section 1151.03
and the word "'certificate' appears within the definition of license in R.C.
119.01(B) . . . it is the certification to do business that invokes the application of R.C. Chapter 119." ' Therefore, when the superintendent
certifies the articles of incorporation pursuant to section 1151.03, he performs an agency function. Section 1151.05, however, does not use language
contained in the definition of "license."' 15 "[T]he absence of that language
in R.C. 1151.05 leads . . . to the conclusion that the General Assembly
did not intend that the superintendent's approval of a branch application
be a licensing function.""'
Following the reasoning of Boesch, the superintendent may be said
to carry on a licensing function and thus be considered an agency for
purposes of Ohio's APA by virtue of his duties to examine and certify the
articles of incorporation of a proposed deposit guaranty association.4'7
Section 1151.82 of the Ohio Revised Code provides in pertinent part:
Upon receipt from the secretary of state of a copy of the articles
of incorporation of a proposed guaranty association the superintendent
. . . shall at once examine into all the facts connected with the formation if such proposed corporation. In the event . . . the examination shows that such corporation, if formed, would be entitled to
commence the business of a deposit guaranty association, the superin8
tendent shall so certify to the secretary of state."
The emphasized language is similar to that used in section 1151.03 which
was interpreted to mean a "licensing function" for purposes of the state's
APA. Since section 1151.82 gives the superintendent power to certify
Id. § 1151.03 (Page 1968) (emphasis added).
"a Id. § 1151.05 (Page 1968) (emphasis added).
14 41 Ohio St. 2d at 118, 322 N.E.2d at 880.
'15OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 119.01(B) (Page Supp. 1981).
1641 Ohio St. 2d at 119 322 N.E.2d at 880.
21m O7mo REv. CODE Ai.
§ 1151.82 (Page 1968).
22 id. (emphasis added).
112
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the deposit guaranty association's articles of incorporation which would
entitle the association to commence business, and since the "right to commence operations is the subject of the licensing function,"1 ' the superintendent is engaged in a licensing function when exercising powers pursuant
to section 1151.82 and12 0 is, therefore, an agency for purposes of the Administrative Procedure Act.
If the ODGF performed similar licensing functions it too, by analogy,
would be considered an agency. However, none of the provisions of ODGF's
enabling legislation1 2 1 give ODGF the authority to issue, suspend, revoke,
or cancel licenses or to certify any of its members to commence business. 2 '
Rather, the purpose of a deposit guaranty association has been held to be
simply "to guaranty the liquidity of its member associations."' 2
The Board of Trustees of ODGF " does have the power to suspend
a member association from membership in the Fund. 125 But, even though
an association's membership may be terminated, it can still carry on its
business as a building and loan association; suspension or expulsion of an
association's membership in the Fund merely prevents the association from
availing itself of "any of the benefits of membership in the Fund.' ' 2 Thus,
the power of ODGF to terminate an association's membership is not analogous to the superintendent's power to refuse certification of a deposit guaranty
association's articles of incorporation. In the former situation, the member
may still carry on its business; in the latter, the association may not commence business. ODGF does not certify its member associations to do business and therefore, is not engaged in a licensing function and cannot be
brought within the definition of "agency" as used in the APA.
Although it does not appear that the ODGF can be brought within
the definition of "agency" as used in 119.01 (A), perhaps ODGF could
be considered a state agency by analogy to the FSLIC. ODGF is a stateoffered alternative to the FSLIC which was established to "insure the
Home Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Boesch, 41 Ohio St. 2d at 119, 322 N.E.2d at 880.
'is
120

0mo REv. CODE ANN. § 119.01(A) (Page Supp. 1981) provides that "sections 119.01
to 119.13 of the Revised Code do not apply to . . . the superintendent of building and
loan associations . . . in the taking possession of, and rehabilitation or liquidation of, the
business and property of bands, building and loan associations . . ." Section 1151.82 does
not provide for the taking possession or liquidation of any building and loan association
business or property. Therefore, the superintendent is not expressly exempted from the
provisions of the Ohio APA in this instance.
a2 Id. § 1151.80-.92 (Page 1968 & Supp. 1981).
122 The powers of the deposit guaranty association are enumerated in Omo REv. CODE ANN.
§ 1151.87 (Page 1968).
123Ohio Deposit Guarantee Fund v. Dziamba, 60 Ohio Op. 426, 137 N.E.2d 905 (C.P.
1956).
224 "ODGF" and "Fund" are used interchangeably for purposes of this note.
12
Omo DEPosrr GuAR&N.EE FUND, RULES -&-REGuLATnONS, 0- H(G) -4 and VII 28.- §§ D-(iB)--14- & VI(A)-(F)
12Id.Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron,
1982 22.
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accounts of institutions eligible for insurance."' 7 If ODGF is analogous to
the FSLIC and if the FSLIC is a federal agency, it could be argued that
the state guaranty association should likewise be considered a governmental
agency.
2.

Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
The federal courts have held that the FSLIC is a federal agency.' 28 In
Guardian Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Federal Savings & Loan Insurance Corp.,2 Guardian challenged certain regulations which were issued
by the FSLIC without prior notice and comment as required by the federal
Administrative Procedure Act.' While the court held that the particular
regulations came under an exception to the APA's requirement of prior
notice and comment, the court stated that "the FSLIC is an agency of the
'' 1
United States as defined by APA subsection 551 (1).
The purpose of ODGF, is to "assure the liquidity of member building
and loan associations"' 2 and to "guaranty moneys on deposit,"'2 3 while
the purpose of the FSLIC is to insure accounts. " However, "insure" and
"assure" appear to have the same meaning when used in connection with
a deposit guaranty fund: "A building and loan association may also obtain
the insurance of its stock and deposits either by the Federal Savings and
Loan Insurance Corporation, by a deposit guaranty association, or as may
be otherwise provided by law."' Although ODGF's enabling legislation'
uses the word "assure," the purpose of the deposit guaranty fund is viewed
3 7 Since
as insuring deposits of a building and loan association."
"assure" and
"insure" are used interchangeably, the use of "assure" instead of "insure"
is not a significant difference between ODGF and FSLIC.
The ODGF is under the control of a nine to fifteen member board of
trustees" 8 and the superintendent of building and loan associations."' The
1 12 U.S.C. § 1725(a) (1976).

See Acron Investments, Inc. v. Federal Savings & Loan Ins. Corp., 363 F.2d 236 (9th
Cir. 1966); Federal Savings & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Quinn, 419 F.2d 1014 (7th Cir. 1969);
Guardian Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Federal Savings & Loan Corp., 589 F.2d 658
(D.C. Cir. 1978).
119 589 F.2d 658 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
1o5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976).
131589 F.2d at 661.
132Oiuo REv. CODE ANN. § 1151.87 (A) (Page 1968) (emphasis added).
1331d. § 1151.87(B) (Page 1968). According to Art. M of the Constitution of the ODGF,
"the purpose of the corporation shall be to use the full extent of its powers, authority and
resources to provide for the liquidity, of its members and to guarantee the moneys on
deposit in member associations....
18412 U.S.C. § 1725(a) (1976).
13 9 0. JuR. 3d Banks & Fin. Inst. § 459 (1979).
1 86
0MO REv. CODE ANN. § 1151.80-.92. (Page 1968 & Supp. 1981).
1lId.
l'8Omo Dmosrr GuAANrm FunD CoNsTrrtrtoN, § 1.
139O1io REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1151.82, 1151.85, 1151.89, 1151.90 & 1151.91 (Page 1968).
128
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superintendent must examine and certify the articles of incorporation be10
fore the deposit guaranty fund may commence business, make an annual
"' and has the power to
examination of the deposit guaranty association,
make special examinations of the association if he deems it necessary."'
"
The FSLIC is under the direction of a five-member board of trustees.
Both corporations, therefore, are subject to the rules and regulations prescribed by their respective boards of trustees.
While the specific powers and duties of the ODGF and FSLIC are
not coterminous, the purpose of the corporations is similar. The FSLIC
has the duty to insure the accounts of federal savings and loan associations
and may insure the accounts of building and loan associations organized
under state laws."' The purpose of the ODGF is to assure the liquidity
of its members and guarantee the moneys on deposit with the members."'
In Maryland Savings-Share Insurance Corp. v. United States,"' the court
stated that the Maryland corporation "is essentially identical to the Ohio Deposit Guaranty Fund""" and that the primary purpose of the corporation
is to insure the accounts of its members.'" Even though the wording in
their respective enabling legislations is different, the purpose of the FSLIC
and ODGF is considered the same. It seems possible, therefore, to argue
that, because the function and duties of the ODGF essentially are identical
to those of the FSLIC, and because the FSLIC is a federal agency, ODGF
should be considered an agency subject to Ohio's APA. Whether such an
argument will succeed, however, is questionable, given the restrictive definition of "agency" in section 119.01 (A) of the Ohio Revised Code and
its interpretation in Boesch.
North Carolina Savings Guaranty Association
The North Carolina Savings Guaranty Association (hereinafter
NCSGA) is subject to the control of the Administrator of the Savings and
Loan Division of the state.' Prior to 1973, the NCSGA was under the
5
control of the Commissioner of Insurance of North Carolina. ' In 1973
the NCSGA enabling legislation was amended and "Administrator" was
substituted for "Commissioner" indicating that the NCSGA was not to be
3.

2401d. §-1151.82 (Page 1968).
411d. § 1151.89 (Page 1968).
142 d. §§ 1151.90 & 1151.91 (Page 1968).

12 U.S.C. § 1725(a) (1976).
12 U.S.C. § 1726(a) (1976).
145Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 1151.87 (Page 1968).
'4' 308 F. Supp. 761 (D. Md. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 400 U.S. 4 (1970).
14T Id. at 768.
148td, at 763.
149N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 54B-238, 54B-246, 54B-247 & 54B-248 (Supp. 1981).
150 1963 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 1091 (amended, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws h. 967) (current version
148
144

GEN. STAT. § 548-236
at N.C.
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subject to the control of the Commissioner of Insurance but subject only
to the control of the Savings and Loan Division of the state. The purpose of
the NCSGA is to "[a]ssure the liquidity of a member institution"15 ' and to
"[g]uarantee the withdrawable accounts, shares of deposits of member in15
stitutions.""
North Carolina's definition of "agency" is broad"' and does not expressly exclude NCSGA from its definition.'" While the Department of Insurance has been held to be an agency of North Carolina for purposes of
the state's APA,'5 5 the NCSGA has not. Since the NCSGA has been expressly removed from the control of the Commissioner of Insurance of
North Carolina, it can be argued that it is not made a state agency by
North Carolina case law. In addition, the NCGSA enabling legislation
consistently avoids referring to the entity as an "agency" but rather uses
the term "guaranty association."'5 8 The absence of the use of the term
"agency" coupled with the 1973 amendments deleting the
word "Commissioner" and substituting "Administrator" may indicate the legislative
desire to prevent the NCSGA from being considered a state agency for purposes of the state APA.
4.

Maryland Savings Share Insurance Corporation
The Maryland Savings-Share Insurance Corporation (hereinafter MSSIC)
was established in 1962 to "insure the savings accounts of members."'' 7 The
Director of the Division of Savings and Loan has the power along with
the board of directors of the MSSIC to certify that a savings and loan association qualifies for membership in the MSSIC. 58 However, in the MSSIC
enabling legislation, the Maryland legislature did not provide for examination or control of the state's guaranty association by the savings and loan
or financial director as do North Carolina,'59 Ohio, 6 Massachusetts,1' and
Pennsylvania."' Nor is there any indication that the MSSIC is subject to
the control of the Director of the State Insurance Department of Maryland.
Since the Director of Savings and Loans has no power of examination over
15 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 54B-244(a)(1)
(Supp. 1981).
52
2
1d. § 54B-244(a)(2) (Supp. 1981). Note the use of the word "assure." See supra text

accompanying notes 52-57.
155N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-2(I)

(1978).

15i/d.

15 5 Commissioner of Ins. v. Rate Bureau, 300 N.C. 381, 269 S.E.2d 547 (1980).
'"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 54B-236-249. (Supp. 1981).
15 7
MD. FINANCIAL INST. CODE ANN. § 10-103(3) (1980).
15 8
1d. § 10-107(a) (1980).
159N.C. GEN. STAT. § 54B-246 (Supp. 1981).
10 0
mo REv. CODE ANN. H9 1151.89-.90 (Page 1968).
11
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN, ch. 170 app. 99 2-1 & 2-8 (West 1971).
;8 7 PA. CONS. STAT. A?*N, §A 6508 & 6514 (Purdon Supp. 1981).
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the MSSIC as in other state schemes, there is no reason to infer that the
insurance director would have such power.
The broad definition of "agency" in Maryland is limited by specific
exceptions.'" The State Insurance Department of Maryland is specifically
excepted from the definition of agency and is not subject to Maryland's
APA." Whether the MSSIC is a part of the State Insurance Department
of Maryland and therefore exempt from the Maryland APA or not is not
settled in Maryland.

Maryland case law 6 ' indicates that an entity will be considered a
"
state agency if the entity is authorized to make rules or adjudicate cases'
but not if the entity's regulations concern "only the internal management of
the agency"' 7 and do not directly affect the "rights of or procedures available to the public."'6 8

Nothing in the enabling legislation gives the MSSIC the power to adjudicate contested cases, 9 so if the corporation is to be considered an
0
agency it must be authorized by law to make rules." The MSSIC, as a
corporation, has the power to promulgate bylaws, rules, and regulations

with which the member associations must comply. Whether such rules
concern only the internal management of MSSIC or whether they affect
the rights or procedures available to the public is not clear. Unless MSSIC
is considered a branch of the State Insurance Department of Maryland and
thus exempt from the provisions of the Maryland APA, the broad definition
of "agency" in Maryland leaves open the question of whether MSSIC is

an agency.
133

MD. ANN. CODE art. 41 § 244(a) (Supp. 1981)

provides:

"Agency" means any State board, commission, department or officer authorized by law
to make rules or to adjudicate contested cases, except those in the legislative or judicial
Commission.. . the
branches, and the Governor, and except the Maryland Parole
Commission . . . "Agency"
State Insurance Department of Maryland, the Public Service
also includes any agency created by general law, which operates in two or more
political subdivisions. (Emphasis added).
'4Id. art. 41 § 244-56 (Supp. 1981).
165 Bernstein v. Bd. of Education, 245 Md. 464, 226 A.2d 243 (1967).
166 MD. ANN. CODE art. 41 § 244(a) (Supp. 1981).
157 Id. § 244(b) (Supp. 1981).
168 Id.

"'Contested case' means a proceeding before an agency in which the legal rights, duties,
statutory entitlements, or privileges of specific parties are required by law or constitutional
right to be determined after an agency hearing." Id. § 244(c) (Supp. 1981).
270 "Rule" includes every regulation, standard, guideline, or statement of policy or interpretation of general application and future effect, including the amendment or repeal
thereof, adopted by an agency, whether with or without prior hearing, to implement
or make specific the law enforced or administered by it or to govern its organization,
procedure, or the practice before such agency, but does not include regulations concerning only the internal management of the agency and not directly affecting thq
rights of or procedures available to the public, •
(Supp. 1981). 1982
Id. §by244(b)
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5.

Massachusetts Share Insurance Fund
The Massachusetts Share Insurance Fund (hereinafter MSIF) was
established to insure the shares of the member banks' and is under the
supervision of the commissioner of banks.' The enabling legislation refers
to the entity as a corporation and does not expressly state that the MSIF
is an agency of the state. Therefore, to be considered a state agency for
purposes of Massachusetts' APA,"' the MSIF must fall within the definition
of "agency"' 74 and must not be a mentioned exception. The definition of
"agency" is similar to that in Maryland, 1 5 but does not except the
Department of Insurance. The Massachusetts courts have held that if an entity
makes regulations'" or conducts adjudicatory proceedings,' 7 it is an agency
for purposes of the state APA. Since there are no cases indicating whether
MSIF is a state agency, again, the question is open.
6. Pennsylvania Savings Association Insurance Corporation
The Pennsylvania Savings Association Insurance Corporation (PSAIC)
is subject to the control of the Secretary of Banking" 8 and was established
to "provide for the liquidity of member associations"' 79 and to "insure the
savings accounts in member associations."' 80 The use of the word "insure,"''
does not mean that PSAIC is a branch of the Pennsylvania Insurance Department, since its enabling legislation provides that it is not subject to the
control of Pennsylvania Insurance laws. 81
There is no case law indicating that the PSAIC is a state agency, and
PSAIC's enabling legislation does not subject it to the state APAY 3 The
definition of "agency" in Pennsylvania is so broad"' that it is difficult
MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 170 app. § 2-1 (West 1971).
d. ch. 170 app. § 2-8 (West 1971).
173
Id. ch. 30A § 1 (West 1979).
IT

172

"'Agency, any department, board, commission, division or authority of the state government or subdivision of any of the foregoing, or official of the state government, authorized by
174

law to make regulations
following: the legislative
215 MD. ANN. CODE art.
27e Massachusetts General

or to conduct adjudicatory proceedings, but does not include the
and judicial departments... ." Id. ch. 30A § 1(2) (West 1979).

41 § 244(a) (Supp. 1981).

Hospital v. Rate Setting Commission, 371 Mass. 705, 359 N.E.2d

41 (1977).
1TT

Mariner v. Bd. of Registration of Chiropractors, 358 Mass. 13, 260 N.E.2d 672 (1970).

's87 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 6508 & 6514 (Purdon Supp. 1981).
9

§ 6503(b)(1) (Purdon Supp. 1981).
Id. § 6503(b)(2) (Purdon Supp. 1981).
181 For a discussion of the significance of the use of "insure," see supra text accompanying
notes 52-57.
27

1d.

180

PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6509 (Purdon Supp. 1981).
2 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.app. § 101-754 (Purdon Supp. 1981).

1827
1s
184

"Agency." A government agency.
"Commonwealth agency." Any executive agency or independent agency.

"Government agency." Any Commonwealth agency or any political subdivision or
other local authority, or any officer of any such political subdivision or local authority.
"Local agency." A government agency other than a Commonwealth agency.

Id. § 101,
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to determine whether PSAIC would fall under the definition. Pennsylvania's
previous definitional statute 185 defined agency as "any department. . empowered to determine or affect private rights . . . by regulation or adjudication . . .""' Since that language is no longer contained in the definition, an entity need not necessarily affect private rights in order to be
deemed an agency. Since the present definition of agency is somewhat circular, it is unclear what criteria will be used to determine an entity's status.
Hence, without further clarification, it is difficult to predict whether the
PSAIC would be considered a state agency.
Although there are some differences among the various deposit guaranty
funds, the main purpose is to assure or insure the members' accounts and
provide for the members' liquidity. No state guaranty funds have been
held to be state agencies. Case law in the individual states indicates that
in order for an entity to be considered a state agency it must conform
to the definition of "agency" as set forth in their respective Administrative
Procedure Acts.
Only the FSLIC has been held to be an agency; none of the states
with deposit guaranty funds have ruled on this precise question. It is not
clear, however, that the fact that the FSLIC is an agency is determinative
of the issue. Although the various states' definitions of "agency" differ greatly, those definitions shall control. Thus, whether an individual guaranty
fund will be considered a state agency depends more on whether it conforms
to the requirements set forth in the respective definitional statutes and less
on the fact that the federal counterpart is considered a federal agency.
V.

STATE LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION OF AN
INSOLVENT SAVINGS AND LOAN

Once a savings and loan association is finally declared insolvent, its
shareholders and depositors will undoubtedly seek to recover their losses.
One possibility is to maintain an action against the state for the negligent
supervision of the insolvent savings and loan association.
The question of whether the state may be held liable for negligent
supervision is an important one in a state like Ohio, which has a large number of state-chartered savings and loan associations. In two states, Illinois
and Arizona, courts have found the state liable for failing to adequately
supervise a savings and loan. This part will examine these decisions and the
respective statutory framework under which they were decided. The Ohio
statutory scheme for the supervision of savings and loan associations' and
1S5 71 PA. CONs. STAT. ANN. § 1710.2(b)

(Purdon 1962) (repealed 1978).

sO Id.
1 Omo

REv. CoDE ANN. tit. I1 (Page 1968 & Supp. 1981).
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the Ohio Court of Claims Act 2 will be analyzed to determine the extent, if
any, of Ohio's potential liability. Finally, alternative means of recovery
against the state will be explored.
A.

Illinois: Tcherepnin v. Franz'
1. Facts
The litigation, which took place in the federal district court,' involved the events surrounding the collapse of City Savings Association (City
Savings), a savings and loan association chartered by the State of Illinois.5
Involved in the collapse was the "blatant" disregard of the rights of City
Savings' depositors by both state and City Savings' officials. The result of
this misconduct cost the depositors nearly $23,000,000.
City Savings was founded in 1908 in Chicago, Illinois.! It issued
to its depositors withdrawable capital shares pursuant to the Illinois Savings
and Loan Act.8 In 1942, C. Oran Mensik emerged as president of City
Savings and with his emergence began a period of economic growth. City
Savings' assets grew from $147,000 in 1942 to $12,000,000 in 1952 and
by 1957 the assets were over $35,000,000.1
However, in 1957, the Auditor of Public Accounts for the State of
Illinois, who was in charge of the supervision of the state-chartered savings and loan association, completed his third examination of books and
records of City Savings within a two-year period." The results of these
findings revealed that the capital of City Savings was severely impaired, that
favored companies staffed by associates and relatives of Mensik had received
a disproportionate amount of mortgage loans, and that properties securing
mortgage loans were greatly overappraised."
These results were released to the press in April of 1957 causing
12
a run on City Savings. Two days later the Auditor, pursuant to statute,
declared an emergency, took custody of City Savings and closed its doors
to the public.
In response, Mensik filed suit charging the Auditor and five of his
associates with conspiracy to steal Mensik's association from him. 3 The
2Id. ch. 2743 (Page Supp. 1981).
8 570 F.2d 187 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 876 (1978).

4 393 F. Supp. 1197 (N.D. I1. 1975).
3 Id. at 1200.

'id.
'Id. at 1201.
8
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32 §§ 701-944 (Smith-Hurd 1970 & Supp. 1981).
9 393 F. Supp. at 1201.
10

Id.

I Id.
22 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32 § 848 (Smith-Hurd 1970).
1 393 F. Supp. at 1201.
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case went before a Master who concluded that the emergency was chargable
to the Auditor because of his release of the confidential report and therefore the state seizure was illegal." The trial judge subsequently adopted
the Master's findings and returned control of City Savings to Mensik."
The Supreme Court of Illinois ultimately affirmed the decision."
After being reopened to the public, City Savings embarked on an extensive advertising campaign pursuant to Illinois Savings and Loan Act."
Offering expensive prizes to induce new depositors, City Savings advertised
that the program was "under state government supervision."'" However,
from 1959 to 1964, the affairs of City Savings were not conducted in accordance with the Illinois Savings and Loan Act.' 9 During this period, City
Savings loaned over $21,000,000 to entities controlled by Mensik or his
nominees. These loans were secured by fraudently over-valued property."'
These inflated mortgage loans, together with unacceptable accounting and
management practices, led to a capital impairment of more than
$14,000,000.21
In January of 1964, the State Department of Financial Institutions, to
whom supervisory authority over state-chartered Savings and Loan Associations had been transferred, began an examination of City Savings.22 It
was not until June of 1964, however, after an independent audit revealed
the full extent of City Savings' capital impairment, that the association
was closed.22
Following the closing, the depositors of City Savings approved a plan
which placed the assets of the association in the hands of three voluntary
liquidators, one nominated by Mensik and two by the State of Illinois. After
the association's collapse on July 29, 1964, Alexander Tcherepnin and
other holders of capital shares of City Savings filed a complaint alleging
that state officials, the voluntary liquidators and others had violated the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.' The plaintiffs moved for the appointment
14
16

15 Id.

Id.

2d 572, 166 N.E.2d 265 (1960).
Mensick v. Smith, 18 M11.
'?ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32 § 773(h) (Smith-Hurd 1970) provides that:
An association while operating under this Section may accept additional withdrawable
capital from its present shareholders as well as accept new withdrawable capital accounts and such withdrawable capital accounts shall not be subject to the provisions
of subsection (b)

of this section but shall be subject to withdrawal at will so long

as the association is operating under the provisions of subsection (b) of this section.
s 393 F. Supp. at 1202.

291d. at
20
1d.
21
Id.at
221d. at
23 ld. at

1206.
1207, 1209-11.
1202.
1210.

On December 18, 1967, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs' withdrawable shares
were "securities" within the meaning of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §
78(a) (1976). Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967).
24
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of a receiver and the court, finding the state supervised plan to be tainted
with fraud, ordered an end to the voluntary liquidation and appointed two
receivers."5
The receivers first cross-complaint charged named state officials, including Joseph Knight, the Director of Financial Institutions for the State
of Illinois, with breaching their statutory duties to City Savings thereby
rendering themselves, the State of Illinois and their surety liable for damage
to the depositors. 6 The State of Illinois and the receivers subsequently
entered into settlement negotiations which culminated in the legislative appropriation of $12,467,500 for the reimbursement of the City Savings'
depositors.2"
The receivers then filed a motion for summary judgment against
the remaining cross-defendants. Count I alleged that Knight had maliciously
breached a statutory duty to supervise the affairs of City Savings. Count
II alleged that Knight had either fraudently participated in foisting the
illegal plan of voluntary liquidation upon the depositors of City Savings
or, alternatively, negligently breached certain ministerial duties in connection with the adoption of that plan."
2.

Statutory Framework
The Illinois Savings and Loan Act" imposes a comprehensive duty on
the director of the Department of Financial Institutions and its officers and
employees to supervise the affairs of all savings and loan associations
within the state and to ensure that these businesses are operated "only
by the association organized and conducted in accordance with the authority provided in this act."' 0
Section 842(a) of the Act requires the director to conduct an examination of every savings and loan association in the state every eighteen months."1 To facilitate the examination, section 842(b) gives the director or his examinters access to the books and records of every savings
and loan association. 2
Section 843 empowers the director to order, without prior notice, an
audit of the books of any association," while section 844 requires every
25 393 F. Supp. at 1207.
2

61d. at 1204.

2 1 d.
28

1d. at 1205.
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32 §§ 701-944 (Smith-Hurd 1970 & Supp. 1981),
- Id. § 792(b).

29

Sl Id. § 842(a).
32
1d. § 842(b).
33
id,J 843.
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association to file with the Department of Financial Institutions a statement of its financial condition at the close of the fiscal year."4
Finally, under section 848 the director is empowered to take custody
of the books, records and assets of any association if, among other reasons,
the association's capital is seriously impaired, or its business is being conducted in a fraudulent, illegal or unsafe manner.'
The powers of the director of the Department are comprehensive and
supervisory in nature. They allow the director to insure that every savings
and loan association within the State of Illinois is being conducted in accordance with the Illinois Savings and Loan Act.
Count I
The plaintiffs alleged in Count I "that the affairs of City Savings were
being so grossly mismanaged during the years 1959 to 1964 that no reasonable person could have made even the most cursory examination of
City Savings and reasonably believed it to be sound or that the management should not be removed.""0 The second allegation was "that there
were either no meaningful examinations of City Savings or that the examinations were made and the results were ignored or concealed by the
Department of Financial Institutions.""7
3.

The primary question centered around Knight's claim that he acted
within the scope of his statutory authority and thus, because of his special
status as a public official, was immune from liability. Although Illinois
courts recognize the principle that public officials are immune from liability
for errors in judgment in the performance of discretionary duties, 8 the immunity is limited. A public official is liable for his negligent conduct in the
performance of ministerial duties or malicious and corrupt conduct in the
performance of discretionary duties.3 0 Having found that Knight's statutory
duties to supervise the affairs of City Savings were discretionary in nature,
the court focused its discussion on whether Knight's failure to conduct the
required examinations of City Savings and his concealment of the results
constituted and malicious breach of those duties.
The court noted that the term malicious connotes something more
than mere negligence."° Malicious has been defined by the Illinois courts
84 Id. § 844.
85 Id. § 848.
36 393 F. Supp. at 1207.
07 id.
83Screiner v. Courtney, 380 111. 171, 43 NE.2d 982 (1942).
App. 3d
BeMunson v. Bartels, 128 EL1.322, 27 N.E. 1091 (1891); Thiele v. Kennedy, 18 M11.
465, 309 N.E.2d 394 (1974). For the court's distinction between ministerial and discretionary
dutis see infra text accompanying notes 58-61.
40 393
F. Supp. at 1208. 1982
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to mean the intentional commission of a tortious act, the willful and reckless disregard of another's rights, and the wanton and deliberate commission
of a wrongful act.41
With this in mind, the court noted that Knight became aware of City
Saving's financial straits in January of 1964 when Justin Hulman advised
him that City Savings was "in trouble". 2 In the course of his investigation
Hulman, a salaried technical advisor to Knight, noticed evidence suggesting that City Savings had made inflated mortgage loans on overvalued
property. 3 He also discovered that City Savings had listed among its assets
$799,000 used to purchase promotional premiums that had already been
given away to entice new depositors and that City Savings had recorded
as income commissions refinanced loans that were never collected. If
these assets were given proper accounting treatment the reserves of the association would have been insufficient to cover even a minor loss."
In addition to findings of Hulman, Knight was aware that in 1963
City Savings' contingent reserves were less than the statutory minimum of
7 %.' However, Knight permitted City Savings to declare a dividend in December of 1963 in clear violation of the Illinois Savings and Loan
Act." Hulman explained that City Savings was permitted to operate under
the lower standards established for associations insured by the Federal
Savings and Loan Corporation.47 (hereinafter FSLIC). But, City Savings
was not and never had been insured by FSLIC. As a result, any losses of
City Savings would fall directly on the depositors. "8
Furthermore, Knight in 1963 was aware that most of City Savings'
loans were made to corporations having the same group of individuals as
officers and directors which was in violation of the Act. 9
Despite all this - the absence of insurance, the evidence of excessive
loans on overvalued property, the dangerously low reserves - Knight failed
to take any corrective action until June 26, 1964. The district court noted
that Knight's failure to act is rendered even more inexcusable by the fact
that he was aware that Mensik and City Savings had encountered serious
financial difficulties in 1957-59.o
41 Fromm v. Seyller, 245 Ill. App. 392 (1927); Kaplan v. Williams, 245 Ill. App. 542 (1927);
Smith v. Moran, 43 Ill. App.2d 373, 193 N.E.2d 466 (1967).
42393 F. Supp. at 1211.
43
1d. at 1210.
4
4 Id. at 1211.
48
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32 § 779(a) (Smith-Hurd 1970).
'61d. § 780(b)(1) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981).
47393 F. Supp. at 1212.
'Id.
8

'oILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32 § 801 (Smith-Hurd 1970).
80393 F. Supp. at 1213.
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol15/iss3/3

84

Winter, 19821

et al.: Savings and Loan Insolvency in the 80's
STUDENT PROJECT

In light of the aforementioned undisputed facts the district court held
that Knight had maliciously breached his statutory duty to supervise the
affairs of City Savings and that his estate was liable to the depositors for
the resulting loss.
Count II
The gravamen of Count I[ is that Knight and Hulman permitted Mensik to foist a fraudulent and illegal plan of voluntary liquidation upon the
City Savings' depositors." As a result no judicial supervision occurred from
June of 1964 until Judge Campbell terminated the voluntary liquidation
and appointed federal receivers on September 7, 1968. The plaintiffs alleged
that Knight was liable under one of two theories: (1) that the adoption of
the voluntary plan of liquidation constituted fraud, in which Knight was
an active participant; or (2) that permitting the adoption of the plan constituted a breach of Knight's ministerial duties, for which he was not immune.5
4.

The plaintiffs claimed that both Knight and Hilman read the transcripts of Mensik's representations to the depositors of City Savings and
that they (the depositors) would receive 100 cents on the dollar plus interest
as a result of a voluntary liquidation. 3 The plaintiffs further contended
that both Knight and Hulman knew these representations were grossly
fraudulent, but neither attempted to correctly advise the depositors.
The district court determined that Knight's acquiesence in the fraudulent representations did indeed constitute actual fraud.5 4 The court noted
that the law is clear in Illinois that a person who by his conduct contributes
to the misrepresentation of a material matter to another and intentionally
fails to correct the misrepresentation is guilty of fraud.5"
At issue in the plaintiff's statutory violation theory were the duties
imposed on the director of the Department of Financial Institutions by sections 921 and 922 of the Illinois Savings and Loan Act.5" Section 921 provides in part:
If the Commissioner, after taking custody of an association . . . finds
that any one or more of the reasons for taking custody continues to
exist through the period of his custody, then he shall appoint any
qualified person, firm or corporation as receiver or co-receiver of
such association or trust for the purpose of liquidation.5"
51Id. See supra text accompanying note 37.
5
53
4 Id. at 1217.
1d. at 1216.
521d. at 1214.
55Piff v. Berresheim, 405 111. 617, 92 N.E.2d 113 (1950); Creighton v. Elgin, 395 Ill. 87,

69 N.E.2d 501 (1946); Endsley v. Johns, 120 IMI.469, 12 N.E. 247 (1887); Mitchell v.
McDougall, 62 Ill. 498 (1872).
WIL . AN. STAT. ch. 32 § 921-922 (Smlth-Hurd 1970).
921.
57 ld.by§IdeaExchange@UAkron,
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Section 922 provides:
After so appointing a receiver, the Commissioner shall direct the Attorney General to file a complaint in equity in the name of the director
in the circuit or superior court of the county in which such association
or trust is located and against the association or trustees or liquidators,
as the case may be, for the orderly liquidation and dissolution of the
association or trust and for an injunction restraining the officers, directors, trustees, or liquidators, from continuing the operation of the
58
association or trust.
The primary issue in the statutory violation theory was whether Knight's
duties under these sections properly could be characterized as ministerial.
This characterization is important because, under Illinois law, the failure
to perform 9 or the negligent performance' ° of ministerial duties is actionable. The court looked to the Illinois Supreme Court's definition of ministerial in Munson v. Bartels:
Official duty is ministerial when it is absolute, certain and imperative
involving merely the execution of a set task, and when the law which
imposes it prescribes and defines the time, mode, and occasion of
its performance with such certainty that nothing remains for judgment or discretion.6 '
Applying that definition to sections 921 and 922 of the Act, the appellate court found that these provisions call for the execution of set tasks
and define the time, mode, and occasion of performance leaving nothing
for judgment or discretion." The court held that in disregard of sections
921 and 922, Knight failed to (1) appoint a receiver for City Savings, (2)
direct the Attorney General to file a complaint against City Savings, or (3)
direct the Attorney General to seek an injunction restraining the officers
and directors of City Savings from continuing operations."3 Thus, the court
held that the failure to perform these acts by a public official constitutes a
breach of a ministerial duty,"4 for which Knight's estate was liable.
Since the court of appeals found "ample grounds" to affirm the statutory violation theory of Count 11,65 it did not determine the validity of the
lower court's holding on the defendant's alleged fraud. In addition the
court of appeals affirmed the grant of summary judgment on Count I of
the complaint.
" Id. 1 922.

59

Pope v. Shelter, 318 IM.App. 279, 47 N.E.2d 732 (1943).
v. Bartels, 138 III. 322, 27 N.E. 1091 (1891).
e Id. at 328, 27 N.E. at 1092.
60
Munson
1

62 570 F.2d at 194.

63 Id.
e4 Id.

65Id. at 193.
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As a final note, an interesting question was raised concerning the
scope of Knight's duties. The defendant contended that his statutory duties
were owed only to the public-at-large (State of Illinois) and not to the depositors of City Savings." The court agreed that official misconduct can
constitute an actionable wrong only if a duty is owed to a party seeking redress. 7 The Illinois Savings and Loan Act, however, in defining the duties
of the director, makes repeated reference to the "protection of the association." These references indicate that the association, and more specifically, its depositors, have a "vested" right in the duties prescribed. 9
Arizona: State v. Superior Court of Maricopa County"
A. Facts
Plaintiffs were depositors of United States and Lincoln Savings.
They filed a class action alleging that the defendants, the State of Arizona,
the Arizona Department of Insurance, the Arizona Corporation Commission and their respective agents, officers and employees, fraudently or negligently allowed the associations to defraud plaintiffs and
aided or abetted the associations in committing the fraud. The complaint
alleged that the associations had raised over $52,000,000 from approximately 20,000 class members and that the associations and their
subsidiaries and affiliates thereafter became insolvent."'

B.

The complaint made the following contentions about the associations:
(1) the associations in an attempt to obtain new investors' funds to meet
maturing obligations promulgated advertising which stressed higher interest
rates, (2) the depositors were falsely told that they were insured up to
$40,000 by Omaha Surety Corporation of America (hereinafter Omaha),
(3) that the advertising and sales literature contained material misrepresentations and omissions and concealed the serious financial difficulties of the
associations, (4) the associations used false and fraudulent financial statements in order to raise monies and to conceal their impaired financial condition. 2
The first of five counts alleged that the Corporation Commission officer defendants, while acting within the scope of their actual or apparent
authority, made untrue statements and engaged in courses of business that
operated as fraud. 73 More specifically, the plaintiffs' asserted that the defendants represented that the associations were well regulated by the Arizona
" Id.at 191.
6? State v. Maryland Casualty Co., 132 F.2d 850 (7th Cir. 1942).
e ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32 § 747, 848 (Snmith-Hurd 1970).

69570 F.2d at 191.
70 123 Ariz. 324, 599 P.2d 777 (1979).
T1123 Ariz. at 328, 599 P.2d at 781.

7 Id.
78 Id.
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Corporation Commission, that the associations and Omaha had made all
filings required by law, that their corporate papers and insurance papers
were in order, and that they were in a solvent financial condition."4 Finally,
the plaintiff's alleged that the defendants failed to make a yearly examination
of the associations as required by statute and failed to disclose that the
associations were in violation of several portions of the Arizona statutes
regulation of thrift institutions (hereinafter Article 17).'
Count II alleged that the State of Arizona, the Arizona Corporation
Commission, the Corporation Commissioner defendants, and the Corporation Commissioner officer defendants aided and abetted the associations
in defrauding the plaintiffs. Specifically, the defendants failed to examine
the associations on a yearly basis or failed to do so in accordance with the
standards required by law."' Finally, Count II alleged that the defendants
failed to disclose that Omaha did not have sufficient assets to insure payments of its insurance obligations."
Count III alleged that the State of Arizona, the Arizona Corporation
Commission, the Corporation Commissioner defendants and the Corporation Commissioner officer defendants were negligent in performing their
statutory duties. Specifically, the defendants failed to make a yearly examination of the associations or failed to do so in accordance with the
standards required by law."8 Furthermore, the defendants failed to properly
supervise and regulate the affairs and records of the associations and
permitted them to continue to issue investment certificates when the associations were in violation of the law."'
Count IV asserted that the State of Arizona, the Arizona Department
of Insurance, the Insurance Director and the Insurance Department officer
defendants were negligent or reckless in supervising the affairs of Omaha. This
count also asserted that the defendants aided and abetted the associations in
defrauding the plaintiffs. Specifically, the defendants failed to examine the
affairs of Omaha in the manner and within the time presented by law, and
the examinations that were conducted were negligently or recklessly performed." Furthermore, the defendants were charged with violating their
statutory duties when they renewed Omaha's certificate of authority and
for failing to disclose that Omaha did not have sufficient assets to
insure payments of its insured obligations." Finally, Count IV alleged that
id.
ARIz. REv. STAT. §§ 44-2041 to -2065, repealed by 1976 Ariz. Sess. Laws 455.
76 123 Ariz. at 328, 599 P.2d at 781.
7T Id. at 329, 599 P.2d at 782.
78 Id.
74

75

a Id.
$0 Id.
gi Id.
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the Insurance Director defendants and the Insurance Department officer
defendants willfully and knowingly acted in disregard of their statutory
duties.82
Count V alleged that the surety defendants were jointly and severally
liable upon their official bonds for the allegations made in Counts I through
IV.83
The trial court denied defendants' motion to dismiss.8" The Arizona
Supreme Court took jurisdiction of defendants appeal in a special action, 5
reversing in part the trial court's action.
2.

Duty Question
The court noted that Counts I and II charged the defendants with
fraud and aiding and abetting the associations in perpetrating a fraud.
It was not alleged by the plaintiffs that these violations negligently occurred.
With this in mind, the court turned to the concept of sovereign immunity for
tort liability and determined that the "public duty defense" discussed in
Massengill v. Yuma County" was inapplicable.
Count III, which alleged that the Arizona Corporation Commission
and its agents and employees were negligent in the performance of their
statutory duties, did involve a duty question. Thus, the defendants asserted that the duty imposed upon state agencies and public officials is
one owed to the public generally, and a breach of this duty does not provide an individual with a cause of action.8
The Arizona Supreme Court had previously discarded the concept
of sovereign immunity for tort liability.88 Nevertheless, the plaintiff must
still show all the elements of negligence to support a cause of action. Therefore there must be a duty owed to the individual plaintiff.8" The court in
Massengill held that the duty imposed upon governmental agencies and
public officers is ordinarily a duty owed to the public and not the individual." However, the Massengill court noted that an obligation owing to the
82

Id.

$aId.
a4 id.
85

ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN., Rules of Procedure for Special Actions, rule 1 (1972).

104 Ariz. 518, 456 P.2d 376 (1969). The court in Massengill held that if the duty imposed upon governmental agencies and public officers is a duty to the public, inadequate
performance is a public, not a private, wrong. Id. at 522, 456 P.2d at 380. Therefore, a
negligence action for breach of a public duty is doomed to failure since the plaintiff cannot
show a duty owed to him. Since Counts I & II in Superior Court did not allege negligence
this defense was unavailable to defendants. The issue on appeal only was whether the
complaint stated a claim upon which relief could be granted. Therefore, the supreme court
affirmed the lower court's denial of defendant's motion to dismiss as to Counts I and II.
87 123 Ariz. at 332, 599 P.2d at 785.
98 Stone v. Ariiona Highway Commission, 93 Ariz. 384, 381 P.2d 107 (1963).
89 123 Ariz. at 332, 599 P.2d at 785.
0 104 Ariz. at 522, 456 P.2d at 380.
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general public sometimes can be narrowed into a specific duty to an individual. Citing Veach v. City of Phoenix,"' the court illustrated this concept:
[A] municipality has no absolute duty to provide water for fire protection purposes to its inhabitants. But, when a city assumes the responsibility of furnishing fire protection then it has the duty of giving
each person or property owner such reasonable protection as others
within a similar area within the municipality are accorded under like
circumstances.92
The court next noted that a duty to the individual may also exist when
the governmental agency is itself the active tortfeasor. For example, if the
State of Arizona is building highways, it has a duty to the individual driver
to build safe highways,9 3 properly maintain its streets,9 4 and to remove from
its land that create a dangerous situation.9"
In the case at bar, the court did not find that the defendants were active
tortfeasors within the examples above. It did find however, that the statutory
language of Article 17 narrowed the duty of the Corporation Commission
into one requiring it to protect the injured depositors. 6
In short, the court held that Article 17 provided a detailed list of requirements with which all Arizona thrift associations were required to comply.
It gave the Corporation Commission and the Director of Securities comprehensive powers, which were designed to foster the supervision of the thrift
associations;-. it required the Commission to examine the affairs and records
of each thrift association once a year; 8 and it allowed the Commission
to suspend a thrift association's registration for any violation of Article
17." Finally, the Director of Securities was empowered to conduct further
investigations. 1 0
The court held that the duties of the Corporation Commission are of
an enforcement nature, thus, the Commission's obligations are more specific
and narrow than the general enforcement duties of a police officer." 1
Whereas, the duty of the police officer is to protect the public in general,
Article 17 clearly states that the Corporation Commission's duty is to protect
the depositors of the thrift associations.'
Furthermore, whereas a police

91 102
92

Ariz. 195, 427 P.2d 335 (1967).
Id. at 197, 427 P.2d at 337.

03 123 Ariz. at 332, 599 P.2d at 785.
9
4 Vegodsky v. City of Tucson, 1 Ariz. App. 102, 399 P.2d 723 (1965).
05 City of Phoenix v. Whiting, 10 Ariz. App. 189, 457 P.2d 729 (1969).

9123 Ariz. at 332, 599 P.2d at 785.
0ild.

98 Aaz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 44-2064 (repealed 1976).
99
d. § 44-2047 (repealed 1976).
20 0 Id. § 44-2044 (repealed 1976).
101 123 Ariz. at 333, 599 P.2d at 786.
L02 Id. at 332, 599 P.2d at 785, 786.
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officer's duties require the performance of a wide scope of diversified acts,
the duties of the Commission are very specific as enumerated in the statute.
The court noted that to hold that Article 17 does not create a duty that
extends from the Corporation Commission to the individual depositor
"would be to render the article meaningless. 10 3
The court next turned to the decision in Tcherepnin v. Franz0 and
compared the Arizona statute with that in Illinois. The court noted that the
Tcherepnin court held that references in the Illinois Savings and Loan Act
to the protection of "the association" indicated that the association and,
more specifically, its depositors had a vested right in the duties of the Department of Financial Institutions. 3 The court then detemined that even
though the specific language of the Illinois statute does not appear in the
Arizona counterpart, the comprehensive nature of Article 17 and the
specificity of the duties that it imposes indicated that the reasoning applied
in Tcherepnin was applicable.'"
The defendants argued that the early Arizona cases did not find that
the duty of a governmental agency or a public official extended to a private
individual. However, the court emphasized that these early cases did not
"fully consider" the distinction between public and private duty, that these
distinctions could only be made on a case by case basis, and that in the
case at bar the public duty had been created by statutory language that
was designed to protect a particular class of persons rather than the public
as a whole. 07
The court concluded its discussion of Count m by ruling that the individual Corporation Commissioners and the Director of Securities could
not be held liable for the negligence of their subordinates in the absence of
misfeasance or actual negligence on their part. 0 Furthermore, the court noted
that if the complaint against the individual Corporation Commissioner defendants was refiled to allege negligent hiring practices, a financial inability to
hire a sufficient number of skilled persons could operate as a defense to the liability of the individual commissioners." However, the court stated such
a defense would not circumvent the liability of the State of Arizona. 1 When
the state imposes duties upon its agencies and employees, it must provide
adequate resources for the implementation of those duties."" In ending, the
103 Id. at 333, 599 P.2d at 786.
104 See supra section A.

105 123 Ariz. at 333, 599 P.2d at 786.

10 Id.
101 Id.
108 Id.
109 Id. at 334, 599 P.2d at 787.
01o Id.
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court stated that the state was also responsible for the torts committed by its
agents and employees while acting within the scope of their authority."' 2
C.

Ohio
1. Supervision of Building and Loan Associations
The statutory framework set out in chapter 1155 of the Ohio Revised
Code, which describes the powers and duties of the superintendent of building and loan associations, is very similar to the statutes set forth in Illinois
and Arizona.
In essence the duties and functions of the superintendent include the
authority to issue cease and desist orders with regard to unauthorized loans,
investments and practices and insure that the laws relating to building and
loan associations and deposit guaranty associations are executed and enforced."'
Furthermore, the Ohio Revised Code gives the examiners, appointed
by the superintendent, access to all books, papers, securities, monies and
other property of an association under examination" and requires the office
of the superintendent of building and loan associations to make an examination into the affairs of each building and loan in the state at least once
each year.115 In addition, the superintendent may, whenever he deems it necessary, conduct a special examination of any building and loan association.'16
The Code also requires the superintendent to keep and preserve a
record of his proceedings, including a concise statement of each association
examined by him, and make an annual report to the Governor of the general conduct and condition of building and loan associations doing business in the state.'" To supplement this report, the superintendent is required to make any suggestions he deems proper."8
Finally, the superintendent's report must include such information
from the statements required of the associations as the superintendent deems
The supreme court ordered those allegations in Count M that related to the individual
defendants dismissed, with leave to amend. The denial of defendant's motion to dismiss as
to the rest of Count III was affirmed. As to Count IV, the court ruled that the statutes defining the obligations and powers of Department of Insurance and the Insurance Director,
ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-201 to -230 (1975), were similar in scope to Article 17. 123
Ariz. at 334, 559 P.2d at 787. Therefore, the denial of the motion to dismiss as to that
portion alleging negligence was affirmed. Likewise, the denial of the motion to dismiss as
to that part of Count IV which alleged fraud was affirmed. See supra, note 86. Those
allegations in Count V arising out of the dismissed portions of Count M were likewise
dismissed; the remainder were reaffirmed.
11sOmio REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1155.01-.02 (Page Supp. 1981).
1'4 Id. § 1155.11 (Page 1968).
11 5 d. § 1155.09 (Page 1968).
1161d. § 1155.10 (Page Supp. 1981).
117Id. § 1155.14 (Page 1968),
I's Id.
112
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necessary, a statement of the associations whose business has been closed
during the year, the amounts of their assets and liabilities, and the amounts
paid to their creditors."1
In a further effort to keep the superintendent abreast of the financial
condition of the associations within the state, each association is required
to make a report in writing of its affairs twice per year. 20 This report must
include the financial condition of the association for the preceding half
year.' Each association is required to establish and maintain a loss reserve
and other net worth accounts adequate to assure solvency of the associ2
ation.1 1

The association must maintain reserve accounts with a minimum balance of five percent of the association's aggregate savings account balances
as of the date of the association's twentieth anniversary of its incorporation
and thereafter or the average of the aggregate of such date and the one
to four consecutive closing dates immediately preceding such date. 2

During the first twenty years of the association's operation, the superintendent must issue regulations providing a uniform schedule of minimum
levels to be reached."' The superintendent may permit an association to
cure a deficiency in its reserve account by requiring the association's directors to earmark pledged savings accounts, capital stock, contributed surplus,

or undivided profits as part of its reserve account in such amounts as needed
to cure the deficiency. 2 5 However, no association may pay dividends or
interest from the reserve account or other funds for the purpose of meeting
the reserve account requirement. 2
In the alternative, each association may at its annual closing date
calculate its total of net worth accounts by application of schedule of percentages applied to the several categories of assets in which the association
has invested its funds. 2 The superintendent must issue a rule providing
for the uniform schedule of percentages which shall be used for the computation purposes.""
If upon examination the superintendent finds that the affairs of a
domestic building and loan association are in an unsound or unsafe condition, that it is conducting its business in whole or in substantial part con119 Id.
1201d. § 1155.07 (Page Supp. 1981).
1221Id.
1221d.

§ 1151.33 (Page Supp. 1981).

Id. § 1151.33 (A).
124 ld.
125 d.
123

12e Id.
127 Id. § 1151.33(B).
1281d.
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trary to law, that it is failing to comply with the law, or that its affairs are
not being conducted for the best interests of its depositors, shareholders,
or creditors, he may take possession of the business and property of such
association. 2
In sum, the comprehensive powers granted to the superintendent of
building and loan associations are designed to enable him to supervise
the affairs of savings and loan institutions within the State of Ohio and,
thus, insure that every association is being conducted in accordance with
the provisions of the Ohio Revised Code.
2. Ohio Court of Claims Act"10
Section 1155.19 of the Ohio Revised Code provides:
Neither the superintendent of building and loan associations nor
any employee of the division of building and loan associations shall be
liable in any civil, criminal or administrative proceedings for any
mistake in judgment or discretion in any action taken, or any omission
made by him in good faith.1"'
This section clarifies many of the problems raised in Tcherepnin and
Superior Court."' The superintendent and his employees cannot be held
liable for negligent supervision of an insolvent savings and loan association
in Ohio. This section, however, does not answer the question of whether
the state can be held liable. This question can only be answered by examining the Ohio Court of Claims Act and the cases decided thereunder.
The liability clause of the Ohio Court of Claims Act reads in part:
"The state hereby waives its immunity from liability and consents to be
sued and have its liability determined ...in accordance with the rules of
law applicable to suits between private parties." '3 Thus, the Act does not
create new causes of action. The phrase "rules of law applicable to suits
between private parties," is troublesome because "private parties do not
ordinarily operate prisons, confine the mentally ill, or provide for the
public welfare through licensing and regulation of business."'3 4 Specifically,
two questions are raised in regard to the activities of the superintendent of
buildings and loan associations. First of all, does the fact that there is no
comparable private activity, i.e., no rules relating to suits between private
parties, mean that the state has not waived immunity from liability for
the negligent performance of these activities? Secondly, does the fact that
1"Id. § 1157.01 (Page Supp. 1981).
1A0d. ch. 2743 (Page Supp. 1981).
131 1d. § 1155.19 (Page Supp. 1981).
132 See supra sections A & B.
183 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.02 (Page Supp. 1981).
134 Wilkins, Tort Claims Against the State: Comparative and Categorical Analysis of the Ohio
Court of Claims Act and Interpretations of the Act in Tort Litigation Against the State,
28 Ctmv. ST. L. REV. 149, 209 (1979).
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some of the superintendent's activities are discretionary provide immunity
for the state under the so-called "discretionary function immunity" exception?"3 5
The leading case on the relevant aspects of the Ohio Court of Claims
Act is Devoe v. State." Devoe involved a claim against the state that the
Division of Securities was negligent because it had been informed of certain fraudulent activities, yet failed to deny registration of the securities.
The court dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and
failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted."' One reason
for dismissing the action was that the court found that there was no analogous activity in the private sector from which "rules of law applicable to
suits between private parties" could be ascertained. "Therefore, since there
could be no private party liability, rules of law could not be extracted from
private parties' activities to cover the conduct complained of by plaintiffs,
and no action could be maintained."", In adopting this point, the court
cited Feres v. United States.3 " In Feres, the United States Supreme Court
similarly interpreted a phrase in the Federal Tort Claims Act,1 0 dismissing an action against the United States because it could not find a
private counterpart to the governmental activity complained of. The Feres

holding was limited by subsequent decisions'

and has been severely criti-

cized as limiting the scope of governmental liability too severely." '2 Despite
these criticisms, the "private counterpart doctrine" remains a part of Ohio

law., ' 3 Thus it is also a possible means for the State of Ohio to avoid
id.at 195-200, 208-09, 246-48.
No. 75-0105 (Ohio Ct. Cl. June 18, 1975), affd, 48 Ohio App. 2d 311, 357 N.E.2d 397
(1975).
137 ld. slip op. at 21. See Wilkins, supra note 134, at 206.
138 Wilkins, supra note 134, at 209.
1- 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
14028 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-80 (1976). The U.S. Supreme Court read the words of 28
135See
136

U.S.C. § 2674, "the United States shall be liable . . . in the same manner . . . as a private

individual under like circumstances" . . . to be "under the same circumstances." Wilkins,
supra note 134, at 193.
"'2 See Indian Towing, Inc. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955).
142Wilkins, supra note 134, at 211.
143 Wilkins suggests that the unworkability of this doctrine is evidenced by its inconsistent
application in the courts:
The Ohio courts have adhered to the no private counterpart test despite inconsistent
applications of the concept which demonstrate its unworkability. For example, private
parties are not responsible for the construction and maintenance of highways, the
validation of certificates of incorporation, the conferral of motor vehicle operational
licenses, or the custody and control of criminal offenders, and yet the Ohio courts
have found governmental liability in each instance. To proclaim that certain activities
are uniquely governmental is to state the obvious. All governmental activities are in
one sense or another unique. The provision of the Court of Claims Act that states that
liability should be determined by reference to rules of law applicable in private lawsuits
should not be viewed as a limitation upon the waiver of immunity, but rather as
an opportunity by the Ohio courts to provide a remedy to persons injured by governmental activity within the controls traditionally imposed by principles of decisions in
our well-developed common law tort compensation system. The Ohio courts should
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liability for the negligent supervision of a savings and loan, since clearly,
there is no private counterpart to the duties of the superintendent.
A second approach would be for the state to avoid liability by claiming that it is immune because the statutory duties of the superintendent are
discretionary in nature. Although the Court of Claims Act contains no
provision exempting discretionary functions from liability, the court of
claims has read this exception into the Act by judicial gloss, apparently
relying on the discretionary function exception in the Federal Tort Claims
Act.' The initial question, of course, is what is meant by the phrase "discretionary function."
The court of claims has taken a very simplistic approach to this
question. In Devoe, the court found the activities of the Department of
Securities to be discretionary simply because the statute authorizing the
regulatory activity contained directory, as opposed to mandatory language.
In Results, Inc. v. Secretary of State,' the court, although reaching the
opposite result, adopted the same approach. In Results, Inc., the court held
that the state could be liable for the Secretary of State's issuance of a certificate
of incorporation to a corporation using a corporate name already assigned,
since the language of the enabling statute contained mandatory, and no
directory language. Thus, it seems that in Ohio, the question of whether governmental activity is discretionary is determined solely by whether the
'' 6
statute uses the word "may" or "shall."
If the duties of the superintendent are analyzed under this approach,
it seems unlikely that an individual could successfully maintain an action
against the state for negligent supervision of an insolvent savings and loan.
Although the statute contains some mandatory language,"4 the sections
providing for the superintendent to take possession of insolvent associations
contain directory language.'4 s Thus, the court probably would conclude
that the duties of the superintendent are discretionary, and hold the state immune from liability for the negligent performance of these duties.
The simplistic approach of the court of claims has been criticized as
abandon the no private counterpart test as an inaccurate and unwarranted interpretation of the Court of Claims Act.
Wilkins, supra note 134, at 246. See, eg., Adomov v. State, 46 Ohio Misc. 1, 345 N.E.2d
661 (Ct. C1. 1975) (custody of juvenile offenders); Results, Inc. v. Secretary of State, No.
75-0295 AD (Ohio Ct. Cl. July 30, 1975) (issuance of certificates of incorporation); Denis
v. Department of Transp., No. 75-0287 AD (Ohio Ct. CL Feb. 27, 1976) (maintenance of
highways).
14428 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1976) states that the Act shall have no application to "[any
claim based upon . . . the performance or failure to . . .perform a discretionary function
.. . [by government employees], whether or not the discretion is abused."
L45
No. 75-0295 AD (Ohio Ct. Cl. July 30, 1975).
146 Wilkins, supra note 134, at 216.
147 See, e.g., Omo Rnv. CODE ANN.
§§ 1155.01, 1155.14 (Page 1968 & Supp. 1981).
148Id. § 1157.01 (Page Supp. 1981).
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ignoring the reason for the discretionary function exception.", One commentator suggests that the court's approach is the result of the confusion
of two separate questions: whether the duties of the government official
are discretionary and whether the activities impose a duty upon the official
to the particular plaintiff.5 0 He suggests that when the court of claims
holds that the activity is discretionary, it means that "the ability to exercise discretion removes any duty to anyone."'' To cure this confusion,
he suggests a two-pronged analysis of the discretionary function exception.
The first step would be to determine whether the activity is in fact the type
of discretionary activity which should be excepted. The suggested approach
is the policy-formulation test of Downs v. United States." 2 Downs held that
Congress, in enacting the discretionary function exception to the Federal
Tort Claims Act,"' intended to put beyond the scope of judicial review,
discretionary functions directed to the formulation of governmental policy,
such as decisions representing an administrator's exercise of quasi-legislative
or quasi-judicial functions.?'5 Activities which implement policy, although
discretionary in nature, do not fall within this exception. Once it is determined, however, that a particular activity does not fall within the discretionary function exception, liability is not automatically established. The
plaintiff must still show that particular activity imposes a duty to him individually. In other words, the plaintiff must still establish the traditional
elements of a cause of action in negligence. " '
The application of this approach to a fact pattern similar to those in
Tcherpnin and Superior Court would most likely have had the same result
as in those cases. The duties of the superintendent to supervise insolvent
savings and loan associations do not fall within the policy-formulation definition of discretionary functions. If the provisions of the Ohio Revised Code
can be shown to establish a duty that runs to the depositors (or shareholders) of a savings and loan, then liability of the state can be established.'"
149 Wilkins, supra note 134, at 211-12.
IN Id. at 211.
151 Id.
(6th Cir. 1975).
152 522 F.2d 990
253 28 U.S.C. 2680(a) (1976).
154 522 F.2d at 997-98.
'55 Wilkins, supra note 134, at 247. Those Ohio courts which dealt with the question of
duty have been reluctant to find liability. See, e.g., Baer v. United States, 511 F. Supp. 94
(N.D. Ohio 1980); Mercer v. United States, 400 F. Supp. 329 (S.D. Ohio 1978); City of
Oregon v. Ferguson 57 Ohio App. 2d 95, 385 N.E.2d 1084 (1978); Shelton v. Industrial
Comm'n, 51 Ohio App. 2d 125, 367 N.E.2d 51 (1976).
'5" Ohio courts have generally held that statutes requiring state agencies to inspect and
enforce safety standards were enacted to protect the public in general against unsafe conditions. They were not intended "nor should they be construed to create a duty toward any
particular person." Shelton v. Industrial Comm'n, 51 Ohio App. 2d 125, 127, 367 N.E.2d
51, 53-54 (1976). See also City of Oregon v. Ferguson, 57 Ohio App. 2d 95, 385 N.E.2d
1084 (1978); Smith v. Wait, 46 Ohio App. 2d 281, 340 N.E.2d 431 (1975). In Shelton, the
court held that only where inspections are conducted pursuant to a contractual agreement
will there be liability for negligence. 51 Ohio App. 2d at 127, 367 N.E.2d at 53.
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The holdings of Tcherepnin and Superior Court, that the similar statutory
schemes of Illinois and Arizona, respectively, do establish such a duty, might
be persuasive in this regard. Nevertheless, the precedent from the court of
claims indicates that depositors of an insolvent savings and loan association
face an uphill battle in attempting to recover from the state. Other means
of recovery, however, might be available.
D.

OtherAlternatives of Recovery
An alternative means of establishing the duty of the State of Ohio is
to look to sections 323, 324A and 552 (3) of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts. Section 323 provides that one who undertakes to render services to
another is liable if the failure to exercise due care increases risk of harm or
harm is suffered because of induced reliance.15 ' Section 324A states that one
who undertakes to render services to another is liable for injury to a third person resulting from negligence if failure to use due care actually increased
the harm, induced reliance resulting in the harm, or discharged a prior
duty that another party owed to the plaintiff. 5 ' Sections 323 and 324A are
commonly referred to as the "good Samaritan doctrine." This doctrine
recognizes the common law tort of negligence when an individual, without
a duty to act, nevertheless undertakes an act and performs it without due
care. 1' The doctrine applies to inspections of private activities or property
by government agents, notwithstanding regulations or statutes requiring
the inspection. 6 '
The plaintiffs in Zabala Clemente v. United States'6 ' attempted to
sue the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act by asserting sections 323 and 324A. The plaintiffs alleged that employees of the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) negligently failed to warn passengers
that the aircraft was overweight and lacked a proper flight crew. The lower
court held for the plaintiffs on the issue of negligence.' However, on appeal, the court reversed the decision holding that there was no statutory
duty to warn the plaintiffs and sections 323 and 324(A) did not apply
because the failure to inspect the aircraft did not add to the risk of an injury to the passengers and there was no evidence that anyone relied on an
order issued by the director of the F.A.A. ordering surveillance of turbined
powered aircraft.'

187 RrTATEMENT (SEcOND)

158 Id.

OF TORTS

§ 323 (1965).

§ 324A.

251W. PRossER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 56 at 343-48 (4th ed. 1971).
'e Note, Government Liability for Negligent Inspection of Aircraft, 15 SUFFOLX L REv.
158, 162 (1981).
1el 567 F.2d 1140 (1st Cir. 1977).
162

163

422 F. Supp. 564 (D.P.R. 1976).
567 F.2d at 1145.
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4 the plaintiffs had more success in asIn Blessing v. United States6'
serting sections 323 and 324A to attach liability to the United States under
the Federal Tort Claims Act. The plaintiffs based their claim on negligent inspections of their private employer's premises by Occupational Safety and
Health Administration inspectors. The plaintiffs contended that, having undertaken to make particular inspections pursuant to OSHA, the government
assumed a duty to the plaintiffs not to conduct those inspections negligently.

The court noted that the good Samaritan doctrine was recognized by
the Pennsylvania courts.1 65 However, Pennsylvania law dictates that when
an inspector is not under an enforceable legal or contractual duty to inspect
the employer's premises, the employee can recover for a negligently performed inspection only where the inspector has physically undertaken to
inspect the specific instrumentality causing the injury or the entire physical
plant of which the specific instrumentality is part.1 6 The court, therefore,
held that the plaintiffs' pleadings did not satisfy the essential requirements
of the good Samaritan doctrine in Pennsylvania.', However, the court
did find that the pleadings were minimally sufficient to state a claim under
the Federal Tort Claims Act against the United States and allowed the
plaintiffs to amend their complaint to state a cause of action under the
good Samaritan doctrine. 6"
Sections 323 and 324A were relied on in Illinois in Greene v. City of
Chicago.' The plaintiff in Greene alleged that the city was negligent in
failing to maintain the street lighting, which he contended was the proximate
cause of his being struck by another automobile. The court held that the
municipality voluntarily provided street lighting and was therefore liable
for its negligence in the maintenance of such lighting.7 0
The good Samaritan doctrine has not been adopted in Ohio, but the
court in Mercer v. United States,' considered the claims of the plaintiffs for negligent inspection by federal employees pursuant to the Federal
Mine Safety Act. In Mercer the court stated that the rendering of services
"to another," as does not encompass an inspection made pursuant to a
statute. The court determined that responsibilities imposed on an inspector
acting pursuant to statutory authority are "altogether different" than respon164 447 F. Supp. 1160 (E.D. Penn. 1978).
165 Id. at 1187. The court looked to Pennsylvania law because whether the United States is

subject to liability under the Federal Tort Claims Act depends on whether a cause of

action exists where the alleged tort occurred. Id.
166 Id. at 1188.
187 Id. at 1197.
113Id. at 1200.
26948 1l. App. 3d 502, 363 N.E.2d 378, af'd, 73 IMl.
2d 100, 382 N.E.2d 1205 (1978).
170 Id. at 508, 363 N.E.24 at 389.
171460 F. Supp. 329 (S.D..Ohio 1978).
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sibilities imposed by contract.' 7 2 However, the court's statement seems to
be directly in contrast to Professor Prosser's notion that "the good Samaritan doctrine applies to inspections of private activities or property by government agents, notwithstanding federal regulations or statutes requiring
the inspection. '7
Furthermore, one could argue the Pennsylvania view; that absent a
contractual duty to inspect, the plaintiff could still recover for a negligently
performed inspection if the inspector has physically undertaken to inspect
the specific instrumentality or the entire entity of which the specific instrumentality is a part and if the element of reliance was present."'
Another alternative to establish the state's liability is section 552(3)
the Restatement (Second) of Torts. " 5 Section 552(3) provides that the
liability of one who is under a public duty to give the information extends
to loss suffered by any of the class of persons for whose benefit the duty
is created in any of the transactions in which it is intended to protect them.
Furthermore, the comment to section 552(3) states that when there
is a public duty to supply the information in question, the maker of the
negligent misrepresentation becomes subject to liability to any of the class
of persons for whose benefit the duty is created and for their pecuniary
losses suffered in any of the general type of transactions in which they are
intended to be protected.'
With the prevalence of the Restatement view, " the oft-cited rule of
Ultramares Corp. v. Touche"I has been weakened. In Ultramares, Judge B.
Cardozo refused to hold accountants liable to third persons who relied
upon financial statements prepared by the defendants when the defendants had prepared the statements primarily for the benefit of their client
and only incidentally for the benefit of third persons." 9 Only if the malpractice amounted to fraud would the accountants be liable to third parties.
However, in the case of simple negligence no liability would attach because
the prospective liability was too great. 80
While Ohio still seems to follow the view in Ultramares,'8' the trend,
172 Id. at 332. See Blessing v. United States, 447 F. Supp. at 1188.

W. PROSsER, supra note 159, § 56 at 345.
See supra text accompanying note 166.
175 RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 552(3) (1965).
176 ld. comment K.
1M7 See Prosser, Misrepresentation and Third Persons, 19 VAND. L. REv. 229 (1966); Com173
174

ment, Accountants' Liability to Third Parties for Negligent Misrepresentation,53 MINN. L.

REv. 1375 (1969); Note, Accountants' Liability to Third Partiesfor an Audit, 52 MARQ. L.
REv. 158 (1968).
178255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
279 Id. at 179, 174 N.E. at 444.
130 Id.
181 See Beardsley v. Ernst, 47 Ohio App. 241, 191 N.E. 808 (1934).
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as noted earlier is contrary.182 With this trend in mind, it could be argued
that when the superintendent of building and loan associations, in the performance of his official duties, negligently certifies a building and loan as
being in good standing, he becomes subject to liability to any shareholder or
depositor who suffered pecuniary losses in reliance on that representation.
The key language in section 552(3) states that the negligent misstater
is liable only to a group of people he intends to reach or knows that the
recipient (the examined building and loan) intends to reach. Therefore,
since the superintendent has an absolute duty to see that the laws relating
to building and loan associations are executed and enforced, he is liable
to the building and loan association and its depositors and shareholders
when he allows a building and loan association to operate in contravention
of the statutory regulations.
Conclusion
In Illinois and Arizona where the state was held liable for negligent
supervision of a savings and loan association, the courts looked to the statutory framework. In doing so, the courts found that the duties prescribed
by the statutes were of an enforcement nature and very specific. Furthermore, the courts noted that the purpose of the legislation was to protect
the individual depositors of the associations.

E.

The statutory scheme in Ohio is very similar to the statutes in Illinois
and Arizona. The case law in Ohio, however, dictates that a duty prescribed by statute is owed only to the public-at-large and not to the individual depositor or shareholder. This type of thinking not only renders
the regulations in Ohio's scheme for its building and loans meaningless,
but also serves to destroy the people's confidence in the state's supervisory
ability.
The Restatement views, therefore, become necessary alternatives for
recovery against the state, despite the fact that they seldom have been
recognized in Ohio as a means of recovery.
The possibility that the state might become an insurer and its coffers
may become accessible for every negligent act by the sovereign or one
of its agents is not a well founded reason for protecting the state. To allow
the shareholders and depositors of Ohio's building and loan associations
to bear the losses effectuated by the state's negligence would be to render
the statutes meaningless.

282 See Rush Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85 (D.R.I. 1968).
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